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ABSTRACT
A GRAPH-BASED, SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR DETECTING
VIOLENT EXTREMIST RADICALIZATION TRAJECTORIES
AND OTHER LATENT BEHAVIORS
The number and lethality of violent extremist plots motivated by the Salafi-jihadist ide-
ology have been growing for nearly the last decade in both the U.S and Western Europe.
While detecting the radicalization of violent extremists is a key component in preventing fu-
ture terrorist attacks, it remains a significant challenge to law enforcement due to the issues
of both scale and dynamics. Recent terrorist attack successes highlight the real possibility
of missed signals from, or continued radicalization by, individuals whom the authorities had
formerly investigated and even interviewed. Additionally, beyond considering just the behav-
ioral dynamics of a person of interest is the need for investigators to consider the behaviors
and activities of social ties vis-á-vis the person of interest. We undertake a fundamentally
systems approach in addressing these challenges by investigating the need and feasibility of
a radicalization detection system, a risk assessment assistance technology for law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies. The proposed system first mines public data and government
databases for individuals who exhibit risk indicators for extremist violence, and then enables
law enforcement to monitor those individuals at the scope and scale that is lawful, and ac-
count for the dynamic indicative behaviors of the individuals and their associates rigorously
and automatically. In this thesis, we first identify the operational deficiencies in efforts by
current law enforcement and intelligence agencies, investigate the environmental conditions
and stakeholders most salient to the development and operation of the proposed system, and
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address both programmatic and technical risks with several initial mitigating strategies. We
codify this large effort into a radicalization detection system framework.
The main thrust of this effort is the investigation of the technological opportunities for the
identification of individuals matching a radicalization pattern of behaviors in the proposed
radicalization detection system. We frame our technical approach as a unique dynamic
graph pattern matching problem, and develop a technology called INSiGHT (Investigative
Search for Graph-Trajectories) to help identify individuals or small groups with conforming
subgraphs to a radicalization query pattern, and follow the match trajectories over time.
INSiGHT is aimed at assisting law enforcement and intelligence agencies in monitoring and
screening for those individuals whose behaviors indicate a significant risk for violence, and
allow for the better prioritization of limited investigative resources. We demonstrated the
performance of INSiGHT on a variety of datasets, to include small synthetic radicalization-
specific data sets, a real behavioral dataset of time-stamped radicalization indicators of recent
U.S. violent extremists, and a large, real-world BlogCatalog dataset serving as a proxy for
the type of intelligence or law enforcement data networks that could be utilized to track the
radicalization of violent extremists.
We also extended INSiGHT by developing a non-combinatorial neighbor matching tech-
nique to enable analysts to maintain visibility of potential collective threats and conspiracies
and account for the role close social ties have in an individual’s radicalization. This enhance-
ment was validated on small, synthetic radicalization-specific datasets as well as the large
BlogCatalog dataset with real social network connections and tagging behaviors for over
80K accounts. The results showed that our algorithm returned whole and partial subgraph
iii
matches that enabled analysts to gain and maintain visibility on neighbors’ activities. Over-
all, INSiGHT led to consistent, informed, and reliable assessments about those who pose a
significant risk for some latent behavior in a variety of settings. Based upon these results,
we maintain that INSiGHT is a feasible and useful supporting technology with the potential
to optimize law enforcement investigative efforts and ultimately enable the prevention of
individuals from carrying out extremist violence.
Although the prime motivation of this research is the detection of violent extremist
radicalization, we found that INSiGHT is applicable in detecting latent behaviors in other
domains such as on-line student assessment and consumer analytics. This utility was demon-
strated through experiments with real data. For on-line student assessment, we tested IN-
SiGHT on a MOOC dataset of students and time-stamped on-line course activities to predict
those students who persisted in the course. For consumer analytics, we tested the perfor-
mance on a real, large proprietary consumer activities dataset from a home improvement
retailer. Lastly, motivated by the desire to validate INSiGHT as a screening technology
when ground truth is known, we developed a synthetic data generator of large population,
time-stamped, individual-level consumer activities data consistent with an a priori project
set designation (latent behavior). This contribution also sets the stage for future work in
developing an analogous synthetic data generator for radicalization indicators to serve as a
testbed for INSiGHT and other data mining algorithms.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am profoundly grateful to many people for the role they played in my life and academic
journey. I have been blessed with tremendous teachers and mentors throughout middle school
and high school, at the United States Military Academy, at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and now at Colorado State University.
Special thanks go to Dr. Stephan Kolitz and Professor Asuman Ozdaglar for their instruc-
tion and mentorship during my first graduate research endeavor. I will always be grateful
for their kindness, patience, and generosity with their time.
I am deeply indebted to Professor Jayasumana for taking me on as a student, especially
knowing that it was going to be through part-time distance initially, and for the confidence
he had in me in supporting my transition to complete the program on a full-time basis over
a very short period authorized by the U.S. Army. I am, of course, indebted to him for his
mentorship and advisorship throughout this research effort. I am also tremendously grateful
to my committee members, Professors Chong, Ray, and Sega for their invaluable support,
belief in our work, and their guidance along the way.
I would also like to give thanks to Dr. Vidarshana Bandara, my advisor’s former student,
for the countless hours he assisted me in learning Big Data processing techniques and in
reviewing my work. Throughout this research period, I have also benefited tremendously
from the scholarship of and collaboration with Professor Klausen at Brandeis University and
the lifetime of study she has in terrorism and intergroup conflict.
None of this would have been possible without the love and support from my family
including my parents Frank and Vera, my brothers Andrew and Eric, and my in-laws John
v
and Ann, particularly for their generous hospitality in Colorado for the last 18 months. To
my incredible children Nathanael, Stephen, and Anna, thank you for making me smile and
laugh and for putting up with my absences during the many hours I was undertaking this
important work. Lastly, to my darling wife Elizabeth, your love and support has meant
everything and enabled everything. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.
I am grateful to my Lord and Savior who has blessed us with every good gift and given
me the strength and perseverance to complete this work.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
LIST OF FIGURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xxvi
Chapter 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Challenges and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Research Purpose and Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Solution Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4. Contributions and Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5. Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Chapter 2. A Primer on the Violent Extremist Threat and Radicalization Processes . . 18
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2. Growing Threat from Violent Extremism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3. Strategies to Counter the Threat from Violent Extremists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4. Radicalization Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5. System Studies of Operational Level Research and Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.6. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Chapter 3. A Radicalization Detection System Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
vii
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2. Operational Deficiencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3. A Radicalization Detection System Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4. Environmental Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5. Technology Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6. Identify Stakeholders and Their Initial Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7. Identify Risk Factors and Initial Risk Management Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.8. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Chapter 4. Investigative Graph Search- A Technical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2. Investigative Graph Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3. Categorical Node Labeling for Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.4. Investigative Simulation- Static Graph Pattern Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.5. Discussion of the Technical Approach Over Other Possible Approaches . . . . . . . . 104
4.6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Chapter 5. INSiGHT: A Novel Dynamic Inexact Graph Pattern Matching Technique . 114
5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.3. Technical Preliminaries and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4. Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5. Results for Motivating Example Problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.6. Real Data Application: Online Blog Behavior Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.7. Enhancements to INSiGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
viii
5.8. Illustrative Applications on Synthetic Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.9. Application #1 Real Data: Radicalization Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.10. Application #2 Real Data: MOOC Persistence Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.11. Application #3 Real Data: Consumer Project Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.12. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Chapter 6. Synthetic Data Generator for Latent Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.2. Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.3. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.4. Rule-Based Purchase Activity Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.5. Example Run of the Synthetic Data Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.6. Modeling with Ground Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.7. Analysis of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
6.8. Combining Investigative Graph Search and Machine Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.9. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Chapter 7. INSiGHT with Neighbor Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
7.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
7.2. Technique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
7.3. Match Goodness Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.4. Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Chapter 8. Analyses of Dynamic Radicalization Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
8.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
ix
8.2. Dataset description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
8.3. Methodology: Modeling Radicalization as a Discrete Dynamic Process. . . . . . . . . 230
8.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Chapter 9. Conclusions and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
9.1. Further Enhancements to Radicalization Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
9.2. Incremental Graph Pattern Matching and Distributed Approaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
9.3. Expanding the Scope to Other Forms of Targeted Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
9.4. Suicide Risk Assessment in the Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
9.5. Cybersecurity Insider Threat Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Appendix A. Reference Table for Recent Violent Extremist Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
A.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
A.2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Appendix B. Case Studies of Homegrown Violent Extremism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
B.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
B.2. Case Study #1: Christopher Cornell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
B.3. Case Study #2: Sayed Farook and Tashfeen Malik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
B.4. Case Study#3: Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
B.5. Conclusions and Insights on Real-World Investigative Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Appendix C. Codebook Excerpt from Klausen’s Radicalization Trajectories Dataset . . 318
x
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 Select FFRDCs in related fields. Source: [210]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.1 Labels for investigative node-types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Summary of notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3 BlogCatalog Graph Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.1 Summary of notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.2 BlogCatalog full and subgraph characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.3 Synthetic Timestamps for BlogCatalog data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4 Summary of notations for INSiGHT enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.5 Class Node-Types and Parameter Sets 1 and 2 for Decay and Re-occurrence
Modules for Radicalization Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.6 Radicalization graph characteristics (Klausen) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.7 Klausen Radicalization Query- Class Node-Types and Parameter Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.8 Prevalence of Red Flag Indicators and the Fit in the Klausen Radicalization
Model. Source: [168]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.9 Course X content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.10 MOOC data graph characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.11 Table of terms and coefficients for a logistic regression model for MOOC
continuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.12 Customer purchases full and subgraph characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
xi
5.13 Home Renovation Project Query- Class Node-Types and Parameter Set . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.14 Minimum Support and the Resulting Size and Type of Itemsets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.15 Model fit for training set using various activity counts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.16 Model fit for test set using various activity counts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.1 Defined sets and random variables in the synthetic data generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.2 Sets and parametrization for sample run of the synthetic generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.3 Statistics of synthetically generated customers and purchases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.4 Table of project purchases by ground truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
6.5 Table of terms and coefficients for the ‘Act 2 Items’ Logistic Regression Model for
the Kitchen Project (Project 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.6 Classification confusion table upon trigger of exceeding threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.1 BlogCatalog full and subgraph characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
8.1 Data features in Klausen Radicalization Dataset. Source: [167]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
A.1 Recent Incidents of Targeted Violence with Social Media Signals (1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . 301
A.2 Recent Incidents of Targeted Violence with Social Media Signals (2 of 3) . . . . . . . . . 302
A.3 Recent Incidents of Targeted Violence with Social Media Signals (3 of 3) . . . . . . . . . 303
B.1 NMF results of term-document matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
B.2 NMF results of term-correlation matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
xii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 (a) Principle stages of the systems engineering life cycle with the expansion of
concept development phases [174]. (b) Systems Decision Process [239]. . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1 (a) Percentage of U.S. terrorist plots from jihadist ideology that were prevented or
not prevented. The (blank) categories in the dataset were mostly attributed to
U.S. individuals who successfully traveled or attempted to travel to become foreign
fighters. (b) The breakdown of plots by type over time. Data provided by [17]. . . . 21
2.2 The total number of victims (killed and wounded) by year in U.S. terrorist plots
from the jihadist ideology. Data provided by [17]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Major terrorist attacks in Western Europe from September 11, 2001 to March 23,
2017. Source: [87]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Method of prevention of U.S. terrorist plots from the jihadist ideology since 9/11.
Data provided by [17]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Method of prevention of U.S. terrorist plots from the jihadist ideology since 9/11
over time. Data provided by [17]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Percentage by year since 9/11 of violent extremists inspired by the jihadist
ideology who “maintained a social media profile with jihadist material or utilized
encryption for plotting” [17]. Source: [17]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7 Percentage of U.S. terrorist plots since 9/11 involving the charges of more than
one individual. Data source: [17]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
xiii
2.8 Histogram of the number of individuals charged in U.S. terrorist plots from the
jihadist ideology since 9/11. Data source: [17]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.9 Graphic from the GAO Report to Congressional Inquiries depicting how countering
violent extremism is different from counterterrorism. Source: [122, p. 7]. . . . . . . . . . 30
2.10 The various populations of support for terrorist groups as conceptualized by
Berger [2012]. We take the support for terrorist groups, especially with the
distinctions of “law-abiding” and “criminal” to be synonymous with violent
extremist radicalization. Source: [18]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.11 The two pyramid model of radicalization. (a) is the opinion radicalization pyramid
and (b) is the action radicalization pyramid. Source: [199] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.12 Table comparing the characteristics and antecedent behaviors of right-wing, single-
issue, and Al Qaeda-related lone-actors. Statistical analysis of 119 individuals who
were convicted or dies in the commission of their crimes in the United States and
Europe from 1990-2012. Source: [116, p. 431]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.13 Table comparing the characteristics and antecedent, network-related behaviors of
individuals who had or did not have command and control links as well as isolated
dyads. Source: [116, p. 432]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.14 The eight warning behaviors of targeted violence proposed Meloy [2012]. Graphic
created from content in [203]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.15 The conceptual framework of pre-attack activities of terrorist proposed by
Schuurman and Eijkman [2015]. Source: [271]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.16 The five stage or factor-based radicalization models analyzed in King [2011] and a
summary of the various stages or factors. Source: [164]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
xiv
2.17 Klausen’s Dynamic Risk Assessment Model showing the behavioral indicators of
state progression in radicalization trajectories [167]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.18 VERA 2 Indicators Source: [249, p. 245]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.1 San Bernardino Terrorist Attack, 2015. Behavioral indicator and association
graph of Farook, Malik, and Marquez showing the indicators and signals of
their collective radicalization and preparations for the attack, consolidated from
investigative findings [299].. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Radicalization detection system framework. This figure depicts a system for law
enforcement and intelligence analysts to detect the radicalization trajectories of
individuals using INSiGHT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3 (a) Pew Research polls in the U.S. about the concern for extremism in the name
of Islam in the U.S. Data source: [246].(b) Pew Research polls in the U.S. about
the concern for extremism in the name of Islam in the world. Source: [246]. . . . . . . 80
3.4 Graphic depicting the four main risk categories and the typical effects on each
other. Source: [130, p. 7.14]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1 (a) An example graph query of a potential homegrown violent extremist and a
fictitious data graph of 4 people with on and off-line activities. Nodes in the data
graph represent distinct entities (person or social media account) or behaviors
(posting extremist n-gram, purchasing a firearm, etc.) with the class label shown
inside the node. The letter of the label outside the node is a code for the class
and the number (if applicable) denotes the person responsible for that entity or
behavior. The query graph represents the pattern of nodes (by class) that may
xv
help identify potential homegrown violent extremists. (b) Desired matching set
that includes full and partial matches in rank order.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 Consistent with the node category definitions and examples, we label the nodes
in the example graph query pattern Q as follows: query focus (A), individually
innocuous but related activity (B,G), indicator (C, D, and E), and red flag
indicator (F). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.3 Network schema of the BlogCatalog graph. IDs own account User Ids. User Ids
author one or more Weblog Ids, and are friends with other User Ids. Weblog Ids
write about one or more tags (which are user specified). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.4 Experiment query for BlogCatalog. Query focus is for User Ids who had been
writing blogs broadly related to ‘computers’ and ‘windows’, and specifically to
Windows operating systems. In this example, we treat the tag ‘windows 7’ as a
red flag indicator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5 (a) A paired bar graph showing the exact correspondence of the top-20 query
focus nodes by match size between both InvSim and exhaustive search, where
|R(u,v) ∩ SInvSim|is the number of matching nodes in the relevant set of the query
focus node. (b): Top-4 results of investigative simulation on the BlogCatalog
dataset with the query in Fig. 4.4. The top-match is User Id ‘u65530’ with 5
indicator nodes matching in the relevant set (2 directed hops from Node A). Note
the presence of the red flag indicator ‘windows 7‘ in each of these matches. The
grayed-out nodes were the original query nodes not matched.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.1 Motivating example for detecting trajectories of homegrown violent extremists.
A small example problem related to the investigative search for homegrown
xvi
violent extremists. (a) Query graph Q- an example graph query of some possible
indicators of a homegrown violent extremist. (b) Data Graph G- a fictitious data
graph of 4 people with various associated indicators as on- and off-line activities.
The node class labels are inside the node, and the node IDs are outside the node.
Each edge has a timestamp (in blue) that denotes the time in which the edge was
formed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2 Depiction of the h-hop Adjacency Matrix Wh(t) and the Parent-to-Child h-hop
Class Adjacency Matrix Ch(t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3 Graphical depiction of baseline INSiGHT algorithm. This graphic depicts the
basic steps in the INSiGHT algorithms described in [144]. Here n′ is the number
of nodes in the query graph Q, n is the number of nodes in the data graph G, and
m is the number of classes. The steps shown are only for the construction of the
parts of Sh(t) that correspond to the Parent-to-Child class membership similarity;
the steps for the Parent-from-Child portions are not depicted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4 Plot of the multi-hop class similarity scores over time S̃(t) for time-based data
graph G for example problem in Fig 5.1. We used α = 1.0 (non-weighted sum
over each hop). We focus on the indicators/activities associated with each of the
persons of interest. For each of time t between 1 and 4, we show the changes in
class similarity over 3 hops from each person of interest node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.5 Experiment query for BlogCatalog (a). Query focus is for User Ids who had been
writing blogs broadly related to ‘computers’ and ‘windows’, and specifically to
Windows operating systems. In this example, we treat the tag ‘windows 7’ as a red
flag indicator. The top-match in graph G shown in (b) is User Id ‘u65530’ with 5
xvii
indicator nodes matching in the relevant set (2 directed hops from node class A).
Each edge is labeled with a timestamp. The grayed-out node is one of the original
query nodes not matched. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.6 (a) Plot of the class similarity scores over time s̃(t)n for the top 10 nodes in the
BlogCatalog data graph using α = 1.0 (non-weighted sum over each hop). For
each of the timesteps t between 1 and 10, we show the changes in class similarity
over 3 hops for the top user IDs of interest. The top scoring User Id was ‘u65530’
and the multi-hop parent-child class similarity score over time is shown in bold
red. (b) Histogram of aggregated class similarity scores for the 1327 ID nodes in
the subgraph. The number above each bar is the number of ID nodes with that
respective class similarity score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.7 (a) Run times for varying data graph size. (b) Run times for varying timestep
range. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.8 Sample parameterized growth and decay curves. (a) Plot of exponential growth
function Fr for repeated indicators using various parameters for λ. (b) Plot of
hyperbolic tangent decay function Fd for diminished significance of indicators from
the last occurrence using various parameters for β and ξ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.9 Multi-hop class similarity for the radicalization example with (a) and without
(b) investigative indicator type filtering. Shown are the results of the efforts
to minimize false positives for legitimate queries, we label nodes according to
investigative node types. Notice that Person 2 now has a zero class similarity score
throughout the window of analysis because its only matching indicator was of type
xviii
‘IIRA.’ Additionally, Person 4 has a zero class similarity score until it also posted
a radical n-gram at time step 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.10 Expanded motivating example for detecting trajectories of homegrown violent
extremists. Beyond the base example from Fig.5.1, the new data graph Fig.
5.10a now has one more individual and depicts additional reoccurring indicators
indicative of online behavior of some homegrown violent extremists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.11 Class similarity score time series for the expanded radicalization example depicting
the effect on the similarity score due to the reoccurring indicators and time decay
from inactivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.12 (a) The schema of the heterogeneous data graph G of individuals and any
exhibited radicalization indicators. (b) The query graph Q of the 23 indicators of
radicalization modeled as a bipartite graph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.13 The radicalization time series plots for (a) all 135 U.S. violent extremists and (b)
only the top 15 scoring individuals in the Klausen dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.14 Histogram showing the distribution of final similarity scores for all 135 U.S. violent
extremists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.15 The radicalization time series plots for (a) only the top 15 U.S. violent extremists
and (b) only the bottom 15 scoring individuals in the Klausen dataset. The red
circles represent the exhibition of flags.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.16 Activity histograms for each of the four types of activities: (a) chapters, (b)
chapter-sequentials, (c) problems, and (d) videos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.17 (a) Data graph G schema relating MOOC students and activities. (b) Query
pattern for Course X, which reflects the hierarchy of course materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
xix
5.18 Similarity score time series plot for those who continued in the MOOC (blue,
n = 84) and those who did not continue (light red, n = 899). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.19 Histogram of the final similarity scores for the MOOC continuation query pattern.159
5.20 Scatter plot of the final similarity score and the day of last activity for both
MOOC students who continued and dropped. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.21 (a) Network schema of the Customer Activities graph. (b) Query graph Q for a
tiling wall and floor project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.22 Plot of the class similarity scores over time s̃(t)n for (a) 150 randomly sampled
non-contractor customers and (b) the top 3 non-contractor customers in the home
improvement purchase data graph. For each of the weekly timesteps t between
March 5, 2012 and March 4, 2014, we show the changes in class similarity. . . . . . . . 165
5.23 Histogram of class similarity scores (a) for all 30,443 customers in the subgraph
and the corresponding boxplot (b) of the class similarity scores which shows a
statistically significant difference in distribution means between professionals and
customers. (c) is a box plot of the project durations in weeks for both groups. . . . . 165
5.24 Histogram and associated table of the size of the itemsets among customers in the
dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.25 Association rules generated for the tiling project using the minimum support of
0.02 and minimum confidence of 0.30. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.26 Correlation coefficients with the 95% CI for both the initial similarity score and
initial gradient metrics against the final similarity score. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
xx
5.27 The histogram of customers by activity counts in both the training (a) and testing
(b) datasets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5.28 Plots of the regression models of the final similarity scores against the test data
for similarity scores after (a) 1 activity (n=1897), (b) 2 activites (n=752), (c) 3
activities (n=256), (d) 4 activities (n=97), and (e) 5 activities (n=34). . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.29 The RMSE of the linear activity models using activity counts for both the training
and testing data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.1 The project item lists for three projects (a) minor kitchen remodel, (b) wall and
floor tiling, and (c) attic insulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.2 Percent of customers by the number of unique item sub-classes purchased in a
21-item project materials and tools list. The orange and grey curves depicts a
normalized exponential function with λ = −1.0 and λ = −0.20, respectively.. . . . . . 186
6.3 Histogram of the total number of unique item sub-classes purchases by customers
in the real dataset. The fitted exponential curve is shown in dotted red. . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.4 Screenshot of the MATLAB output from the synthetic data generator. . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.5 The final similarity scores for simulated purchase data for those with indicators
from (a) Kitchen project, (b) Tiling project, and (c) Attic project. Blue bars are
the customers who undertook those projects, while the red bars are the customers
who made those purchases for other projects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.6 ROC curve for the classification of three projects based upon the final similarity
score. The AUC for Kitchen, Tiling, and Attic are 0.9352, 0.9367, and 0.9642,
respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
xxi
6.7 AUC performance of stepwise logistic regression models on activity sets of various
sizes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.8 Classification scores for the Kitchen Project (Project 1) over time for (a) all 1000
simulated customers and (b) only the 263 simulated customers who were actually
undertaking the project. The dashed black line in (b) is the threshold classification
score of 0.51639. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.9 (a) Distribution of classification scores for all 1000 simulated customers undertaking
the Kitchen Project (in blue), and those who were not (in light red).(b) The
scatter plot of the final similarity scores the corresponding classification scores for
all 1000 simulated customers. Dots in blue are those customers undertaking the
Kitchen Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.10 ROC curves for the ‘Act 2 Items’ logistic regression model evaluated on (a)
Activity 1 data, and (b) Activity 9 data. A common threshold of 0.516388 in both
curves achieved suitable selectivity and specificity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.1 Multi-hop class similarity (a) and match goodness (b) scores for radicalization
example, with investigative indicator type filtering.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.2 Expanded motivating example for detecting trajectories of homegrown violent
extremists with additional person-to-person links. Beyond the base example from
Fig.5.1a, the new data graph Fig. 7.2a above now has additional person-to-person
links (in yellow). Fig. 7.2b-g depicts the match goodness scores over time for
α = {0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 1.00}, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
xxii
7.3 Multi-hop match goodness scores for radicalization example, without (a) and with
(b) the effect of indicator reoccurence and time decay. Using Parameter Set 1
in 5.5, we artificially established the need for more than 2 occurrences each the
Radical and Extremist n-gram indicators to achieve an effectively full score for
that indicator. We also chose to examine the effect of decaying score contribution
of the the Purchase Firearm indicator to half after 2 time steps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.4 Expanded motivating example for detecting trajectories of homegrown violent
extremists over an extended time. Beyond the base example from Fig.5.1a, the
new data graph Fig. 7.4a now has one more individual and depicts additional
reoccurring indicators of the on-line behaviors of some homegrown violent
extremists. Fig. 7.4b is the match goodness score time series for 1-1 neighbor
matching and shows the effect on scores due to the reoccurring indicators and time
decay from inactivity. Fig. 7.4c and Fig. 7.4d are the match goodness score times
series for 2-2 neighbor matching at α = 1.00 and α = 0.50, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.5 Log-Log Plot of the In- (a) and Out- (b) degree distributions of the BlogCatalog
directed graph. X is the random variable for the degree distribution. The dotted
lines in each plot show the theoretical power law for α = 2.27 and x ≥ 251, and
α = 2.42 and x ≥ 373, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
7.6 The schema and partial datagraph of the BlogCatalog graph and the query graph
Q. Fig. 7.6a depicts the node types and connections present in the network, while
Fig. 7.6b is a partial graph that is illustrative of the larger graph. Fig. 7.6c shows
the 7-node query graph Q. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
xxiii
7.7 INSiGHT results on the BlogCatalog dataset. The match goodness time series
plots for all nodes in Gsubgraph for 1-1 neighbor matching (a) and 2-2 neighbor
matching at α = 0.50 (b) and α = 1.00 (c). The corresponding histograms of the
final match goodness scores (at t = 10) are shown in Fig. 7.7 d-f. The number
above each bar is the quantity of nodes with that respective match goodness score.221
7.8 Top scoring UserIDs in BlogCatalog Experiment. Fig. 7.8a depicts the top 17
scoring UserIDs in 1-1 Neighbor Matching. Fig. 7.8b depicts the top 27 scoring
UserIDs in 2-2 Neighbor Matching at α = 0.50. Fig. 7.8c depicts the top 33 scoring
UserIDs in 2-2 Neighbor Matching at α = 1.00. The grey colored indicators denote
those matches which were tags established by the corresponding User ID, while
those not shaded denote tags that were established by the User ID’s immediate
neighbors. The ‘windows 7’ red flag indicators are highlighted in red.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
8.1 Radicalization feature/behavior transition matrix P ∈ W26×26 where each entry
pij is the number of times a state (outcome) which contains behavior i leads to a
state (outcome) which contains behavior j. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
8.2 Radicalization transition diagrams. Nodes are features/behaviors and paths
represent instances when features/behaviors sequentially followed one another.
(a) Contains all instances of paths from one feature/behavior to another. Edge
weights are also proportional to the transition probabilities in P′′ for that edge.
(b) Filtered and color-coded version of (a). Direction arrows indicate the pairwise
sequence of behaviors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
8.3 Edge weights for the modified radicalization behavior transition matrix P′′ for
edges where p′′ij ≥ 20%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
xxiv
8.4 Distribution of the non-zero transition probabilities (n = 388 unique non-zero
transitions in P′′). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
8.5 Box plot of each individual’s set of transition probabilities along the radicalization
path (n = 135 individuals). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
8.6 (a) Distribution of the max normalized path probabilities for each individual
(n=135) (b) Distribution of the mean of the max path probabilities for each
individual (n = 135). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
8.7 Distribution of the maximum transition probability in each individual’s
radicalization path (n = 135). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
9.1 Army Composite Life Cycle Model. Source: [139, p. 36]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
9.2 CERT insider threat graphic. Source: [45]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
B.1 US Capitol Attack Plot, 2015. Example class graph of Christopher Lee Cornell
showing the indicators and signals of his radicalization and progress towards an
attack.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
B.2 San Bernardino Terrorist Attack, 2015. Example class graph of Syed Farook,
Tashfeen Malik, and Enrique Marquez showing the indicators and signals of their
collective radicalization and preparations for the attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
B.3 Term document matrix of “J star” Twitter account.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
B.4 Term correlation matrix of “J star” Twitter account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
B.5 Functional decomposition of the topic detection system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
xxv
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official




Radicalized violent extremists seeking to support or commit terrorist acts continue to
pose a serious threat in the United States and abroad. Those extremists motivated by
the Salafi-jihdaist ideology have perpetrated 26 such attacks in the U.S. alone since 9/11,
including the 2009 Fort Hood attack, the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings, the 2015 San
Bernardino attack, and the 2016 Orlando night club attack. In Western Europe, radical
violent extremists who adhere to the same ideology1 carried out numerous other attacks
including the 2015 Paris attacks, the 2016 Brussels airport and metro attacks, the 2016
Nice attack, the 2016 Berlin market attack, the 2017 London Parliament attack, and most
recently the 2017 Manchester concert bombing. In order to thwart other violent extremists
from carrying out future attacks, law enforcement agencies in their investigative capacities are
effectively called upon to monitor and make continuous risk assessments on a large number
of individuals for the likelihood of violence. To prevent people from becoming attracted to
violent extremist groups in the first place, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), working
either in private or partnered with government entities in prevention and de-radicalization
programs, make these risk assessments as well [221]. The task is fraught with challenges,
which was aptly summarized recently by the former FBI Director following the terrorist
attack at an Orlando night club in June 2016: “We are looking for needles in a nation-wide
haystack, but we’re also called upon to figure out which pieces of hay might someday become
needles” [56]. His remark highlights that both dynamics and scalability are key interrelated
issues involved in the detection of radicalization and the prevention of future attacks.
1Throughout this work, we focus our investigation on the violent extremists motivated by the Salafi-
jihadist ideology and will often refer to them as just ‘violent extremists’ for brevity.
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Current research suggests that radicalization, while complex, may be understood as a
dynamic and phased-based process where individuals exhibit indicative behaviors or psycho-
logical states along pathways to violence.2 While the importance of kinship or other social
ties to ones involvement in terrorism is well established [133, 262], there is neither consensus
on all the components (phases or indicators) of these models [165, 214], nor on how long the
process itself takes. The latter has been posited to range from years to weeks, and to even
days [123, 165]. Yet law enforcement agencies recognize the dynamics of the problem and
utilize all lawful investigative techniques and methods, including both physical and electronic
surveillance, in order to detect indicators of violent radicalization at the earliest opportunity
and to be postured to rapidly foil plots [57, 123]. However, given the commitment of per-
sonnel and technical assets necessary, employment of these full-on techniques do not scale
well to the caseload. These resource constraints have subsequently forced the agencies to
make tough, subjective decisions on the level of surveillance and monitoring that suspected
individuals receive [88, 123, 255]. Moreover, recent terrorist attack successes highlight the
real possibility of missed signals from, or continued radicalization by, individuals whom the
authorities had formerly investigated and even interviewed.3 Additionally, beyond consid-
ering just the behavioral dynamics of a person of interest is the need for investigators to
consider the behaviors and activities of social ties vis-á-vis the person of interest. As in the
conspiracy behind the San Bernardino attack in 2015, it is only when behaviors are viewed
2See Chapter 2 or [31, 164] for some thorough surveys of the different models and [165] for a good
discussion on the operationalization of these conceptual models.
3Recent U.S. cases include Tamerlan Tsarnaev (Boston Marathon bombings, 2013) [106], Omar Mateen
(Orlando night club shooting, 2016) [56], and Ahmad Khan Rahami (New York and New Jersey bombings,
2016) [217]. Recent Western European cases include several involved in the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015
[96], Anis Amri (Berlin market truck attack, 2016) [77], and Salman Abedi (Manchester concert bombing,
2017)[205]. Likewise, NGOs and practitioners working in de-radicalization programming also fear mistakenly
taking someone on who is in fact highly radicalized and poses a risk to society [169].
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collectively that one may be able to detect the many indicators of a violent extremist plot
are present.4
1.1. Challenges and Motivation
Due to the devastating effects of 9/11, the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI has
since strategically shifted efforts from prosecution of terrorism to preventive counterterror-
ism efforts through the investigation of those on suspected pathways of radicalization to
violent extremism.5 Although law enforcement face a number of challenges in identifying
radicalization and preventing violent extremist attacks, they are all related to either issues
of dynamics or scalability and can be grouped into two principle and interrelated categories:
1) the insufficiency of current radicalization risk assessment protocols to anticipate the im-
minent risk of violence, and 2) the shortfalls related to the monitoring and surveillance of
those considered at risk for committing extremist violence.6
In order to determine whom to initially investigate and the risk level of individuals
currently under investigation, law enforcement agencies generally use some form of a risk
assessment protocol or structured professional judgment instrument, which can be laborious
and require the manual assessment of dozens of indicator items for each individual of inter-
est. Furthermore, the process does not sufficiently distinguish those truly on pathways to
extremist violence and those who are not [264, p. 11], is not designed to consider behavioral
dynamics of individuals [168] and their relevant social ties, and has no known associated
automated methods to keep up with the evolving individual-level indicative behaviors.
4See Section 3.2.3 (Complexity of Assessing Risk through Social Ties) and [299] for more details.
5See the 2002 DOJ fact sheet [79] and [10, 284] for analysis of this change.
6See Section 3.2 (Operational Deficiencies) for more details.
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The other related group of challenges all involve shortfalls with monitoring and surveil-
lance of those considered at risk for extremist violence. First, law enforcement faces shortfalls
in terms of resources for full-on surveillance. For example, while it was estimated that the
FBI had over 900 active investigations in 2015 [27] and around 1000 investigations in 2016
[123] of ISIS-related homegrown violent extremists, it had the ability to thoroughly surveil
the activities of only “dozens” of individuals [123]. Furthermore, the current state of the
law enforcement and intelligence information sharing enterprise is not conducive to tracking
individual radicalization indicators of individuals and their associates due to the stove-piped
agency databases [211] and the reliance on the query/response pattern [229] for each indi-
vidual of interest. Lastly, federal and state-level law enforcement agencies face limitations
with the utilization of available indicators on social media due to proprietary restrictions
and privacy protections [197]. Overall, these shortfalls have the led the FBI, in particular, to
seek help from local law enforcement [244] as well as make tough, resource-constrained deci-
sions on whom it would select for surveillance based on insufficiently reliable risk assessment
protocols. Unfortunately, this has allowed some of those whom the Bureau had previously in-
vestigated to eventually go on and carry out an attack. See, for example, Tamerlan Tsarnaev
[106], Omar Mateen [56], and Ahmad Khan Rahami [217].
Addressing the aforementioned challenges is of great interest to both law enforcement
and intelligence agencies, as well as the researchers who desire to support them. The latter,
however, are also challenged by a deficit in individual-specific data on behavioral cues for
study. A more detailed discussion on the “lack of comprehensive and reliable data” impeding
scholarship in terrorism studies is in [264, p. 6-7]. The problem stems from the fact that such
data is often considered sensitive or even classified, and is closely held by law enforcement and
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intelligence agencies. With the exception of the Klausen dataset recently available through
the National Institute of Justice [167],7 there is a paucity of large datasets for training and
testing that contain individual-level, time-stamped activities containing behavioral cues for
data scientists to test algorithms for detecting radicalization.
1.2. Research Purpose and Questions
The overarching purpose of this research is to assist US law enforcement and intelligence
agencies in identifying domestic radicalization to violent extremism and preventing future
violent extremist attacks. Based upon the aforementioned challenges in the previous section,
in this thesis, we investigate the need and feasibility of risk assessment assistance technologies
that enables law enforcement monitoring at the scope and scale that is lawful, and that
rigorously and automatically considers the dynamic indicative behaviors of individual persons
of interest as well as their associates. During this investigation, we are guided by the following
questions related to the issues of both dynamics and scalability in assessing the risk of violent
extremist radicalization:
(1) Which risk assessment indicators for violent extremism in the extant literature are
detectable via automated or semi-automated technologies, and what databases and
datasets must be integrated to facilitate this detection? (scalability)
(2) Can computationally efficient tools be used to mine these databases (existing and
streaming data) for the specific purposes of monitoring and screening for in near
real-time those individuals who pose a significant risk for violence? Do these tools
allow for the better prioritization of limited investigative resources? (scalability)
7See Section 2.4.4.1 for a description and use of this dataset in this work.
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(3) Can tools that rigorously examine and account for the activities of close associates
better assess the risk that an individual engages in violent extremism? (dynamics)
(4) Beyond the established indicators in extant literature, are there any more discerning,
dynamic patterns of behavioral indicators that could help law enforcement better
assess the risk of violent extremist radicalization? (dynamics)
Understanding which risk assessment indicators are detectable through automated means
(Question 1) concerns scalability and has the potential to address the resource gaps that
law enforcement agencies face in tracking the radicalization trajectories of a large number
of individuals. It also involves the prescription of including currently under-utilized data
sources such as social media, and better integrating extant law enforcement and governmental
databases where specific indicators can be found.
The development of computationally efficient tools to mine the databases (Question 2)
is the main thrust of this present research effort and addresses several law enforcement chal-
lenges with dynamically assessing risk at scale. The technology must be efficient enough to
sift through voluminous open and restricted (government) databases for patterns of radi-
calization indicators for a large number of persons of interest, and to assist in dynamically
updating law enforcement and intelligence agencies when these individuals exhibit addi-
tional indicators through their evolving behaviors. Additionally, given the paucity of avail-
able large-population datasets for testing and validating such tools, developing a process for
anonymized, synthetic data generation would be an important supporting effort.
Accounting for the activities and risk indicators in associates (Question 3) directly ad-
dresses a deficiency in current individualized risk assessment protocols by not rigorously
accounting the dynamic influences of close associates. A technology which can account for
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the activity and behaviors of linked individuals has the potential to better assessing the risk
of an individual’s risk for radicalization and the risk of conspiratorial plots.
Lastly, the search for more discerning, dynamic patterns of behavioral indicators (Ques-
tion 4), is focused on contributing to developing better risk assessment protocols for law
enforcement use. By utilizing a technology that can consider sets of indicators and their
occurrence rates, investigators and analysts may be better able to distinguish those at risk
for extremist violence.
Although the prime motivation of this research is the detection of the violent extremist
radicalization, similar problems exist in the other domains such as consumer analytics, on-
line student assessment, behavioral health, and cybersecurity. This is primarily because, in
each of these domains, there is a compelling interest to detect the presence of an individual’s
latent behavior utilizing time-stamped indicator data.8 Investigating the applicability and
utility of our work to each of these domains is an additional research purpose. In consumer
analytics, for example, businesses are interested in using an individual’s on-line activities
and previous purchases over time to track his or her place on the customer journey and
determine the potential for future purchases [89, 90, 309]. Likewise, in the field on-line
student assessment, Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) teachers and course designers
are interested in predicting student performance and persistence through the time-stamped
course-related behavioral data [8, 32, 98, 173]. In behavioral health too, we find that family
members and caregivers are interested in identifying those who may be showing indicators of
suicide risk or veterans who may exhibit signs of post-traumatic stress [152, 232, 248]. Each
of these risk behaviors has their own set of unique, identifiable signs which may be exhibited
over time. Lastly, in cybersecurity, organizations continually seek to prevent insider threats
8We define a latent behavior as a hidden or emergent activity exhibited by an entity [109].
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by detecting risk potential using performance-related and technical indicators recorded over
time [45, 73].
1.3. Solution Approaches
Given the size and complexity of the problem set, we undertake a systems-based approach
for the need and feasibility analysis of a risk assessment assistance technology. We henceforth
refer to this objective technology as a ‘radicalization detection system’ oriented towards
assisting law enforcement and intelligence analysts in screening for, in near real-time, those
individuals who are on the pathway towards extremist violence. Additionally, as part of
a nested effort at demonstrating technological opportunities for a radicalization detection
system, we pursue the development of a computationally efficient tool that can mine, monitor
and screen for the occurrence of radicalization indicators in large heterogeneous databases
in order to provide early warnings of individuals or groups on behavioral trajectories toward
extremist violence. For this technical portion, we utilize a dynamic graph pattern matching
approach.
1.3.1. A systems-based approach. Systems engineering, defined as “an interdisci-
plinary approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems” [147], is a well
suited approach to investigate the need and feasibility of a radicalization detection system. It
is an ordered process that 1) focuses on framing the right (albeit possibly complex) problem
to solve through holistic, associative thinking, 2) integrates the expertise from a multitude
of relevant disciplines to solve the problem, 3) analyzes and seeks to meet stakeholder needs
to ensure optimal value for the resources [239].
A systems approach is critical because the problem area straddles a multitude of complex
issues, including
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• Adequately enabling and empowering law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
address a real and growing threat from violent extremists and to prevent future
attacks.
• The ability of law enforcement to access and utilize the early warning behavioral
indicators available in on-line activities of persons of interest, while ensuring the
protection of civil liberties and the privacy to the broader population.
• The ability of law enforcement to access and utilize the early warning behaviors and
indicators in disparate government databases, while still preserving classification
levels and authorities for access.
• The proper roles of social media companies and internet service providers to balance
the fostering of free communities, the policing of content, and the legal requirements
of supporting law enforcement investigative efforts.
• Addressing public concerns over the possibility of perceived discriminatory policies
and actions against minorities.
Involved in each of these issues are stakeholders with competing interests as well as some
adversarial groups who are opposed to any significant increase in law enforcement capabilities
or to any erosion of individual privacy.9 As will be described later in Chapter 2, the threat
posed by violent extremists is real and growing, as well as the resource and technical problems
posed to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Real too is the ability of social media
companies to cause the shut down of all or portions of a social media monitoring company’s
operations by denying application program interfaces (APIs) over concerns of the assistance
given to law enforcement agencies.
9These groups have been shown to have high salience, which is defined as possessing one or more either
the power to influence the system, legitimacy in relation to the system, and urgency of the claim on the
system [239]. See Section 2.5.3 for more details.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.1. (a) Principle stages of the systems engineering life cycle with the
expansion of concept development phases [174]. (b) Systems Decision Process
[239].
This thesis takes an integrated analysis approach utilizing both foundational systems
engineering theory in [174] and the systems decision process (SDP) in [239]. The former
is depicted in Fig. 1.1a, which details the three stages of the systems engineering life cycle
model with a more in-depth look at the sub-stages and activities within concept development.
The latter is depicted in Fig.1.1b, which details the disciplined, cyclical process involving
stakeholders and decision makers throughout the life cycle. While the systems engineering
life cycle model focuses more on the inputs, outputs, and functions of each stage, the SDP
better emphasizes the requisite analyses of environmental factors and stakeholders in all the
stages [239].
Therefore, in this stage of research effort for a radicalization detection system, we focus
on the components of the Needs Analysis sub-stage of the systems engineering life cycle,
where one primarily asks, “Is there a valid need for a new system?” and “Is there a practical
approach to satisfying such a need?” [174]. Our analysis in this thesis includes identification
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of the operational deficiencies of current law enforcement efforts, and a robust set of system
studies that covers the measures currently being taken at the operational level to address
the threat from violent extremism.
The preponderance of this thesis is devoted to the study of technological opportunities
by developing and testing the utility of a novel dynamic graph pattern matching technique
for the identification of individuals matching a radicalization pattern of behaviors. However,
consistent with the analytical framework of the SDP, a significant portion of this research
effort was also devoted to the description of the environmental context and a framework
for a radicalization detection system, the full development of which requires engagement
of multiple stakeholders as well as sizable associated efforts by the government and other
researchers to realize. Lastly, we also assess both high-level programmatic and technical
risks of this system.
For reasons of specificity and thoroughness of analysis, we define the boundary of our
systems-level examination of a radicalization detection system as proposed for implemen-
tation within the U.S., but acknowledge that the principles can seemingly be applied to
comparable efforts in Western Europe and elsewhere. We also focus on supporting law en-
forcement (over NGOs involved in de-radicalization), because of the imminence of the threat
that these organizations face, their access to restricted governmental and intelligence-related
data sources, and the scale of technological effort that we are advocating.
Lastly, as is characteristic of the systems approach, the multi-disciplinary aspects of
this research effort are also prominent. We surveyed and regularly revisited the extensive
scholarship of social scientists and terrorism experts to better grasp an understanding of
radicalization processes and early warning indicators of violence. Later, we were fortunate
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to also consult with Professor Jytte Klausen, founder of the Western Jihadist Project at
Brandeis University and a highly-respected, cited, and published researcher in the areas of
jihadist radicalization and violent extremism. These efforts provided the foundation for the
investigation and development of a technological opportunity to assist law enforcement in
screening for individuals at risk for extremist violence.
1.3.2. A dynamic graph pattern matching approach. For the specific task of
detecting whether an individual or group of individuals exhibit a pattern of radicalization
indicators, we utilize a dynamic graph pattern matching approach which we call investigative
graph search. While traditional graph pattern matching is well-studied and has been used
extensively in a variety of applications to include complex object identification, software
plagiarism detection, traffic route planning, and recommender systems [23, 100, 113, 193], it
relies on the certainty of specific types of connections or attributes in the query pattern. Since
the detection of latent behaviors such as radicalization may involve less certainty about the
query structure, or that the entities of interest may not exhibit all of the possible behaviors
or attributes, we devised investigative graph search to search for and prioritize persons of
interest who may exhibit part or all of a pattern of suspicious behaviors or connections.
We framed our technical approach as a unique dynamic graph pattern matching problem
and introduced a technology called INSiGHT (Investigative Search for Graph-Trajectories)
to help identify individuals or small groups with conforming subgraphs to a radicalization
query pattern and follow the match trajectories over time. We tested our software imple-
mentation of INSiGHT on small synthetic and real datasets related to radicalization. The
small, synthetic dataset was a stylized set of five persons of interest and their on- and off-line
behaviors arranged in a heterogeneous graph of 61 nodes and 59 time-stamped edges. Each
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of the five individuals fit some profile determined a priori that included violent extremists of
varying numbers and types of exhibited behaviors, as well as a non-extremist and a former
violent extremist. We also validated our work on a real dataset from [167], which consisted
of 135 U.S. homegrown violent extremists who were arrested for terrorism-related offenses
between 2001 and 2015 or had died in the commission of their offenses, and 1,326 combined
behavioral indicators exhibited over time. Due to the lack of large-scale radicalization-related
datasets, we also tested our implementation of INSiGHT on the BlogCatalog dataset [320],
a heterogeneous graph consisting of over 382K nodes and 4 million edges which served as
a data proxy because it contained structural and behavioral parallels to intelligence-related
networks.
Importantly, beyond the stated purpose of detecting radicalization, we demonstrated
in this thesis that the basic technical approach of investigative graph search is also very
applicable to several other domains that involve the detection of latent behaviors utilizing
time-stamped indicator data. As discussed earlier, such domains include consumer analytics,
on-line student assessment, behavioral health, and cybersecurity. In this work, we applied
investigative graph search and provided results for problems in both the consumer analytics
and on-line student assessment domains. We tested INSiGHT on a real, large proprietary
consumer activities dataset from a home improvement retailer with 60K customers and over
11 million transactions over a two-year period as well as a synthetically generated dataset
of 1K customers and 25K transactions. INSiGHT was indeed useful in the detection of cus-
tomers undertaking certain home improvement projects based on this time-stamped purchase
data. For on-line student assessment, we tested INSiGHT on a portion of the Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) Cup 2015 competition dataset [160] of approximately
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1K students and 19K on-line activities to predict those students who persisted in the MOOC
course.
1.4. Contributions and Outcomes
The following summarizes our main contributions in this thesis. We first investigate
at a system-level the fundamental need and feasibility of a violent extremist radicalization
detection system and correspondingly propose an overarching analyst-in-the-loop framework
for a tool that would mine pubic data and government databases for individuals who pose
a significant risk for extremist violence. We also describe the environmental conditions and
most salient stakeholders related to the proposed system, and address programmatic and
technical risks with several initial mitigating strategies.
Towards the development of a computationally efficient tool to mine these databases,
we formalize the technical approach of investigative graph search and develop INSiGHT as
an algorithmic implementation that performs it. INSiGHT is a vectorized, multi-hop class
similarity graph pattern matching technique that tracks full or partial matches of subgraphs
to a query graph over time. Tailorable to the detection of radicalization indicator patterns,
enhancements were also developed to account for the re-occurrence of indicators, the time
decay of indicator significance, and the incorporation of red flag and other conditional fil-
ters. The applicability of INSiGHT to detect latent behaviors in other domains such as
consumer analytics and on-line student assessment was demonstrated through experiments
with real data. We also further enhance INSiGHT with an algorithmic implementation for
non-combinatorial graph neighbor matching that accounts for the activities of close associates
to better reveal the presence of suspicious individuals or conspiratorial plots.
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Additionally, as a means to address the paucity in large population, time-stamped,
individual-level activities data with ground truth in both the radicalization domain and
other domains, we provide a synthetic data generator software implemented in MATLAB.
The generator produces large population, time-stamped, individual-level consumer activities
data consistent with an a priori project set designation (latent behavior). Importantly, this
formulation sets the stage for future work in developing an analogous synthetic data gener-
ator for radicalization indicators to serve as a testbed for INSiGHT and other data mining
algorithms.
The last significant contribution contained in this thesis is the development of a novel
discrete dynamical process to model violent extremist radicalization and use of state transi-
tion analysis to find more discerning patterns among the behavioral indicators. Our efforts
centered on analyzing the unique, restricted-use Klausen dataset [167] that contained known
U.S. violent extremists and their behavior indicators coded in time. Significantly, we found
highly frequented indicator transitions that could subsequently be incorporated in a system
to better detect radicalization trajectories. Additionally, our analysis showed that while
indeed perpetrators took widely various paths in total (as is commonly characterized in the
literature), an overwhelming majority of them followed at least some highly common seg-
ments of paths. The identification of these few frequent pair-wise sequences could prove
useful to law enforcement and intelligence analysts.
1.5. Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we provide a primer on the threat from
violent extremists motivated by the Salafi-jihadist belief system, a description of governmen-
tal strategies to counter this threat, and a survey of the most recent research on radicalization
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processes and early warning behaviors. This chapter motivates our efforts in this problem
area and establishes a foundation into the scholarship of largely social-psychological process
and phenomenon.
In Chapter 3 we first study of the current operational deficiencies that law enforcement
and intelligence agencies face in the very challenging work of preventing future extremist
violence and protecting the public. Then we provide a description of a radicalization detec-
tion system framework, which is an overarching approach designed to address the existing
deficiencies. In line with the systems development process, we also describe the environmen-
tal conditions in which this proposed system would be developed and operate, provide an
analysis of the most salient stakeholders, and address programmatic and technical risks with
several initial mitigating strategies.
Chapter 4 introduces our foundational technical approach to detecting individual-level
radicalization trajectories through investigative graph search, a novel dynamic graph pat-
tern matching process. In this chapter, we also develop a categorization of indicators for
violent extremist radicalization that is consistent with the threat assessment literature and
important in both reducing false positives and enabling alerts for red flag behaviors.
Chapter 5 covers the development of our principal technical contribution, the INSiGHT
dynamic graph pattern matching algorithm and its use in detecting latent behaviors through
the mining of large graph databases for indicators that match a query pattern. We test
INSiGHT on an array of datasets, both real and synthetic and of varying sizes.
In Chapter 6 we provide a synthetic data generator for large population, time-stamped,
individual-level consumer activities data consistent with an apriori latent behavior. This
enabled further validation of INSiGHT as a screening technology when ground truth is
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known, as well as sets the stage for future work in developing an analogous synthetic data
generator for radicalization indicators to serve as a testbed for INSiGHT and other data
mining algorithms.
In Chapter 7 we extend our formulation of INSiGHT to enable the non-combinatorial
neighborhood matching on graphs to identify potential threats from clusters of individuals
in possible terrorist conspiracies. We also develop a match goodness function as a quanti-
tative means to prioritize the investigation of matches (i.e., potential threats), and test the
application of INSiGHT on small synthetic radicalization datasets and one real world proxy
dataset on a benign domain with structural parallels to radicalization.
In Chapter 8 we develop a discrete dynamic model of radicalization by utilizing a real
indicator dataset offered by the Western Jihadism Project at Brandeis University [167], and
relate the results back to refining the query pattern for INSiGHT with more discerning
behavioral transitions.
Finally, in Chapter 9 we summarize the contributions of our work and provide several
key areas of future work on the develop and testing of INSiGHT as well as the extension of
the methodology for detecting other types of latent behaviors such as suicide risk and insider
threats.
We also include the following in the appendices: Appendix A, a reference table for
the recent prominent violent extremist attacks (not limited to Salafi-jihadism ideology);
Appendix B, a set of case students of U.S. homegrown violent extremists; and Appendix C,
Klausen’s original codebook for radicalization indicators that was utilized in [165, 168, 171].
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CHAPTER 2
A Primer on the Violent Extremist Threat and Radicalization
Processes
2.1. Introduction
This chapter serves as a primer on the threat from violent extremists and existing research
on radicalization processes. An understanding of the nature and scope of the problem is
necessary to better understand its complexity, the motivation of our efforts, and where our
research fits in the context of other existing efforts to prevent future attacks. It first covers
the trends primarily in the U.S. in violent extremists plots and successful attacks, followed
by an overview of the strategies and methods governmental officials are proposing to counter
the threat of violent extremism. Later, it provides a survey of the latest research advances
in understanding the violent extremist population, radicalization process and the associated
indicators or early warning behaviors. Lastly, it presents the specific system studies of
measures currently being taken at the operational level to address the threat from violent
extremism.
We first note that violent extremism is subject to terminological differences. The U.S.
government primarily refers to it in the broadest sense of “supporting or committing violent
acts to achieve political, ideological, religious, or social goals” and include under this umbrella
groups such as “white supremacists, anti-government groups, and groups with extreme views
on abortion, animal rights, the environment, and federal ownership of public lands; and
radical Islamist entities, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)” [122, p. 1].
However, given the vast differences in motivations and ideologies and indicators [168], in this
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thesis we narrow the scope of violent extremism as others have done10 to the supporting or
commitment of violent acts motivated by the Salafi-jihadist ideology.
2.2. Growing Threat from Violent Extremism
Over the last decade and a half, we have seen a precipitous rise in the threat of violent
extremists inspired by the Salafi-jihadist ideology who have been radicalized and seek to
commit acts of terrorism in the United States and abroad. As opposed to the terrorist
attacks on 9/11 which were planned and conducted by foreigners, the recent growing threat
has been from ‘homegrown violent extremists’ who ‘act alone or in small groups on behalf
of al-Qa’ida and now ISIS without any direct or formal connection to the foreign terrorist
organizations” [171].11 The homegrown terrorist threat in the U.S. has been facilitated and
fueled by extremist organizations utilizing the internet and social media for recruitment and
radicalization [166]. This technique seeks to inspire others in their home countries to conduct
decentralized attacks and do not necessarily require the organizational hierarchy that once
facilitated transnational terrorism.12
10Researchers and practitioners who have scoped their focus particularly to the aforementioned radical
Islamist entities have either specified the extremists’ motivational ideology (i.e., Klausen specifies “violent
extremists motivated by the Salafi-jihadist ideology” in her work [165, 167]), or, as was done in CSIS’s
seminal work “Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism,” stated
upfront that use the term violent extremism “[referred] to the subset of violent extremist organizations that
claim that religion of Islam as their motivating source to justify their nefarious goals” [126, p. 2].
11The characterization of ‘homegrown’ is particularly apt in the U.S., where every attack successfully
carried out since 9/11 was committed by citizens or permanent legal residents [16]. We note that Klausen
has recently advocated that such a concept is misleading when referring to terrorist violence in Europe. She
points to the empirical evidence of a large European terrorist network of 85 individuals who responsible
for the 2016 Brussels and Paris attacks were also responsible for 9 other plots in Europe (4 of which were
successful) from 2014 to 2016.
12The term ‘lone wolf terrorist’ is another frequently used term for ‘homegrown terrorist,’ but is also
commonly-debated among terrorism researchers and practitioners. According to [116, 292], ‘lone wolf ter-
rorist’ potentially helps glorify the offenders while also ambiguously setting unclear limitations on either the
number of actors and their connections to any broader networks.
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2.2.1. Data sources. Deciding on a data source is the first step in quantifying the
previous acts of violent extremism. Various organizations to keep track of terrorist-related
incidents, but the numbers seem to vary based upon the definition of terrorism or extremist
violence, the time window of analysis, and the geographical scope (e.g., US, Western Europe,
international). They also vary in the level of reported detail and the plot/incident character-
istics coded. For instance, the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) hosts the Global Terrorism Database
[178] of both U.S. and international terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2015, while Esri has
produced a crowd-sourced database and visualization of worldwide terrorist incidents for
2016 and 2017 [97]. START also produced two databases with a U.S. focus. First, the U.S.
Extremist Crime Database [112] contains criminal incidents from 1990-2015 by far rightists,
Islamist radicals, animal and environmental extremists. Second, START had maintained
an informative database of the characteristics of U.S. violent and non-violent extremists
called Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) [179]. Importantly,
it contains individual-level details of offender demographic backgrounds and radicalization
characteristics of nearly 1500 individuals motivated by varying ideologies from 1948-2013.
While the START databases are widely cited for raw incident numbers, we chose to use
the New America database13 in this primer to provide an overview of the trends in terrorist
attacks. This think tank’s database 1) is focused only on U.S. incidents since September 11,
2001, 2) includes important coded details on the incident as well as their perpetrators, 3)
contains up-to-date information and is observed to be updated fairly quickly following recent





Figure 2.1. (a) Percentage of U.S. terrorist plots from jihadist ideology that
were prevented or not prevented. The (blank) categories in the dataset were
mostly attributed to U.S. individuals who successfully traveled or attempted
to travel to become foreign fighters. (b) The breakdown of plots by type over
time. Data provided by [17].
Figure 2.2. The total number of victims (killed and wounded) by year in
U.S. terrorist plots from the jihadist ideology. Data provided by [17].
2.2.2. The trends in both successful and prevented attacks. Within the U.S.
both the number and lethality of violent extremist plots have been growing. While Fig. 2.1a
shows a vast majority of terrorist plots inspired by the Salafi-jihadist ideology have been
prevented, Fig. 2.1b shows that the number of plots has grown particularly since 2009 and
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peaked to 34 in 2015 alone.14 Beyond simply the number of plots, Fig. 2.2 shows the yearly
totals of those killed and wounded by these terrorist attacks that were successfully carried
out. While one could argue that the number of incidents has been relatively small since 9/11,
the timeline is punctuated by spikes of a large number of victims for each successful attack.
Notably, the Fort Hood shooting by Nidal Hasan occurred in 2009, the Boston Marathon
bombing by Tamerlan and Dhzokhar Tsarnaev occurred in 2013, the San Bernardino shooting
by Sayed Farook and Tashfeen Malik occurred in 2015, and most recently the Orlando
night club shooting by Omar Mateen occurred in 2016. The costliness of the operational
deficiencies of existing counter-radicalization and counter-terrorism efforts is clear: the 26
attacks carried out in the U.S. since 9/11 had a collective total of 95 killed and 353 wounded15
Figure 2.3. Major terrorist attacks in Western Europe from September 11,
2001 to March 23, 2017. Source: [87].
14Plots according to the database are broadly defined to include anyone charged with a terrorist-related
offense, and can include those attempting to travel to Iraq or Syria to fight for the Islamic State, or those
providing material support to terrorists, or those plotting and attempting to carry out their own attacks.
15While a statistical outlier, it is also important to recall that the terrorist attacks on 9/11 killed 2996
people and wounded over 6000.
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It is also important to put the violent extremist threat in the U.S. in context with other
areas around the world. Of serious concern is the noticeably larger threat by Salafi-jihadists
to Western Europe. The infographic in Fig. 2.3 shows the number of killed in each of the
major terrorist attacks since 2001, with a focus on the data points in red since those are due
to jihadists. Several factors have been posited to explain this difference, to include Europe’s
geographic proximity to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and the relative ease by which trained
and radicalized foreign fighters can return, as well as the lack of intelligence sharing among
European countries [36, 96]. Law enforcement agencies in Western Europe too are facing
resource constraints and the inability to track all those radicalizing individuals they deem
are potential threats [88, 255].
Another benefit of the New America dataset is that it provides, where possible, the
identification of the primary method by which each terrorist attack or threat was prevented
based upon publicly available information. While the method of prevention was unclear for
a significant portion of cases (28%), we do gain insights on the prevalence of the known
methods of prevention in aggregate in Fig. 2.4 as well as over time in Fig. 2.5.
The data source did not provide exact definitions for each of these prevention methods,
but we provide general descriptions below.
• Informant: A confidential human source such as a former extremist now cooperat-
ing with law enforcement or an undercover law enforcement officer who provided
intelligence about a particular individual and plot [10].
• Militant self-disclosed: The data sources [17] seems to utilize this code when the
individual openly discussed his/her views in an open forum (through social media
or some other periodical).
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Figure 2.4. Method of prevention of U.S. terrorist plots from the jihadist
ideology since 9/11. Data provided by [17].
Figure 2.5. Method of prevention of U.S. terrorist plots from the jihadist
ideology since 9/11 over time. Data provided by [17].
• Routine law enforcement: The data sources [17] seems to utilize this code when
individuals are discovered primarily through the investigative work of local law
enforcement and observing a suspicious social media posting.
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• Suspicious activity report (SAR): A report of “observed behavior reasonably in-
dicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism and other criminal activity”
[222]. The report is usually made by local law enforcement and sent for further
analysis to either the FBI or an intelligence fusion center.
• NSA surveillance targeting non-U.S. persons under Section 702 (of the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act- FISA): This is the targeted collection of communications
of non-U.S. persons located abroad for foreign intelligence purposes. The revelation
and use of the identities of U.S. persons who are part of those communications are
only allowed “under narrowly defined circumstances” [257]. Based upon a 2013 NSA
fact sheet, the circumstances are when “it is necessary to understand the intelligence
or assess its importance, is evidence of a crime, or indicates a threat of death or
serious bodily harm” [218].
• NSA bulk collection under Section 215 (of the PATRIOT Act): This is the telephone
metadata program that allows the NSA to selectively query telephone carriers to
reveal the date and time of the call, the calling and called numbers, and the duration
of the call [136].
As mentioned earlier, the demand on law enforcement to prevent attacks has compelled
them to increase the use of confidential human sources (informants). Since 9/11, this method
accounted for about 24% of the total number of preventions (the most of any known preven-
tion method) and is seen in the Fig. 2.5 as generally increasing since 2009. But as pointed
out earlier, these methods are also resource-intensive [123] and therefore limited. It is also
worth highlighting that the proportion of preventions as a result of community or family tips
is only 10% since 9/11 and has occurred intermittently without a noticeable increase over
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time. While more analysis most assuredly needs to be done, when this statistic is paired with
another that others were aware of lone-actors terrorist planning in over 69% of Al-Qaeda
related cases in U.S. and Europe from 1990-2012 [116, p. 431],16 it calls into question the
efficacy of the current emphasis on law enforcement engagement of local communities for
increased information sharing.17
2.2.3. Role of social media and the widespread dissemination of propa-
ganda. While there are a variety of socio-economic issues that may be factors in the rad-
icalization process, the prevalence of jihadist themes and messages on social media most
recently promulgated by the Islamic State (commonly known as ISIS) serves as a significant
driver by inspiring recruits, garnering support, and provoking homegrown attacks or foreign
fighter activities. ISIS has shown its preference to disseminate propaganda and messages on
Twitter because of its low barrier to entry and the high message reach [166].
Online Radicalization. Percentage of extremists who maintained a social media profile with jihadist material or 
utilized encryption for plotting since 9/11. Hover over a bar for more detail on the number of individuals who were 
charged or died in each year.
Figure 2.6. Percentage by year since 9/11 of violent extremists inspired by
the jiha st ideology who “maintained a social media profile with jihadist ma-
terial or utilized encryption for plotting” [17]. Source: [17].
16See Section 2.4.3 for more details.
17See Section 2.3.1 for more details.
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Fig. 2.6 depicts the percentage of violent extremists who had some form of online or
digital presence, which [17] defined as those who “maintained a social media profile with
jihadist material or utilized encryption for plotting.” It is clear that among the perpetrators
of violent radicalization, this behavior has become more prevalent.18
During testimony before the Senate in 2016, the former FBI Director observed,
[W]e are confronting an explosion of terrorist propaganda and training avail-
able via the Internet and social networking media. Due to online recruitment
and indoctrination, foreign terrorist organizations are no longer dependent on
finding ways to get terrorist operatives into the U.S. to recruit and carry out
acts. Terrorists in ungoverned spacesboth physical and cyberreadily dissemi-
nate poisoned propaganda and training materials to attract easily influenced
individuals around the world to their cause. They encourage these individuals
to travel, but if they cannot travel, they motivate them to act at home. This
is a significant change and transformation from the terrorist threat our nation
faced a decade ago [57].
An in-depth treatment of social media radicalization and recruitment is found in [187].
The specific usage of Twitter and other social media by ISIS is described in [19], while an
analysis of the social media networks of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria is available in [166].
Other social media services such as Telegram and WhatsApp are being used for even
more nefarious purposes because they proffer end-to-end encryption of communications and
claim that it is impossible to give access to the data even with a court warrant. This is
what the FBI Director calls, “going dark,” and is a tactic that is increasingly being used by
violent extremists especially in the near-term execution of their attacks [58]. See the 2015
Paris terrorist attack [245] and 2017 UK Parliament attack [70] as case studies.
18We note that [134] seemed to contradict this by determining that only 12.6% of 183 individuals con-
victed for terrorist offenses in the U.S. from 1995-2012 had viewed videos or websites dedicated to online
extremist material. However, the study admitted that their estimate was likely more conservative due to
data limitations (i.e., they principally used as sources indictments and sufficient quantities of open source
reporting, neither of which may have contained details of this non-illegal behavior.)
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2.2.4. Trends in known associates and co-conspirators. As discussed previ-
ously, recent cases of violent extremism have demonstrated that perpetrators can operate
in a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. As shown in Fig. 2.7, nearly a third of all plots
in the U.S. since 9/11 involved more than 1 individual, meaning that attacks were carried
out by more than 1 person, or that authorities were able to bring charges to associates for
providing material support or a conspiring to commit terrorist acts. Fig. 2.8 is a histogram
of the total number of plots involving a varying number of individuals. For example, the
Boston Marathon bombing by the Tsarnaev brothers is counted in the ‘2’ bar, whereas the
San Bernardino shooting involving Farook, Malik, and Marquez is counted in the ‘3’ bar.
The point is that a significant portion of terrorist plots involve associates, and therefore it
might be important to explore how clusters of individuals could be exhibiting indicators for
planned violence.
Figure 2.7. Percentage of U.S. terrorist plots since 9/11 involving the charges
of more than one individual. Data source: [17].
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Figure 2.8. Histogram of the number of individuals charged in U.S. terrorist
plots from the jihadist ideology since 9/11. Data source: [17].
There is further support for the prevalence and relevance of small groups of perpetrators
among violent extremist attacks [116, 292]. Researchers in [116] sought the inclusion of
“isolated dyads,” which they defined as “pairs of individuals who operate independently of a
[terrorist or extremist ]group” and “may become radicalized to violence on their own (or one
may have radicalized the other), and they conceive, develop, and carry out activities without
direct input from a wider network” [116, p. 426]. According to the same researchers, isolated
dyads constitute around 27% of the 119 ‘lone-actor terrorists’ from the United States and
Europe from 1990-2012 (which include those motivated by right-wing and Ismalist ideologies,
as well animal, environmental, and anti-abortion issues) [116].
In summary, this section quantified the threat from violent extremists motivated by Salafi-
jihadism in the U.S. as well as investigated the empirical support for various characteristics
of their radicalization (namely, the online/social media component and the role of associates
and co-conspirators).
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2.3. Strategies to Counter the Threat from Violent Extremists
Given the scale and multi-faceted aspects of the threat posed by violent extremists and
violent extremism, many recognize that comprehensive strategies must be developed and
implemented to adequately counter the threat. Particularly useful in each of the strategies
is also an inherent position on the gaps or shortfalls present in current effort. In this section,
we cover the current U.S. strategy to counter threats from violent extremists, as well as
elements of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) multi-national strategy
to countering violent extremism and the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security
Committee’s strategy against Islamic Terror.
Figure 2.9. Graphic from the GAO Report to Congressional Inquiries de-
picting how countering violent extremism is different from counterterrorism.
Source: [122, p. 7].
2.3.1. Current U.S. strategy. While a legacy from the previous Administration,
the current U.S. strategy to counter the threat from violent extremists can be viewed as
bifurcated into two efforts: countering violent extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism (CT).
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The former is defined as “proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to recruit, rad-
icalize, and mobilize followers to violence” [227, p. 2], while the latter, lacking an available
explicit definition, can by aptly summarized as actions to prevent terrorist attacks and “to
disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents” [226].
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) most recently released a report assessing the im-
plementation of the Federal Government’s strategy to counter violent extremism [122] and
included a graphic to depict the distinction between CVE and CT. See Fig. 2.9.
The U.S. Government’s strategy to counter violent extremism, as expressed in the 2016
Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering of Local Partners to Prevent Violent Ex-
tremism in the United States, fundamentally seeks to “address the conditions and reduce
the factors that most likely contribute to recruitment and radicalization by violent extrem-
ists” [227, p. 2]. Operating on the assumption that “strong and resilient local communities
are the most effective means of safeguarding individuals in the United States against violent
extremist recruitment and radicalization,” the strategy is focused entirely on engaging and
supporting local communities and stakeholders. Where law enforcement is addressed, it is
limited to expanding the use of community policing strategies to “build trust, mutual respect,
and collaboration between police and the communities they serve” [227, p. 9], while also lim-
iting CVE efforts from including the “gathering intelligence or performing investigations for
the purpose of criminal prosecution” [227, p. 2]. The Department of Homeland Security’s
Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism echoed this prohibition as one of its guiding prin-
ciples: “intelligence and law enforcement investigations are not part of CVE activities” [74,
31
p. 2]. Part of this may be attributed to a lesson learned from the UK Prevent counter-
radicalization program, which was accused of targeting Muslim communities and ultimately
lost the trust of many British Muslims [24].
However, while the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice
jointly lead the federal efforts on countering violent extremism [122], each also has their own
investigative arms (Homeland Security Investigations and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tions, respectively). The possibility of a conflict of interests has already been addressed in
[291].19 The problem is exacerbated at the State, Local, and Tribal law enforcement levels
where many organizations do not necessarily have the personnel or resources to keep separate
responsibilities between CVE and normal investigations [267].
Whether such agencies can truly separate their CVE efforts and not involve any aspect of
their investigative authorities has yet to be established. However, recent research states that
this prescription is only part of the set of broader recommendations to help improve effective
community policing to counter violent extremism [267]. Overall, the recommendations are
focused on a genuine commitment by law enforcement leaders for deeper community engage-
ment, the quality and expanse of law enforcement engagement efforts with the community,
training for officers in “outreach techniques and cultural competency,” and “finding ways to
19Dr. Southers, the director of Homegrown Violent Extremism Studies at the University of Souther
California Sol Price School of Public Policy, wrote in an Op-Ed in the Los Angeles Times, “There was a
fundamental error in charging U.S. attorneys with managing the CVE pilots. A successful program cannot
be run by the same arm of government that prosecutes terrorism cases. That demands an unrealistic level of
trust on the part of the community. Why would someone participate in such an initiative if they fear their
questions, comments and concerns could lead to an FBI agent knocking on their door?” [291].
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divert individuals away from the criminal justice system when possible by providing them
the resources and assistance they need” [267, p. 6].20
Beyond the U.S. White House strategy to deal with the threat from violent extremism,
we deem it important to discuss two more because of their integrated approach to address
all aspects of the problem and their prescriptions for the integration of both hard and soft
power.
2.3.2. CSIS strategy for countering violent extremism. In 2015 the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) established the Commission on Countering
Violent Extremism to assess the worldwide problem and provide specific recommendations
to the next U.S. administration and its governmental and non-governmental partners on
“dimish[ing] the appeal of extremist ideologies and narratives” [126]. The comprehensive
strategy represented the consensus of numerous public- and private-sector leaders from
academia, civil society, the faith community, and technology companies. This report outlined
the following eight components:
(1) Strengthening resistance to extremist ideologies.
(2) Investing in community-led prevention.
(3) Saturating the global marketplace of ideas.
(4) Aligning policies and values.
(5) Deploying military and law enforcement tools.
(6) Exerting White House leadership.
20Schanzer acknowledges that many police departments “have been interacting with their Muslim Amer-
ican constituents for years or are forging ahead with substantial efforts to build relationships of trust with
Muslim American communities [267, p. 13]. For example, following the release of this CVE strategy, the FBI
described their own CVE strategy implementation as involving the positive engagement of local communities
in Minnesota leading to law enforcement’s ability to “charge - locally or at the federal level - some really
bad actors and recruiters of young people for nefarious purposes” [107].
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(7) Expanding countering violent extremism (CVE) models.
(8) Surging funding [126].
This strategy to counter violent extremism was comprehensive and included efforts to support
and bolster communities to resist the extremist ideologies and the need to employ additional
law enforcement tools as well. The CSIS Commission agreed that CVE and CT must be
separated in terms of “tactics, agencies, and actors involved” but also stated that “effective
strategy will require soft and hard power operating at scale an in tandem” [126, p. 49]. For
instance, the Commission stressed the need for “codified protocols for referrals” where law
enforcement can recommend cases for NGO/community off-ramps, and where communities
can refer cases to law enforcement [126, p. 41].
We stake that our proposal of a radicalization detection system is part of the ‘developing
military and law enforcement tools’ component in this overarching strategy. We also envision
that our system could be helpful in the assessment efforts of non-governmental organizations
working in CVE [165]. These organizations are actively trying to identify those radicalizing
individuals short of any criminal activity and steer them to suitable “off ramps.”
2.3.3. U.S. House of Representatives strategy. Another strategy document worth
mentioning is the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee’s “A Na-
tional Strategy to Win the War Against Islamist Terror” [197]. Citing the obsolescence
of existing U.S. strategies, the Homeland Security Committee developed this strategy in
consultation with other national security experts. Their prescriptions included:
(1) Thwart attacks and protect our communities.
(2) Stop recruitment and radicalization at home.
(3) Keep terrorists out of America.
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(4) Take the fight to the enemy.
(5) Combat terrorist travel and cut off financial resources.
(6) Deny jihadists access to weapons of mass destruction.
(7) Block terrorists from returning to the battlefield.
(8) Prevent the emergence of new networks and safe havens.
(9) Win the battle of ideas [197].
Our work also addresses several aspects of this House Committee’s strategy. For instance,
to thwart attacks the committee recommended 1) “robust, real-time information sharing”
without the loss of even a “data-point”, and 2) that “social media should be better incorpo-
rated into investigations as well as routine criminal screening and other background checks
in order to identify suspects who have openly broadcasted their support of foreign terrorist
organizations” [197, p. 9]. In the category of stopping recruitment and radicalization, the
Committee recommended expanding confidential tip line for citizens within communities to
report not just suspicious activity but other concerns related to “possible terrorist radicaliza-
tion” in their neighborhoods. Our vision for a common, fused graph database of the on- and
off-line indicators and tips to law enforcement about those on the radicalization pathways
would be a major step towards each of these prescriptions.
2.4. Radicalization Research
In this section, we provide a brief survey of the large body of radicalization research
within the last 15 years. We first discuss two opposing views of the population of individuals
undergoing radicalization. Then we provide an overview of the main radicalization models,
35
frameworks, and early warning behavior research currently available. Ultimately, our pro-
posal for a radicalization detection system relies on the advancements on this still expanding
literature.
2.4.1. Radicalization of beliefs versus actions. In order to understand a par-
ticular radicalization model, we identified two main conceptualizations of the radicalization
process. Much of the research until recently was based on the notion that radicalization
is a social-psychological process that individuals underwent toward increasingly threaten-
ing stages that did not seem to distinguish beliefs, views, or opinions from behaviors. See
Fig. 2.10, which visually depicts the population along the spectrum from the vulnerable to
the imprisoned. Some critical of this conceptualization have characterized it as a “conveyer
belt” [200, p. 211], or worse as a “religious conveyer belt” [241, p. 3] implying the pathway
wrongfully rests on Islamic stereotypes.
Source: http://news.intelwire.com/2012/03/visualizing-cve-audiences.html
Figure 2.10. The various populations of support for terrorist groups as con-
ceptualized by Berger [2012]. We take the support for terrorist groups, espe-
cially with the distincti ns of “law-abiding” and “cri inal” to be synonymous
with violent extremist radicalization. Source: [18].
More recently, researchers beginning with Bartlett and Miller [12] began distinguishing
those who held radical views versus those who turned to violence while holding those views.
McCauley and Moskalenko conceptualized this in [199] by proposing a two pyramid model
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that separates radicalization of opinion and radicalization of action. See Fig. 2.11. The key
insight is that violent radicalization (towards actions) is a distinct process from non-violent
radicalization (of opinions and beliefs) [200, 264, 266] and can explain how many people may
hold radical beliefs or opinions, but only a few relatively will undertake radical actions.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.11. The two pyramid model of radicalization. (a) is the opinion
radicalization pyramid and (b) is the action radicalization pyramid. Source:
[199]
Researchers in [199, 200] clearly advocate for the two pyramid model to support the
statistical observation that radicalization of opinion rarely leads to radicalized action. On
the other side of the debate are those who see beliefs and actions as inextricably interwoven
in radicalization conceptualizations. There are even others like Dean in [67] who focus on the
assessment of beliefs and attitudes as a critical step in conducting a threat risk assessment.
Regardless of who is right, we think that our approach, more than anything, calls for the
fusion of the ideology identification with the behavioral detection in order to come up with
a more informed risk assessment of extremist violence.
McCauley and Moskalenko also state that “means and opportunity” are important in
evaluating the risk of engaging in terrorist action, again as a way to explain why so many
people with radical views never commit radical actions [199, p. 4]. But our approach of
utilizing a heterogeneous graph database, in fact, seeks to find the connections between
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individuals, actions, and circumstances that would reveal such means and opportunities to
an analyst. For example, our data model would capture the activity of support networks
who give people the last push to participate in some action, or the new social influence or a
suspicious travel behavior that may have opened doors and social networks for individuals.
It may even capture the existence of alienation or desperateness (loss of family, divorce,
threat of deportation, etc) through text analysis of social media posts or court filings.
Lastly, of particular interest is that McCauley and Moskalenko recently posited “at least
five trajectories of radicalization to terrorist action:”
(1) Lone wolf (an individual undertakes “political violence alone without group or or-
ganizational support”)
(2) Foreign fighters (an individual undertakes violence “by joining an already violent
group”)
(3) Suicide bomber (an individual undertakes violence “by volunteering as a suicide
bomber for an already violent group”)
(4) Small, isolated group terrorist plot (akin to Sageman’s “bunch of guys” [263])
(5) “Small group within a larger activist movement” turning to “violence as part of
intergroups competition” [200]
The importance of distinguishing and specifying what behavior one is tracking the radical-
ization is also discussed in [134, 214, 266].21 Our methodology, although presently limited
in empirical testing of a generic extremist violence trajectory, could also potentially handle
separate graph patterns for each of the other different types of trajectories.
21For example, Monahan stated that risk assessments need to be clear on what they are assessing: “the
risk of terrorism in the aggregate, or of specific types of terrorism, or of specific phases in the process of
becoming a terrorist, or of specific roles in terrorist activity” [214, p. 167].
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2.4.2. Radicalization mechanisms. There are several works which focus on under-
standing the various mechanism of radicalization, meaning those factors which might cause
someone to increasingly participate in violent extremism. For instance, [198] provides an
overview of the individual and group mechanisms (psychological and social) that would
cause an individual to radicalize. This included a list seven individual-level mechanisms:
personal grievance, group grievance, slippery slope of small increments in action, love for
someone in a militant group, escape from a situation more risky than terrorism, thrill and
status seeking, and seeking new friends after losing social connections (unfreezing) [199, p. 3].
Another example is [302], which provides a root cause model of Islamist Radicalization. We
refer the reader to these works but do not provide additional details in this thesis because we
are less focused on explanatory models for radicalization than the detection of the observable
behavioral indicators when one is undergoing violent radicalization.
2.4.3. Antecedent and early warning behavior research. Beyond just under-
standing what brings someone further along the radicalization process, there are quite a
number works which focus on early warning behaviors. Gill in [116] conducted an in depth
study the statistically significant characteristics and early warning behaviors that are present
among 119 lone-actors terrorists who had engaged in or planned to engage in violence within
the U.S. and Europe and were either convicted of their offenses or had died as a result of
their offenses. The important research better informs both CVE organizations focused on
identifying and off-ramping individuals on radicalization paths, as well as law enforcement
organizations seeking to prevent future attacks. See Fig. 2.12 for these features in Al-Qaeda
related lone-actors (radical extremists inspired by Salafi-jihadist ideology) as compared to
other lone-actors.
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Figure 2.12. Table comparing the characteristics and antecedent behaviors
of right-wing, single-issue, and Al Qaeda-related lone-actors. Statistical anal-
ysis of 119 individuals who were convicted or dies in the commission of their
crimes in the United States and Europe from 1990-2012. Source: [116, p. 431].
We include these tables for reference specifically because of the antecedent behaviors
and not for the personal characteristics that would profile individuals. In particular, the
statistically significant behaviors which may help indicate radicalization include:
• More likely to seek legitimization from “religious, political, social, or civic leaders
prior to their terrorist event or plot” [116, p. 431].
• More likely to have others help procure weaponry.
• More likely to have command and control links with a terrorist group, which means
that the individual was “trained and equipped by a group- which may also choose
their targets” but “attempt[ed] to carry out their attacks autonomously” [116,
p. 431].
• Less likely to have a previous criminal conviction or been previously imprisoned.
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• More likely to have learned through virtual (online) sources.
• More likely that others are aware of individual’s planning.
Furthermore, these researchers also provided analysis of the network-related antecedent be-
haviors that provide the supporting motivation for our graph-based approach. See Fig. 2.13.
Even for those individuals without command and control links, there are many statistically
significant pre-attack behaviors such as the consumption of propaganda and learning to
conducting various aspects of the terrorist plot through virtual sources.
Figure 2.13. Table comparing the characteristics and antecedent, network-
related behaviors of individuals who had or did not have command and control
links as well as isolated dyads. Source: [116, p. 432].
The above results counter the common notion that homegrown violent extremist at-
tacks are “virtually undetectable” [116] due to their social isolation [10, p. 1652], and rather
suggest that “many lone-actor terrorists regularly interact with wider pressure groups and
movements either face-to-face or virtually” and lends credence to the use of “traditional
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counterterrorism measures (such as counterintelligence, HUMINT, interception of communi-
cations, surveillance of persons, etc)” in the detection of those on pathways towards violence
[116, p. 434]. In our work, we also intend to exploit these network connections in order to
conduct risk assessments on those who may be on pathways towards violent extremism.
Another related study is a proposal for the typology of early warning behaviors found
in various forms of targeted violence by Meloy [203]. These eight early warning behaviors
(not just antecedent behaviors) shown in Fig. 2.14 were derived by extensive empirical study
by a forensic psychologist who consults for the FBI. These indicators were intended to be
1. Pathway warning behavior: Any behavior that is part of research, planning, preparation, or 
implementation of an attack
2. Fixation warning behavior: Any behavior that indicates an increasingly pathological preoccupation with a 
person or a cause.
3. Identification warning behavior: Any behavior that indicates a psychological desire to be a “pseudo-
commando”
4. Novel aggression warning behavior: An act of violence which appears unrelated to any targeted violence 
pathway warning behavior which is committed for the first time
5. Energy burst warning behavior: An increase in the frequency or variety of any noted activities related to 
the target, even if the activities themselves are relatively innocuous, usually in the days or weeks before the 
attack 
6. Leakage warning behavior: The communication to a third party of an intent to do harm to a target 
through an attack 
7. Last resort warning behavior: Evidence of a violent “action imperative” 
8. Directly communicated threat warning behavior: The communication of a direct threat to the target or 
law enforcement beforehand.
Figure 2.14. The eight warning behaviors of targeted violence proposed
Meloy [2012]. Graphic created from content in [203].
determined through a threat risk assessment by a trained psychologist taking into account
the totality of the available verbal communications and behaviors observed to subjectively
determine the threat. However, we note that at least two of them— leakage and directly
communicated threat warning behaviors— might be directly available to law enforcement
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prior to an attack through confidential source reports or public social media posts. Addition-
ally, under the Electronic Communications Protection Act, a law enforcement entities may
be able to get access to very specific electronic activities (email content, internet searches,
etc) with a subpoena, warrant and other court order [34, 301] that might corroborate these
behaviors as well as reveal more about pathway warning behaviors.22 Such requests, however,
face tremendous scrutiny and often require demonstration of probable cause that a crime
has already been committed or justification of emergency circumstances to save lives. See
for example Google’s explanation of the law enforcement requirements in [124].
Another work worth mentioning due to its unique methodology is the work by Bartlett
and Miller in [12], who set out to find out what characteristics of violent radicals were distinct
from non-violent radicals (as a means to avoid selecting only on the dependent variable).
Through extensive interviews with non-violent radicals and convicted violent radicals, the
researchers provided empirical evidence for the distinguishing indicators found only in violent
ones and dispelled generalized indicators common to both populations. For instance, the
researchers pointed out that both groups are familiar and agreed that the term and concept
of “kafir” (non-believer) can describe non-Muslims, but only the violent radicals use the
term as a means to “dehumanize non-Muslims and Muslims who disagree with their views”
[12, p. 10]. They also found that while many violent and non-violent radicals viewed violent
films, it was mostly violent radicals who would watch them in groups. Also, only violent
radicals distributed videos about jihad, engaged in debates between “do-ers” and “talkers.”
[12, p. 17]. This work has tremendously important implications in the development of
more discerning indicators of violent radicals. However, as part of a radicalization detection
22Researchers in [118] describe empirical digital evidence for past lone actors who signaled attacks, selected
targets, and conducted other pre-attack planning and preparation through internet-related activity.
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system, it would very valuable to detect the presence of these concepts automatically through
machine learning and natural language processing.
Lastly, in this subsection, we highlight the work by Schuurman and Eijkman [271], a
relevant paper which attempts to identify the seven distinct (possibly concurrent) phases
of terrorist preparation for an attack. The study is based upon seven cases of homegrown
jihadism in Western Europe from 2004 to 2007. The researchers essentially examined the
empirical evidence to formulate a pre-attack process framework. Particularly useful was the
detailed behavior types provided for each of the phases and threat stages, and the potential
basis the collection served as a future risk indicator typology.
Figure 2.15. The conceptual framework of pre-attack activities of terrorist
proposed by Schuurman and Eijkman [2015]. Source: [271].
2.4.4. Stage-based radicalization models. There is quite a number of conceptual,
phase-based models for violent radicalization proposed in the literature that provide indica-
tive behaviors or psychological states of individuals along the process. See [31, 86, 164]
for some thorough surveys and Fig. 2.16, which shows some detail on the five commonly
cited models to give the reader a sense for the types of the progression forwards terrorist
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violence. According to [164], linear means that the progression must occur in ordered stages,
while Sageman’s non-linear model attempts to describe the four factors which combine (not
necessarily in order) to motivate extremist violence. Later in this subsection, we intend to
discuss the radicalization model proposed by Klausen [165, 167], which is based in part on
the NYPD’s Silber and Bhatt model.
Figure 2.16. The five stage or factor-based radicalization models analyzed
in King [2011] and a summary of the various stages or factors. Source: [164].
The phase-based models that emerged between 2003 and 2008 faced two main criticisms.
The first was that they are subject to selection bias because they are derived from “successful”
cases of radicalization to violent extremism [264, 302]. The second critique was that they
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utilize “vague” or “general” traits which could easily apply to others who are not radicalizing
at all and has the potential for causing discrimination [241, 302].
We have a two-part response to the first critique. First, as mentioned previously, re-
searchers beginning with Bartlett and Miller [11, 12] have begun to empirically distinguish
those who held radical views versus those who turned to violence while holding those views.
Admittedly, this research approach is still maturing, but the original Bartlett findings were
significant in and of themselves. Additionally, without excusing the need for discerning
indicators, our approach and the approach of many other researchers and practitioners is
to screen for those suspicious behaviors that may suggest someone is on the pathway to
radicalization. We are not trying to statistically predict those who will commit violent acts.
In response to the second critique, more recent work including that of Schuurman and
Eijkman [271] and Klausen [165, 168] propose radicalization models and frameworks that
are much more descriptive and include specific behaviors to describe the radicalization pro-
cess. Notably, the Klausen radicalization model, which we will cover next, contains many of
Bartlett’s discerning characteristics between radicals and terrorists (violent radicals). Addi-
tionally, Klausen’s behavior-based approach, which we adopt in our research, is in contrast
to ones that are reliant on either physical appearance or socio-demographic profiles, and
have been dismissed as lacking statistical basis [116] or as potentially misleading [223].
2.4.4.1. Klausen dynamic radicalization model. In this work, we specifically seek the ad-
vancement and eventual operationalization of the Klausen’s novel dynamic radicalization
model and its associated behavioral indicators found in [165, 168]. In a project funded by
the National Institute of Justice, Klausen and her research team undertook a multi-year study
to empirically test their dynamic model for radicalization based upon the NYPD Silber and
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Figure 2.17. Klausen’s Dynamic Risk Assessment Model showing the be-
havioral indicators of state progression in radicalization trajectories [167].
Bhatt model discussed previously [285]. The model contains four stages: Pre-Radicalization,
Detachment, Peer-Immersion and Training, and Planning and Execution of Violent Action.
The description and possible indicators associated with each stage are shown in Fig 2.17.
The researchers then compiled a dataset that contained actual or inferred dates of the
behavioral indicators of 135 US Al Qaeda-inspired violent extremists who committed offenses
between 2001 and 2015. This dataset [167] was constructed entirely from publicly available
sources (court documents and investigations into their activities conducted by the United
States government and news media, which may have included online communications posted
by the terrorist offenders). Appendix C contains the codebook they used in this process to
determine if the indicators were present in each individual’s detailed history.
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The researchers then empirically assessed a dynamic model for radicalization, found a
large number of behavioral cues that occurred in the right sequence in a high percentage of
cases, and arrived at a predictable structure/template for the radicalization process. They
also made some important findings on the duration of radicalization trajectories. This study
was a significant advancement in the field, especially for the accessible dataset based on
publicly available material and the important conclusion that radicalization based on Salafi-
jihadist ideology did often follow an empirically-assessed structure or template. Moreover,
its findings on radicalization durations should be very informative to both practitioners and
policy-makers alike, and may even signal necessary changes to policies and procedures on
how long investigations should stay open and how long any form of surveillance is authorized
to continue [168].
It is important to emphasize that these conclusions were limited to violent extremists
motivated by the Salafi-jihadist belief system. Klausen wrote:
The question is often raised whether radicalization to violent extremism is per-
haps not “the same” across ideologies, and the essential factor here is simply
some pathology of extremism. This may be true in so far as networks and
detachment from ordinary life are the essential elements of the recruitment
to cults and sects - or gangs. But if the process may appear to be similar,
the drivers are different. At this level of abstraction little can be learned that
is of practical use for crafting intervention programs addressing homegrown
terrorism. There are common features, such self-alienation from family and
productive engagement with institutions of education or employment. How-
ever, other crucial features of behavior vary because of the different action
scripts for followers advocated by the ideologies [169].
The U.S. government’s broad definition of violent extremism and its umbrella strategy
of countering violent extremism based upon all ideologies and motivations23 had fostered
generalizable radicalization research detached from specifics to any one ideology. Klausen’s
23See Section 2.3.1 for discussion of the U.S. government strategy.
48
conclusion at least suggests the most effective detection and subsequent intervention pro-
grams would depend on knowledge of ideology-specific indicators.
Later in Chapter 8, we utilize the Klausen dataset to model radicalization as a discrete
dynamical process in order to find more discerning patterns of behavioral indicators for those
on path trajectories towards extremist violence.
2.4.5. Case Studies of Violent Extremists. In Appendix B, we detail three spe-
cific case studies of violent extremist plots planned or carried out in the U.S. While no
case is considered “typical,” we chose these specific ones because they highlight the realistic
complexity of law enforcement prevention efforts, a retrospective look at the possible indica-
tors exhibited, and insights into the level of data collection and analysis needed to improve
detection efforts.
2.5. System Studies of Operational Level Research and Tools
In this section, we provide specific system studies of research or measures taken at the
operational level to counter the violent extremist threat. These efforts include 1) proposal
for early warning detection systems of targeted violence primarily through social media, 2)
practitioner instruments and tools to enable a more consistent but still manual assessment
of individual risk for violence, and 3) commercialized social media monitoring systems.
2.5.1. Proposed early warning detection systems of targeted violence.
There have been several preliminary efforts for threat-based monitoring systems in the liter-
ature in recent years, including [35, 157, 274, 276]. In [274] and [276], researchers devised the
architecture for a three-component monitoring system (consisting of a crawler, repository,
and analyzer), as well as formalized the necessary social media site data ontology. Their main
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application was the detection of potential school shooters. Researchers in [35] developed an
approach to detect the weak signals of lone wolf terrorists by analyzing for intent, capabil-
ity, and opportunity. This effort 1) emphasized individual potential terrorist identification
over terrorist group identification, and 2) focused on developing semi-automated (human
analyst in-the-loop) tools rather than fully-automated tools. Their proposed methodology
employed a web-crawler to find extremist forums/websites and algorithms to identify the
potential actors/aliases who are active them. From there, they identified potential methods
to estimate the components of a lone wolf hypothesis through tailored natural language pro-
cessing techniques. Lastly, in [157] researchers proposed SEMCON to calculate the similarity
of time-stamped social media posts to an empirically derived criminal ontology to identify
potential criminals.
Our work differs in two ways. First, while previous works focus only on utilizing social
media posts for indicators of threat-behavior, our overarching framework is premised on
the idea that analyses of both social media and linkages to off-line behaviors and activities
apparent in governmental databases are necessary for increased accuracy and the reduction
of false positives. Secondly, our work differs because we chose a graph-based representation
of the data to capture the richer relationships between individuals as well as the important
context of various behaviors.
2.5.2. Practitioner instruments and tools. In terms of manual tools, there is a
prevalence of structured professional judgment instruments for law enforcement agencies.
See, for example, VERA 2 [249], Radar-iTE used by the German BKA [15], and SAVE 30
[67, 68]). We highlight only the first and last for purposes of discussion.
50
VERA 2 is a structured professional judgment tool of 31 indicators for the identification
of risk specific to terrorists and violent political extremists. See Fig. 2.18. Developed by
psychologists in consultation with other professionals in law enforcement, corrections, and
forensic psychology, it was designed for those who were responsible for “assessing individual
risk for terrorist-related violence” [249, p. 244]. The researchers advocate for its use with
all “violent offenders for whom ideological motivation was involved in criminal action” (i.e.,
those already convicted)[249, p. 247] as a means to determine risk for future violence as well
as help in bail, placement and security classifications [249, p. 238]. The researchers also allow
for its use in pre-crime settings and for individuals under surveillance but recommend caution
based on “ethical and empirical [complexity] concerns” [249, p. 244]. The VERA 2 researchers
made it a point to state the importance of gathering and integration of “all available facts
and knowledge accessible from intelligence, legal, law enforcement, correctional and other
reports” for the assessor prior to the use of the tool for risk specification [249, p. 247]. This
fusion of information is clearly no small task in many cases and serves as one of the main
motivations of our research. As will be discussed in further detail later in Section 3.3.2, even
after considerable investment and effort, the fusion of intelligence and law enforcement data
is still challenged. It is not clear how quickly and easily knowledge about the individual being
assessed could be obtained, let alone considering if the knowledge about her or her associates
could be integrated into the analysis. For instance, indicator HC.2 “Network (family, friends)
involved in violent action” presumably requires knowledge of the individuals (possibly many)
associations and their behaviors. To implement the recommended process to scale, it is clear
that a novel database structure and query tools would be required.
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Figure 2.18. VERA 2 Indicators Source: [249, p. 245].
SAVE 30 is an empirically-validated, neurocognitive structured professional judgment
tool to quantify the predictive risk assessment of potential violent extremists [67, 68]. It
requires a trained analyst to complete an inventory on 30 perceptions and beliefs of each
suspected individual and is supported by a software tool that helps the assessor visualize
the risk [69]. For proprietary reasons, the specific 30 indicators are not available. This
work, while promising, differs from ours in three areas. First, our risk assessment protocol
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specifically utilizes overt and observable behavioral cues that bystanders (as well as law
enforcement) can identify [168], rather than cognitive states or perceptions which may be
much more difficult to discern. Second, unlike Dean, the initial dynamic risk assessment
protocol in [168] that we intend to build upon does not cover all forms of violent extremism.
As previously stated, Klausen’s conclusion is that “the ideology and the behavioral changes
and adaptations required by the Salafi-jihadist belief system [lends] a predictable structure
to the radicalization process” [168, p. i]. Lastly, beyond structured professional judgment
tools, we are rather seeking advancements towards a semi-automated risk assessment system
that can scale with both the number of potentially radical and radicalizing violent extremists
and the voluminous amount of behavioral and activities data they generate.
Some including [214, 249] proffer the use of structured professional judgment instruments
and make the conclusion that they are “clearly preferable [over other methods]” because they
can “jog the assessor’s memory [of relevant indicators]” while still allowing for “informed clin-
ical judgment” [214]. However, structured professional judgment tools clearly do not address
the aforementioned challenges related to the dynamics and scale of the radicalized violent
extremist problem. First, their use does not scale well because they require the manual as-
sessment of dozens of indicator items for each individual (in the case of VERA 2, 31 indicators
[249]). This process can be laborious and requires careful study of a suspect. Furthermore,
such instruments are not designed to consider behavioral dynamics of individuals or their
social ties, nor any measure of their trending.24
2.5.3. Social media monitoring systems. It is important to mention the commercial
systems that have been utilized by a variety of local and state law enforcement agencies to
24For example, while VERA 2 has the indicator “HC.2: network (family, friends) involved in violent
action,” [249] for which an assessor could rate “low,”, “moderate,” or “high,” this would likely oversimplify
any specific network influences or the unique roles that associates could perform in a conspiratorial plot.
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glean real time insights and alerts from social media. Prominent ones include Geofeedia,
Digital Fly, Social Sentinel, Digital Stakeout, Snaptrends, and Media Sonar. These services
have also found root in school and university safety [314]. According to [53] published by
Brennan Center for Justice, law enforcement agencies have used these services to:
• Gather evidence in criminal investigations.
• Decrease response times to incidents by alerting agencies of incidents.
• Alert police to potential threats.
• Detect trends in activities.
• Analyze the negative sentiment levels in social media posts [53].
None of these services have published their proprietary methods, but analyses of their
product websites indicates that the techniques include: 1) keyword filters for threats based
upon client input and security word libraries, 2) sentiment analysis, 3) establishment of
geo-fencing that provides search results localized to an area or establishment (i.e., school
or patrol area) of interest, 4) allowing clients to add context to searches to help officials
know what is really being discussed. Snaptrends, one service reportedly in use by both the
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice [39], also reportedly has the
capability for social media account entity resolution to allow the development of individual
profiles (including location information) across multiple social media accounts [40].
All services seem to provide alerts to administrators and clients of suspicious activity.
But two key shortcomings are that 1) insights are drawn primarily from social media and
no other data sources, and 2) alerts are only trigger-based, and may not explicitly include
analysis on individual behavioral trajectories through indicators over time.
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It is also important to note of that a number of these services, including Geofeedia, Snap-
trends, Media Sonar had some of their application program interfaces (APIs) with popular
social media sites suspended due to revelations about their uses by U.S police departments
[39–41, 60]. For example, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram all cut off both Geofeedia and
Media Sonar between October 2016 and Janurary 2017 following revelations that the services
helped police track social media posts of BlackLiveMatter activists [40, 243]. Additionally,
Snaptrends had its Twitter access suspended and reportedly shut down its law enforcement
support [53]. Twitter updated its platform policy in November 2016 to state, “We prohibit
developers using the Public APIs and Gnip data products from allowing law enforcement –
or any other entity – to use Twitter data for surveillance purposes. Period” [213]. Facebook
also updated its platform policy in March 2017 to state, “Don’t use data obtained from us
to provide tools that are used for surveillance” [281].
One other commercial product worth mentioning is Beware R©, a public safety personnel
information service created by West Safety Solutions (formerly Intrado). Designed to better
inform law enforcement of the potential threats when they respond to a house-call or other
emergency, the system is unique because it fuses not only social media [155] but publicly
available commercial records, data which includes “vehicle registrations, criminal records,
warrants, property records, and known associates before arrival at the scene” [308] to produce
a “threat” score for residents of the premises. This service also received public backlash. The
most current product fact sheet has removed any mention of social media usage, and it is
no longer clear if it still has access to data from the popular sites.
Lastly, it is important to mention signs that other countries may be having successes with
their use of social media monitoring services to prevent terrorist attacks. A recent article in
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the The Economist revealed that the Israeli Defense Forces reportedly employed specially
developed algorithms to monitor the social media activity of Palestinians on sites such as
Twitter and Facebook [87] to look for the presence of indicators found in past attackers.25
It is unclear the how such monitoring occurs in the international setting or whether such
surveillance continues given the later updates to platform policies. Interestingly, the Aus-
tralian police forces also utilize some form of social media analytics and touted some cases
of successful disruption of cases in 2016 [237]. According to a recent poll, the public there
seems to be favorable of surveillance for counter terrorism purposes, while being quite unfa-
vorable of the use of social media data for commercial and advertiser purposes [315] (which
ironically seems the opposite of the sentiment found in the U.S. [66, p. xi]).
2.6. Summary
This primer was provided to first detail the trends in both the number and lethality of
violent extremists plots particularly in the U.S. but also Western Europe. Included also was
a review of the large body of literature on the latest understanding of violent radicalization.
Existing research affirms the notion that personal (albeit widely various) behavioral trajec-
tories towards violent radicalization exist, and that many of these behavioral indicators were
indeed are detectable and observable. This conclusion forms a firm foundation for the rest
of the efforts in this thesis.
As shown in each of the stage-based models, there is also support for the importance of
social influences on one’s involvement in violent extremism. Personal and online relationships
25Indicators include: “allegations that Israel is ‘desecrating’ the al-Aqsa mosque on Temple Mount in
Jerusalem, complaints about the Palestinian leadership, and declarations of how they belong to a ‘lost
generation’ or are personally enraged by a relative, friend or neighbour having been killed by Israel” [149].
The algorithms also look for the presence of “personal problems”, such as “forced marriages, debt and social
exclusion” [149].
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play a complex role in the radicalization of terrorists, and there is a tendency for extremist
individuals to leverage preexisting friendship or kinship ties or immerse themselves among
like-minded peers attachment to other jihadists. These observations also propel us later in
this thesis to consider the behaviors and influences of neighbors on the assessment of risk in
potential violent extremists.
This chapter also provided an overview of the various governmental strategies proposed to
counter the violent extremist threat. While these strategies emphasized a holistic approach
to countering the underlying Salafi-jihadist ideology and empowering local religious and civic
groups to provide off-ramps for susceptible individuals, it is also important that they included
statements about investing in law enforcement investigative tools, improved interagency




A Radicalization Detection System Framework
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, describe our solution approach as embodied in a proposed radicalization
detection system framework to enable law enforcement and intelligence to mine, monitor, and
screen for the occurrence of radicalization indicators in large heterogeneous databases in order
to provide early warnings of individuals or groups on behavioral trajectories toward extremist
violence. We first describe the principle operational deficiencies in efforts at detecting the
radicalization of violent extremists. Then we propose the radicalization detection system
framework. Following this, we describe the most salient environmental factors that would
impact the development of such a system, as well as an identification of the most relevant
stakeholders. Lastly, we discuss initial risks associated with the proposal of this system as
strategies to mitigate the risk.
3.2. Operational Deficiencies
In Chapter 2, we detailed the concerning trends in both the number and lethality of plots
by violent extremists motivated by Salafi-jihadism in the U.S. and Western Europe. This
leads us to investigate the present operational deficiencies in efforts to prevent extremist
violence as a first step in needs analysis. As discussed in Section 2.4, current research sug-
gests that radicalization, while complex, may be understood as a dynamic and phased-based
process where individuals exhibit indicative behaviors or psychological states along pathways
to violence. To prevent future extremist violence, the tasks to law enforcement can be aptly
summarized in two steps. First, it needs to determine whom to investigate based upon an
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individualized risk assessment using knowledge of observed or inferred indicators. Second,
it needs to decide on both the level of investigative resources to be devoted and the type of
investigative techniques and methods (including both physical and electronic surveillance)
to be used on the individual. In this section, we discuss where current approaches by law
enforcement and intelligence agencies are deficient in both these principal tasks.
3.2.1. Deficiencies in current risk assessment protocols. As was previously
discussed in Section 2.5.2, in order to determine whom to investigate, law enforcement agen-
cies generally use some form of a risk assessment protocol or structured professional judgment
instrument such as the VERA 2 [249] or SAVE 30 [67, 68]. However, their use can be labo-
rious and requires careful study of a person of interest and the manual assessment of dozens
of indicator items for each individual (in the case of VERA 2, 31 indicators [249]). These
current risk assessment protocols are deemed insufficient to distinguish those truly on a
pathway to extremist violence and those who are not (i.e., distinguishing true positives from
false positives). According to Sageman in [264, p. 11], “law enforcement agencies complain
that they are drowned by an ocean of false alarms, which overwhelm their resources.26 Fur-
thermore, such instruments are not designed to consider behavioral dynamics of individuals
or their social ties, nor any measure of their trending, and ultimately do not scale well to
the number of threats that law enforcement face.
3.2.2. Physical and electronic surveillance is resource intensive. For those
with the highest risk of extremist violence, law enforcement would desire both physical and
26Morever, Sageman writes, “The major request from the field is help to distinguish the very few true
positives that will turn to violence from the vast majority of false positives- young people who brag and
pretend that they are tough and dangerous, but, in fact, just talk, talk, talk, and do nothing”[264, p. 11].
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electronic surveillance in order to detect indicators of radicalization at the earliest opportu-
nity and be postured to rapidly foil plots [57, 123]. However, the employment of these full-on
techniques does not scale well to the caseload. In November 2015, the FBI revealed that it
had at the time over 900 active investigations related to homegrown violent extremists in the
U.S. [27]. The Bureau also maintains records of, but cannot possibly continually monitor
or investigate, the hundreds of thousands of individuals in the Terrorist Screening Database
(TSDB) [55, 123]. Furthermore, recent law enforcement successes in intercepting homegrown
terrorists have relied upon a limited and resource-intensive approach with confidential hu-
man sources. It has been estimated in the open media that between 30-40 personnel (FBI
agents, technicians, and analysts) are required to thoroughly surveil a single individual and
that the Bureau has enough resources for only “dozens” of people [123].
Reports suggest that law enforcement agencies in Western Europe like Germany, France,
and Belgium are likewise overwhelmed by the number of people they need to track [88]. For
instance, following a terrorist attack in Berlin in December 2016, a German Interior Ministry
official said on the condition of anonymity, that their law enforcement agencies were having
difficulty keeping tabs on nearly 600 gefärder (“someone deemed likely to endanger the
state”) [88]. Following the November 2015 coordinated Paris terrorist attacks that killed 129
people, French intelligence officials revealed they they simply did not have the resources to
monitor all whom they consider a threat. A CNN reporter wrote:
[I]t takes 15 to 20 people to monitor one suspect 24 hours a day. [The French]
have 11,000 people on their ‘fiche S’ list, used to flag individuals considered
a threat to national security and who they believe are radicalized. Of those,
5,000 have been elevated to an additional level of concern. Adding to that
hundreds, perhaps more than 1,000, who have gone to Syria and Iraq, of
whom about half have returned [255].
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It is also interesting to note that following the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack, France
announced a $493 million plan to add 2680 new counterterrorism security posts, as well as
“[provide] more tools and technology for monitoring, such as phone-tapping and Internet
surveillance” [25].
In the end, resource constraints have forced the agencies to make tough, subjective de-
cisions on the level of surveillance and monitoring that suspected individuals receive [123].
Moreover, recent terrorist attack successes highlight the real possibility of missed signals
from, or continued radicalization by, individuals whom the law enforcement agencies had
formerly investigated and even interviewed. Recent U.S. cases include Tamerlan Tsarnaev
(Boston Marathon bombings, 2013) [106], Omar Mateen (Orlando night club shooting, 2016)
[56], and Ahmad Khan Rahami (New York and New Jersey bombings, 2016) [217]. Recent
Western European cases include several involved in the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015 [96],
Anis Amri (Berlin market truck attack, 2016) [77], and Salman Abedi (Manchester concert
bombing, 2017) [205].
3.2.3. Complexity of assessing the risk for violent extremism through
social ties. Complicating matters more, the dynamics for an individual’s social ties, are
also important for assessing the risk for violent extremism. These dynamics may include
activities by jihadist recruiters as well as the activities of co-conspirators in terrorist plots.
As shown by the statistics in Section 2.2.4, about 30% violent extremist plots in the last 20
years have involved two or more co-conspirators, each of whom we can reasonably suspect
might have exhibited indicators. For example, the FBI investigation after the San Bernardino
terrorist attack in California revealed that the indicators of the homegrown violent extremist
threat were dispersed among Syed Farook, wife Tashfeen Malik, and Farook’s associate,
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Figure 3.1. San Bernardino Terrorist Attack, 2015. Behavioral indicator
and association graph of Farook, Malik, and Marquez showing the indicators
and signals of their collective radicalization and preparations for the attack,
consolidated from investigative findings [299].
Enrique Marquez [299]. Fig. 3.1 depicts that Marquez served as Farook’s straw purchaser of
2 weapons, which were ultimately used by Farook and Malik in the attack. Both Malik and
Marquez had suspicious social media activity, the details of which are available in Appendix
B.3 and [299]. It is only when their behaviors are viewed collectively, as a conspiracy, that
one can see the many indicators present.
3.2.4. Continuing challenges in the sharing and fusion of available intel-
ligence and law enforcement data. The U.S. government reforms following the 9/11
terrorist attacks included initiatives for better sharing of information across all levels of
government to prevent future attacks. These reforms included the establishment of 1) the
Office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (which had
just published its framework in 2014 [229]), 2) the National Network of Fusion Centers to re-
ceive, analyze and share such threat-related information across levels of government (federal,
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state, local, and tribal), and 3) the National Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative
(NSI) to facilitate information sharing of suspicious activity reports (SARs).27 A multitude
of additional information sharing portals was established, to include the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) [228], eGuardian [33], and several others [44].
However, interagency cooperation and sharing continue to be challenging. The failure
to share information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the perpetrators of the 2013 Boston
Marathon Bombings, was investigated by an interagency team of inspectors general [148].
The final unclassified report found that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had provided
intelligence to both the FBI and the CIA that Tsarnaev was a follower of radical Islam and
was “preparing to travel to Russia to join unspecified underground groups in Dagestan
and Chechnya” [148, p. 1], but neither agency knew of the report to the other agency.
Additionally, despite Tsarnaev being put on two separate watchlists, the inspectors general
could not confirm that the Department of Homeland Security notified the FBI when Tsarnaev
departed and returned from Russia less than a year before the bombings. This precluded
the FBI from conducting any follow-up investigation on Tsarnaev for his travel abroad [148].
A 2017 Inspectors General report still identified gaps and shortfalls in information sharing
[228].
The ISE Framework outlines three principle patterns of information sharing: query/
response, broadcast (of alerts, warnings, or notifications), and workflow. However, our ex-
amination of the description and capabilities of each of the existing information sharing
portals found that most only utilize query/response in the form of a document repository
or database that has to be searched. While economical from an information consumption
27See NSI website https://nsi.ncirc.gov/about_nsi.aspx and the DHS website https://www.dhs.
gov/topic/information-sharing for more details.
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standpoint, it presupposes that law enforcement analysts know precisely whom they need
to query about. Given the dynamic nature of the threat of radicalizing violent extremists,
this is a likely a very tall order. The broadcast model seems the most beneficial for tracking
individual-level radicalization indicators which may only initially be visible to a particular
government agency (such as local law enforcement or the TSA). However, to the extent that
broadcast is available in the existing portals, it was for notification of imminent, action-
able threats or share-point style notifications of new documents in a particular document
repository [75].28
We also note that down at the State, Local, and Tribal (SLT) law enforcement level,
there is a multitude of available systems by which personnel can obtain sensitive intelligence
or information on counterterrorism issues. A recent survey of SLT law enforcement listed six
different information sharing services with varying levels of use [44]. Moreover, the report
noted many investigators and analysts will only access one of the systems due to convenience
and simplicity even though different information may appear on each system [44, p. 16].
In summary, the present threat information sharing environment is not conducive to
tracking violent extremist radicalization indicators that may be apparent only initially to
disparate government entities. There are a multitude of existing portals, which are too
28NSI: It is unclear what information besides SARs are shared and whether fusion is done manually or
automatically. HSIN: A secure, web-based portal used by fusion centers across the country to share Sensitive
But Unclassified terrorist-related information and intelligence that includes a document repository, messaging
and instant messaging services, and GIS mapping capabilities [75]. However, the alerts and notifications in
this system are either only bulletins pushed to all users, or SharePoint-like notifications when documents or
document folders have been updated. The portal collects disparate pieces of information and intelligence
but does not necessarily represent a true ‘fusion’ like a graph database. eGuardian: Part of the FBI’s Law
Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP), it is a database system which pools new SARs related to terrorist or
other potential criminal offenses with a legacy SARs reporting system and feeds a separate database for Joint
Terrorism Task Forces to utilize [33]. Besides standardizing reporting formats and providing a triage-like
system for SARs, it is not entirely clear what type of fusion (linkages, entity resolution, etc) is available in
the eGuardian system [33].
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reliant on the query/response pattern and selective, human-driven fusion of information
about individuals and their related data points.
3.2.5. Lack of rigorous utilization of available indicators on social media.
It is acknowledged by both the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee
[197] and the National Fusion Center Association that law enforcement agencies are presently
under-utilizing the indicators available on social media.29 As Sections 2.2.3 (Role of Social
Media) and 2.4.3 (Antecedent Behaviors) described, there is an increasing involvement of the
internet and social media in the radicalization of individuals and the possibility of finding
early warning behaviors online. Consumption of propaganda and learning to conducting
various aspects of the terrorist plot through virtual sources were among the statistically
significant pre-attack behaviors. Additionally, warning behaviors such as leakage and di-
rect communication of threats may also be available through electronic sources as well. In
Appendix A, we provide empirical evidence in recent cases of extremist violence in which
the perpetrators left early warning digital signals, many of which were undetected by law
enforcement.
There are several factors that make the utilization of social media challenging to law en-
forcement. First, the open monitoring of social media for pre-crime indicators has significant
push-back from civil liberty and privacy groups as well as the social media companies them-
selves. This state of affairs was previously described in Section 2.5.3. Second, as previously
described in Section 2.4.3, even when conducting investigations of a specific individual, U.S.
29There is a new initiative called the Real-time Open Source Analysis of Social Media (ROSM) led by
the National Fusion Center Association with the goal of determining “how law enforcement agencies can
and should analyze and share social media information and related criminal intelligence to help identify
common indicators that can support intervention with potentially violent extremists and thereby prevent
and/or disrupt attacks” [228, p. 8]. However, nothing is publicly available on this initiative and is deemed
a seemingly novel effort to which our research efforts could eventually help contribute to.
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law enforcement is subject to the Electronic Communications Protection Act and is required
to present a subpoena, warrant, or another court document to the social media company to
request preservation and release of electronic records. Lastly, even if law enforcement could
readily monitor social media, sorting through the immense amount of data is a problem.
While machine learning and natural language processing algorithms are improving in this
area (see Section 3.5.3), there are still significant challenges to automatically identifying
genuine threats and discerning indicators of violent radicalization.
The confluence of issues involving the authorities for use of social media data and the
technological support to utilize the signals was most recently addressed by the former Acting
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency David Shedd, who said:
I have been a strong advocate that the U.S. Department of Justice must give
new authorities to the FBI to conduct something between a full and open
investigation on a potential attacker...These in-between collection authorities
would require court oversight but would use technology to track and then flag
anomalies related to the kind of correspondence, postings, or activities of a
suspicious individual. This approach would make it far less human resource-
intensive [280].
The present gaps and shortcomings are indeed limiting the early warning signals available
for law enforcement analysis and straining agency resources, but Shedd is proposing that
changes in legal authorities and technological innovation can improve the situation. We go
further by including in the scope of our proposed system the activities that are apparent in
government databases (like the TSA and weapons background checks).
3.2.6. Lack of accessible training data. Lastly, many have noted the paucity in
available training data for researchers who want to assist law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. In 2013 LaFree, the Director of the National Center for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism (START), summarized that, “[C]ompared with collecting data
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on other types of crime, collecting data on terrorism has been especially challenging” [177].
He went on to cite the 3-stage progress that START and associated researchers had done
to improve the empirical study of terrorist attacks including 1) “development of interna-
tional databases of terrorism– assaults where a group or an individual from one country
attacks targets in another country,” 2) “collection of domestic as well as international data
on terrorist attacks,” and 3) “development of specialized data sets on specific subsets of
terrorism cases,” [177] such as ones segmented by motivation/issue [116, 117]. However,
beyond the three advances previously mentioned is a forth initiative: the development of
large population, synthetic but empirically-based datasets on the early-warning behavioral
indicators of violent extremists. Such an advancement would specifically address Sageman’s
concern of a “lack of comprehensive and reliable data” and the impediment it is to scholar-
ship in terrorism studies due to the difficulty gaining access to sensitive and even classified
details of individuals which are held closely by law enforcement and intelligence agencies
[264, p. 6-7], and greatly benefit the growing body of researchers supporting law enforce-
ment with analyzing and weighing the pre-incident behavioral indicators of terrorism and
violent extremism. Specifically, a large-population synthetic dataset of people and potential
radicalization indicators could serve as a validation testbed for risk assessment tools. In or-
der to be effective, the dataset would likely have to contain synthetically generated samples
of 1) terrorist offenders and their behavioral characteristics based on anonymized, empirical
case studies, and 2) non-violent radicals and their behavioral characteristics. The latter
could potentially be derived from the datasets found in [12], which were acquired through
extensive field interviews with non-violent radicals.
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Similar efforts appear in other domains, including [7] for generating synthetic data mim-
icking real time-varying multi-attribute characteristics of computing nodes and [120] for the
behavioral indicators of cybersecurity insider threats. Most recently, efforts such as [242] at-
tempt to produce synthetic datasets in a variety of domains that protect privacy and closely
resemble the original source data.
3.3. A Radicalization Detection System Framework
Ultimately, there is a compelling need to address the deficiencies in law enforcement pro-
cesses and capabilities so that they can handle both the scale and dynamics of the violent
extremist threat. In [142, 143] we codified this need in the definition of the radicalization
detection problem, which is “the automated task of dynamically detecting and tracking be-
havioral changes in individuals who undergo the process of increasingly espousing jihadist
beliefs, and who transition to the use of violent action in support of those beliefs.” In this
section, we present a radicalization detection system framework as a proposed overarching
approach to addressing this problem and enabling law enforcement to monitor persons of
interest at the scope and scale that is lawful, and to rigorously and more automatically ac-
count for the dynamic indicative behaviors of individual persons of interest as well as their
associates. It first involves the development of a robustly capable data management system
that fuses and processes all the person-centric data from governmental databases that law
enforcement would have an interest in tracking. Additionally, the data management sys-
tem would fuse social media data by individuals whom law enforcement would currently be
approved to surveil. Second, the framework calls upon a multi-disciplinary team of law en-
forcement practitioners, terrorism experts, and data scientists to derive discerning patterns
of violent radicalization and develop computationally efficient tools to mine the databases
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(of both existing and streaming data) for these patterns. These tools would have the specific
purpose of identifying radicalization indicators and then monitoring and screening for in near
real-time those individuals who pose a significant risk for extremist violence.
The framework is depicted in Fig. 3.2. We discuss below the main components of 1) data
requirements and processing, 2) query pattern development, 3) the foundational investigative
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Figure 3.2. Radicalization detection system framework. This figure depicts
a system for law enforcement and intelligence analysts to detect the radical-
ization trajectories of individuals using INSiGHT.
3.3.1. Query Pattern Development. As previously mentioned, our approach is
predicated upon the development of effective query graph patterns of indicators for vio-
lent radicalization or some other latent behavior of interest. The creation of indicator-based
screening patterns for violent radicalization that are empirically-derived is a necessary con-
tribution from social scientists (i.e., psychologists, criminologists, political scientists). Based
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upon several existing radicalization models, it is likely that the pattern will have an ‘in-
tent’ or ‘ideology’ indicators as well as a ‘capability’ or ‘operational preparation’ indicators
[35, 223]. Obviously, the pattern subsequently drives what types of data are necessary and
what types of automated classifiers are needed for semantic analysis.
3.3.2. Data Fusion and Processing. Critically, our approach also calls for continued
efforts at improving the law enforcement and intelligence data management systems to enable
automated methods for fusing time-stamped data from a variety of domains and activities.
RAND recently analyzed the vital role of this step and its potential value in any behavioral
indicator threat detection system in [66, p. xxxiv and xi]. The numerous systems available
today for analysts to reference data on records of persons of interest were summarized in
Section 3.2.4. Given the dynamic nature of the threat of radicalizing violent extremists,
we advocate for a dynamic, continuously updated graph database of individuals and their
linked person-centric data points. It is this type of database on which graph pattern matching
algorithms could operate and return meaningful results with of individuals’ radicalization
indicators available across disparate government databases.
It is important to mention a potential system by which this improved data management
system could be based. The FBI also hosts as part of LEEP the National Data Exchange
(N-DEx), an “unclassified national information sharing system that enables criminal justice
agencies to search, link, analyze, and share local, state, tribal, and federal records” [105].
An ambitious effort that is designed to enable detectives and investigators from any law en-
forcement agency in the U.S. access available data on individuals and on-going investigations.
Unlike other databases, N-DEx specifically touts a link-analysis tool that allows investigators
to examine “associations between people, places, things, and events” in the data available
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[105]. This type of database is the beginning of the type architecture on which INSiGHT
can run on.
Short of true fusion of a multitude of data and intelligence sources, one possible proposed
technology is the Person-Centric Identify Management (PCIM) capability which recently ap-
peared in a MITRE white paper in 2017 [211]. Confirming the state of affairs, the paper
stated, “The vast majority of the data collected [by U.S. government agencies] is stored in
stand-alone and stovepiped systems with limited or no data sharing capabilities, no standard
correlation capability to resolve or link identifies, and no substantive capability to link ad-
ditional peripheral encounter data (e.g., information gleaned from social media, checkpoint
screening results, or other relevant agency records)” [211, p. 1]. It affirms the need for fused
information across disparate databases for counterterrorism and other security purposes and
proposes that the Department of Homeland Security lead a cross-government initiative to
develop this capability. What it envisions is the ability to obtain, upon query, a federated
view of an individual’s interactions with various government entities. We suspect that such
a technology could be a utilized with INSiGHT if queries of a large number of individuals
could be returned by efficiently accessing separate databases and combining the information
into a person-centric graph database.
Based upon case studies of radical extremist cases, we surmise that at a minimum we
need the fusion of local, state, and federal criminal and terrorist databases (e.g., SARs, FBI’s
Tripwire and ‘FBI Tips’ programs and TSA’s Automated Targeting System and Secure Flight
programs), firearm background check databases (e.g., National Instant Criminal Background
Check- NICS), and publicly available social media data (e.g., Twitter, Facebook). The fusion
of such data has technical challenges, such as the construction and universal adoption of an
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ontology, as well as entity resolution between social media accounts and individuals. There
are also privacy and civil liberties concerns as well, but as stated in RAND’s study “the
irony is that commercial organizations (and even political parties) are already far ahead in
exploiting the relevant technologies and forever changing notions of privacy,” [66, p. xi]. In
our present work, we intend to demonstrate that such a fusion of such data would greatly
help law enforcement and intelligence officials connect the dots among different types of
behavioral indicators.
Moreover, as previously mentioned in the query description, the data must undergo
binary or multi-class classification for each of the features or labels prescribed in the query
pattern. There are already a few machine learning approaches put forth for the detection of
ideological indicators of radicalization [35, 51]. But clearly, much advancement is required
in this important area for the larger radicalization detection system to the feasible.
3.3.3. Investigative Graph Search. Once the requisite inputs are in place, we run
our parser to produce a time-stamped, heterogeneous data graph. The nodes in this graph
represent entities or their activities, while the directed, time-stamped edges represent the
connections between nodes at the specified time-step. Investigative graph search is the novel
process of searching for and prioritizing persons of interest who may exhibit part or all of a
pattern of suspicious behaviors or connections. It is particularly relevant to search for those
on radicalizing towards violent extremism and has both static and dynamic variants which
we will cover in detail in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2) and Chapter 5, respectively. The dynamic
variant is the technique is called INSiGHT, which is our algorithmic graph pattern matching
approach that calculates the multi-hop class similarities between nodes in the query and
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data graphs over time. Presently, our methodology collects data and performs the analysis
on the entire network at periodic times.
The investigative graph search has four enhancements to make the technique particularly
applicable to helping law enforcement identify individuals or small groups with conforming
subgraphs to a radicalization query pattern. The first improvement made to static investiga-
tive graph search is the incorporation of filters for certain types of investigative indicators (see
forthcoming Section 4.3) to minimize false positives for stand-alone individually innocuous
activities. The next three enhancements were made to dynamic investigative graph search
(INSiGHT) and will be covered in detail in Section 5.7. One is the parameterized method
of decaying an indicator’s significance over time. Another is the parameterized method to
weigh the re-occurrence of each class of indicator. The last is a non-combinatorial method for
neighbor matching to reveal the presence of suspicious individuals with nearby connections
and the possibility of collective threats if individuals happen to be working together. The
resulting time-series of similarity scores from investigative graph search readily enables the
monitoring and screening of those individuals whose behaviors indicate a significant risk for
violence.
3.3.4. Role of the Analyst. Several works have previously highlighted the impor-
tance of analysts in threat detection systems or risk-assessments [66, 91]. As outlined in
Fig. 3.2, we envision the analyst needing to interpret and contextualize the results from
INSiGHT, perform trade-off analysis of the sensitivity and selectivity of the technology, ad-
just the parameters allowed in the weighting and decay modules, and intelligently utilize the
results for possible law enforcement intervention.
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Moreover, we also envision that the analyst is someone with formal psychological train-
ing to make risk assessments of individuals. Recently, Sarma in [266] outlined the needed
training and the skills required of individuals performing such assessments. This included
“knowledge of the hazard and associated risks, analytic skills, and confidence in completing
risk assessments,” as well as knowledge of applicable theories of radicalization and others
generally related such as social movement theory [266, p. 285]. The researcher also men-
tions the importance of a supervisory authority over the analyst to ensure that support and
feedback are present [266].
3.4. Environmental Analysis
The proposal for a novel analyst-in-the-loop system to mine, monitor, and screen for the
occurrence of radicalization indicators sits at the nexus of some key issues and debates in the
U.S. and abroad. Namely, the issues affected include the pronounced and high-profile threat
from violent extremists; the legal, ethical, and civil liberties issues involved in countering the
threat from violent extremism; the on-going debate between privacy and security; and on-
going struggle of inter-agency and federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement intelligence
sharing. In this section, we discuss some of the most pertinent aspects these issues by
examining each of the environmental dimensions in a complex ecosystem of government
agencies, non-governmental organizations, private companies, and civic and religious groups.
3.4.1. Social. Many studies support the idea that local communities and organizations
are critical to preventing the radicalization of susceptible individuals and that law enforce-
ment engagement efforts with these communities need to be a centerpiece of any CVE strat-
egy [24, 126, 267, 313]. However, Muslim communities both nationally and internationally
have been suspecting of such engagement efforts as stigmatizing or discriminating against
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Muslims, disproportionately focusing on Muslim communities, or serving as a ploy to surveil
or otherwise gain intelligence on Muslims for terrorist investigations [267]. Any effort at
developing tools for law enforcement must consider these social factors.
3.4.2. Economic. The development of any tools to assist law enforcement in the detec-
tion of radicalization trajectories must consider the economic factors associated with social
media companies, the explosive growth of users, and the pervasiveness and variety of tech-
nologies, services, and communication mediums.
3.4.3. Emotional. There are several aspects of the emotional factors to consider in the
environment related to violent extremism. A terrorist’s intention is to induce an emotional
response of fear and susceptibility from its victims and the intended targeted populations.
These responses have ripple effects that include the public’s overestimation of the true threat,
as well as the irrational reactions to stigmatize or discriminate the ethnic or religious groups
of some of the offenders en masse. Others, however, may make light of the situation and
underestimate the true threat [126, 176].30
Another crucial consideration in the area of the development of government use of a
detection-type system for potential terrorists is privacy and civil liberties. The arguments
are wide and various but principally centered on an emotional aversion to the government
knowledge of aspects of a person’s life, regardless of whether it was self-disclosed or not to
a public forum. This demand for privacy is not without exception, however. People are
readily willing to give up many aspects of their privacy for other social or economic utility.
For example, Facebook continually collects a large number of personal features data on its
30According to the 2016 CSIS countering violent extremism assessment, “The U.S. policymakers have
severely underestimated the allure of violent extremism, which has constrained the allocation of funding and
manpower to deal with it” [126].
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users [82] and willingly share it with data brokers and advertisers [254], but unwilling to have
its data for use by law enforcement agencies to prevent terror attacks [281] or by insurance
companies to glean auto accident risk [59].
3.4.4. Legal. There are two major aspects of this legal factors surrounding the devel-
opment of violent extremist detection technologies. The first is the court-ordered warrant
for social media and cloud data from the accounts of suspected or known perpetrators of ex-
tremist violence. Many of the popular social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter
have been known to rightfully comply [233]. There are others, however, such as Telegram
and WhatsApp, which proffer end-to-end encryption of communications and claim that it
is impossible to give access to the data even with a court warrant[85]. This is what the
FBI Director calls, “going dark,” and is a tactic that is increasingly being used by violent
extremists especially in the near-term execution of their attacks [58, 70, 245]. There are
currently no known legal means to compel these companies to create a ‘backdoor’ [57]
The second issue is the bulk collection and analysis of social media platforms to track
the statements of suspected radical or radicalizing individuals. The Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, which guards against the government’s “unreasonable searches and
seizures,” should protect an individual’s right to privacy while giving the “government the
necessary means to solve crimes, keep order, and safeguard national security” [63]. Up until
recently, U.S. courts have relied on the third-party doctrine, which suggests information in
the hands of a third party receives no Fourth Amendment protection [63]. However, such
distinctions have blurred in light of the prevalence of on-line and cloud-based technologies
that have made many aspects of people’s lives electronically available. While many of an
individual’s posts are publicly available, it is currently a gray area legally of the expectation
76
of privacy associated with an individual’s posts from the government [63]. In this case, it
seems that the social media companies can dictate the terms and conditions of the data usage
in their platform and privacy policies. Most recently, several prominent social media sites
suspended data access to application program interfaces (API) to social media monitoring
companies when it was discovered that law enforcement agencies were using these companies
to conduct some tacit form of surveillance on suspected individuals [39–41].
3.5. Technology Assessment
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the latest technical innovations which give
promise to the realization of a scalable radicalization detection system on large heterogeneous
databases.
3.5.1. Graph databases and distributed systems. Graph databases are now widely
used in the commercial sector to leverage the complex and dynamic relationships between
entities. There is a growing list of graph databases on the market such as Neo4j [256].
There are also recent advancements in translating text documents into graphs [153], using
distributed systems to search big graphs [140, 193], the storage and analysis of temporal
graph data [48, 207]. We by no means provide a sufficient survey of the literature in these
areas, but only attempt to demonstrate how viable is the use of and searches that can be
conducted on large graph databases through distributed systems.
3.5.2. Entity resolution. Entity resolution is a significant problem in database fu-
sion, especially considering the array of disparate databases from which individual records
will be extracted. The state of the art techniques in entity resolution in SQL-based and
graph database settings are ably covered in [304]. Additional efforts at entity resolution
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with a particular focus on online account contexts for security applications is offered in
[35, 188, 170].
3.5.3. Machine learning and natural language processing advancements.
A key challenge in our radicalization detection framework is the automated or semi-automated
classification of data as specific indicators of a radicalization query pattern. We envision that
the data points could be in the form of social media posts, investigator case notes in a docu-
ment repository, or simply an entry in a specific database (such as a flight manifest). Without
denying the difficulty, it is also important to point out that researchers have been making
advances in the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms on a variety of
data sources to identify depression [61] as well as predict and prevent suicide [212]. This
includes uses of medical records, social media post content (see also [38, 206]), and auditory
signals through cell phone usage.
3.6. Identify Stakeholders and Their Initial Interests
Here we consider the ecosystem of stakeholders in the development of risk assessment en-
abling technologies for law enforcement. This includes the perspectives of law enforcement,
the public whom they serve and protect, the governmental agencies at the federal, state,
local, and tribal levels who may have relevant data on individuals to share, and the com-
mercial companies that develop the communication technologies or manage the online data.
Throughout this research effort, we take the principal viewpoint that law enforcement and
intelligence agencies are prospective clients in the exploration and development of technolo-
gies that can aide them in more effectively utilizing investigative resources to prevent violent
extremist threats. All the while, we integrate the multitude of interests by other stakeholders
and consider their impact on the feasibility and acceptance of such technologies.
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The 2016 U.S. Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent
Violent Extremism in the United States identified a broad list of stakeholders who have “ex-
pressed or identified role in countering violent extremism and include, but are not limited to:
Federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local governments and law enforcement; communities;
non-governmental organizations; academia; educators; social services organizations; mental
health providers; and the private sector” [227, p. 1]. We adopt this initial list. The full pro-
cess of stakeholder analysis, to include identification, engagement, interviewing, surveying,
and value modeling is an involved, multi-step process [239] which we intend to conduct in
future work. In this thesis, we begin by describing the initial interests or role each may have
broadly in the development of the proposed system.
3.6.1. Law enforcement and Intelligence Enterprise. The entire enterprise in-
cludes law enforcement agents and officers, intelligence analysts, and technicians at every
level (federal, state, local, and tribal); fusion centers and every agency involved in the Infor-
mation Sharing Environment (ISE). Within the U.S., the Departments of Homeland Security
and Justice are leading the interagency effort to counter violent extremism [228], and we ex-
pect within these organizations’ leadership are the decision makers for any future system.
While we believe that this enterprise is united in their efforts to protect the homeland from
future terrorist attacks, we also acknowledge that each will have their own parochial interests.
3.6.2. Communities. “Communities” is a broad term that encompasses the localities
across the country that have been, are currently, or may be in the future affected by extremist
violence, and the subsequent results or consequences of the implementation of any part of
a radicalization detection system. While communities all value broad assurances of safety,
specific ones will have different valuations and priorities among public safety, privacy, and
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law enforcement and intelligence actions. Some of these concerns were addressed in Section
3.4.
We highlight one aspect of these communities which plays a role in the impetus for the
continued efforts to counter violet extremist motivated by Salafi-jihadists. According to the
polls conducted on U.S. residents by Pew Research for the last 10 years, there has been
sustained concern over Islamic extremists both at home and abroad. See Fig. 3.3.31
(a) (b)
Figure 3.3. (a) Pew Research polls in the U.S. about the concern for ex-
tremism in the name of Islam in the U.S. Data source: [246].(b) Pew Research
polls in the U.S. about the concern for extremism in the name of Islam in the
world. Source: [246].
3.6.3. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There are quite a number of
NGOs involved specifically in countering violent extremism by working with local commu-
nities and providing suitable off-ramps through various forms of social and economic assis-
tance. Anecdotally, these NGOs and practitioners working in de-radicalization programming
are admittedly fearful of being unable to discern highly radicalized individuals from those
31We note the drop in 2011 in both Fig. 3.3a and 3.3b. Although it was never discussed in the poll
analysis, it is possible some of the decrease in concern during the survey in July 2011 is due to the U.S.
killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011.
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individuals open to their efforts and would likely value a tool that can help law enforce-
ment and intelligence analysts screen for the most dangerous individuals [169]. There are
also NGOs who are focused on protecting civil liberties and privacy. See [241, p. 25] for a
description of the roles these organizations have played in resisting any added capabilities
to law enforcement in this area.
3.6.4. Academia. Academia obviously plays a role in the continued rigorous research
into the radicalization process, any more discerning early warning behaviors associated with
those on pathways to violent extremism, and the development of technological systems and
tools to assist law enforcement. See [264] for a description of broad survey of their efforts
and limitations.
3.6.5. Social services organizations. This is a broad term for agencies and orga-
nizations who would provide social and economic assistance to various segments of society,
such as helping refugees or immigrants. Some at least may come in contact with poten-
tial perpetrators or even victims of extremist violence and are likely to have knowledge of
susceptible individuals that could benefit CVE NGOs or law enforcement.
3.6.6. Mental health providers. Like social services organizations, these providers
who may come into contact with those susceptible to violent radicalization are likely to have
knowledge that would benefit CVE NGOs or law enforcement.
3.6.7. Private sector. This includes a broad listing of companies offering services in
the online domain, to include social media companies, other technology companies such as
cell phone manufacturers, application (app) developers, and search engine/email providers.
Their interest is primarily in the economics, any legal or regulatory requirements placed on
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them, and their accountability to shareholders. Their positions on law enforcement use of
their data and platforms were covered broadly in Section 3.4.
3.7. Identify Risk Factors and Initial Risk Management Plan
Risk factors are categories of “uncertain events or conditions whose occurrence will have
a negative impact on system cost, schedule, value, technical performance, or safety” [239,
p. 79]. The identification of risk factors is a critical step throughout the systems development
process. INCOSE recognizes four main categories of risk: technical risk, schedule risk,
cost risk, and programmatic risk [130]. In this thesis, we cover broadly only technical and
programmatic risks, but not schedule or cost risks explicitly. This is due to the anticipatory
and forward-thinking nature of this research and the discussion of schedules and budgets
would be premature. For both technical and programmatic risks, we also provide an initial
discussion of the mitigation strategies.
Figure 3.4. Graphic depicting the four main risk categories and the typical
effects on each other. Source: [130, p. 7.14].
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3.7.1. Programmatic Risks. Programmatic risks are those risks due to external fac-
tors or decisions that may adversely impact the successful development of a system [130, 239].
As covered in Section 3.4 there are numerous external realities in the environment.
3.7.1.1. Multitude of high-salience stakeholders complicates the approval/adoption pro-
cess. The first significant programmatic risk for the development of the system is a multitude
of government agencies which serve as stakeholders in the counter-terrorism and countering
violent extremism domain, and the resulting difficulty that would result even if the project’s
sponsor was clear. As mentioned previously, the U.S. government designated both the De-
partment of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security as the lead agencies for
countering violent extremism. But there are numerous other agencies involved in the ef-
fort including the Departments of State, Education, Health and Human Services as well as
the the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) [184].
3.7.1.2. Inability to access restricted government and law enforcement data. Another ma-
jor programmatic risk is the inability to access restricted government and law enforcement
data that would be needed to inform the development and truly validate the system. This
research calls upon the integration and fusion of several restricted databases including the
data accessible to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the network of Fusion Centers. Part
of the larger research effort is a data management system that would interface with our
graph querying procedure.
3.7.1.3. Cut-off from access to social media data via APIs. Another risk for the develop-
ment of the system is the cut-off to access to social media data from various companies due
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to platform policies. As discussed in Section 2.5.3, several commercial social media monitor-
ing companies have been negatively affected in this way due to the assistance they provided
to law enforcement. This results in large business risk and costs when a for-profit company
needs to re-orient towards tailoring its services for other sectors and domains.
An important mitigation strategy that best handles these aforementioned programmatic
risks is that this research and system development should primarily be carried out by a
Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). These unique, independent,
not-for-profit organizations that are sponsored by a U.S. Government agency (or agencies)
and principally receive funding from the federal government to conduct responsive research
and development.32 Sageman in [264] called for greater integration between academic re-
searchers and government agencies, but neglected to mention such close cooperation already
exists in these institutions. There are a total of 41 centers currently, but the few with the
likely specialized domain expertise and associated relevant government sponsor are shown in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Select FFRDCs in related fields. Source: [210].
FFRDC Administrator Government Sponsor





The MITRE Corporation Department of Defense




The MITRE Corporation Department of Homeland
Security
32The Defense Acquisition University defined a Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC) as “an activity sponsored under a broad charter by a Government agency (or agencies) for the
purpose of performing, analyzing, integrating, supporting, and/or managing basic or applied research and/or
development, and that receives 70 percent or more of its financial support from the Government; and –
1) A long-term relationship is contemplated; 2) Most or all of the facilities are owned or funded by the
Government; and 3) The FFRDC has access to Government and supplier data, employees, and facilities
beyond that common in a normal contractual relationship [72].
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One of the merits of this FFRDC-based approach is that the work would have a clear
government agency sponsor and have greater credibility with other government stakeholders
than compared to a private company responding to Broad Area Announcements (BAAs).
Additionally, much of the programmatic risk is absorbed by the sponsoring agency for the
research and systems development.
Relatedly, FFDRC’s established relationships with the federal customers and stakeholders
will also assist in the development and validation of any proposed system. This includes the
close partnership with law enforcement analysts, whom the developers could draw upon
for expertise, guidance and processing protocols. It is also likely that a combined effort
would allow the developers at the FFRDC to access generally restricted data for testing and
validation purposes [72].
Lastly, an FFRDC’s unique role and associations with federal law enforcement agencies
will also help mitigate the last significant risk in relation to social media data access. The
support from a law enforcement and legal team who are experts in obtaining warrants and
court orders to compel social media companies to release the requested data would greatly
help in the development and continued operation of the proposed system [34, 301].
3.7.2. Technical Risks. A technical risk concerns the failure to achieve some system
requirement, including a performance objective or a functional, operability, producibility,
testability, or integration requirement [130, 239]. At this early conceptual development
phase, we have not yet developed all the system or subsystem requirements. But based upon
the performance objectives, we identify the following risks.
3.7.2.1. Inability to achieve data integration/fusion due to incompatible systems. As de-
scribed in Section 3.3.2, there is presently a multitude of systems by which law enforcement
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agencies share information. Many of these systems were developed independently, and it is
unclear at this stage if and how data from each could be integrated and fused.
3.7.2.2. State-of-the-art natural language processing and machine learning algorithms not
sufficient to accurately classify specific textual indicators. While natural language processing
(NLP) and machine learning algorithms continue to improve in capability, no research that we
are aware of has specifically addressed the detection of certain social-psychological indicators
of radicalization. As discussed in Section 3.5.3, progress has been made in related areas such
as the detection of suicide indicators and warning signs.
3.7.2.3. Radicalization query patterns not sufficient at screening for individuals. Given
the variance among social scientists on the indicators of radicalization and the various forms
of resulting violent actions (i.e., foreign fighter, homegrown attack, material support, etc.),
it is likely that this technology needs to be able to accept sets of patterns for testing and
validation.
The key mitigating strategy for the first two technical risks is the pursuit of Commercial-
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technologies. We anticipate advancements in both the database tech-
nologies as well as NLP and machine learning algorithms to address these risks. The COTS
strategy has been pursued by the Department of Defense since 1999 in the development
of systems [114] and is currently prominently integrated into the Department of Homeland
Security Science and Technology Innovation Strategy [76]. This out-sources some of the
technical and cost risks to researchers in the commercial industry and academia, but gen-
erally requires at least some effort adopting and transitioning the technology to meet the
government’s needs. Of course, this transition has its own risks that can be identified with
86
the Software Engineering Institute’s COTS Usage Risk Evaluation (CURE) [42]. Specific
security related issues are also explored in [83].
As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, there are also two mitigation strategies specifically for
the first technical risk of the inability to achieve true data fusion and integration. The
FBI’s extant information sharing portal N-DEx touts a link-analysis tool for analysts to
investigate the “associations between people, places, things, and events” in the data available
[105]. Leveraging this accomplishment would greatly assist in the future development of
a similar exchange for the radicalization detection system. Another mitigation strategy
is reliance on MITRE’s proposed Person-Centric Identify Management (PCIM) capability
which obtains through query a federated view of an individual’s interactions with various
government entities [211]. If such a technology were efficient, law enforcement agencies could
periodically query for a large number of persons of interest to access separate databases
and then subsequently combine the information into a person-centric graph database for
INSiGHT’s use.
3.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, we described a radicalization detection system framework as an overarch-
ing approach to mine, monitor, and screen for the occurrence of radicalization indicators in
heterogeneous databases. It was derived from analysis of the existing operational deficiencies
in law enforcement and intelligence agency efforts. We also analyzed the potential environ-
ment in which such a system would be developed and in use as well as the stakeholders that
have an interest in supporting or resisting such a system. Importantly, we also identified
initial programmatic and technical risks and offered several mitigating strategies that need
to be strongly considered before any future steps in the systems design process.
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CHAPTER 4
Investigative Graph Search- A Technical Approach
4.1. Introduction
This chapter introduces the foundational technical approach of the proposed radicaliza-
tion detection system framework: investigative graph search and the employment of graph
pattern matching for use in law enforcement investigations and intelligence analysis to find a
pattern of indicators for a latent behavior in a large heterogeneous graph. Recalling the rad-
icalization detection system framework described in Section 3.3 and depicted in Fig. 3.2, we
note that this approach is predicated on the implementation of the entire framework, includ-
ing the access to and proper classification/labeling data from open and restricted sources to
produced a large heterogeneous data graph as well as the radicalization query pattern from
criminologist and terrorism study experts.
In the era of big data and user-generated content, one of the most pressing needs in many
applications continues to be filtering unnecessary/irrelevant data and finding the desired
information so that one can make timely and accurate decisions [193]. Since much of the data
in a variety of domains can be conveniently represented as heterogeneous data graphs, graph
pattern matching is of ever growing importance to find such information. While a recent
overview [193] lists complex object identification, software plagiarism detection, and traffic
route planning as some additional applications, a bulk of the research in this field is oriented
towards social search and recommender systems [13, 49, 100, 103, 162, 192, 193, 247, 297].
In social search, for instance, one may utilize graph pattern matching to find an entity with
specific types of connections or attributes, while recommender systems help individuals form
collaboration networks with people with specific skills and expertise.
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In the application domains of law enforcement and intelligence analysis, we make the
analogous extension of a graph pattern matching framework to finding radicalizing individ-
uals on large heterogeneous graphs who exhibit indicators through their on- and off-line
behaviors and associations with other individuals and may be on pathways to carryout ex-
tremist violence.
This chapter includes a survey of the related graph pattern matching literature, the intro-
duction of a necessary node categorization for investigative indicators, and the development
of Investigative Simulation (InvSim), an extension to an existing graph pattern matching
scheme to make it appropriate for intelligence analysts and law enforcement officials.
4.2. Investigative Graph Search
While graph pattern matching approaches are efficient and robust in application, most
rely on the certainty of specific types of connections or attributes in the query pattern. In
reality, one may be much less certain about the query structure, or the entities of interest may
not exhibit all of the possible behaviors or attributes. This is especially true in the search
for those undertaking latent behaviors, which we define as hidden or emergent activities
exhibited by an entity [109]. We, therefore, introduce the concept of investigative graph
search, which is the process of searching for and prioritizing persons of interest who may
exhibit part or all of a pattern of suspicious behaviors or connections. It is particularly
relevant to search for those on radicalizing towards violent extremism. Some distinguishing
characteristics of investigative graph search from other searches include:
(1) Nodes in a query pattern are hypothesized indicators of a latent behavior of interest;
all indicators may not or need not appear in the matched result to make a partial
match worthy of further investigation.
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(2) Some indicators nodes are only significant in the context/presence of other indica-
tors.
(3) The ranked full or partial match results should help analysts prioritize among po-
tentially many matches based upon the presence of red-flag indicators as well as the
similarity of the matches to the query.
(4) While the hypothesized indicators may or may not have a known sequence of occur-
rence, the rate and trajectory by which someone exhibits the indicators in a query
pattern are often of interest to investigators.
4.2.1. A motivating example in the static setting. A small example problem
related to the investigative search for homegrown violent extremists is shown in Fig. 4.1a.
The top left graph is a simplified query graph Q of some possible indicators of a homegrown
violent extremist. The pattern is a person who 1) posted radical- and extremist- labeled n-
grams from a social media account, 2) underwent suspicious travel to a foreign country and
received terrorist-related training, and 3) purchased a firearm. This is only an example for
illustration, and the behaviors characterizing such queries need to be generated by experts
on radicalization behaviors. The top right is a simplified data graph G of 4 people each with
various on- and off-line activities.33 The problem is to find all whole or partial matches of
the query Q in the data graph G and present results according to some intuitive ranking
scheme.
33As noted previously, our approach is predicated on access to and proper classification/labeling data
from open and restricted sources to produce a large heterogeneous data graph. Details of these aspects of
the proposed radicalization detection system framework were discussed in Section 3.3. For this example, it
is clear that social media data (e.g, Twitter, Facebook) was envisioned to be fused with firearm background
check databases and local/state/federal criminal and terrorist databases (including data from the FBI’s





Figure 4.1. (a) An example graph query of a potential homegrown violent
extremist and a fictitious data graph of 4 people with on and off-line activities.
Nodes in the data graph represent distinct entities (person or social media
account) or behaviors (posting extremist n-gram, purchasing a firearm, etc.)
with the class label shown inside the node. The letter of the label outside
the node is a code for the class and the number (if applicable) denotes the
person responsible for that entity or behavior. The query graph represents the
pattern of nodes (by class) that may help identify potential homegrown violent
extremists. (b) Desired matching set that includes full and partial matches in
rank order.
The ideal matching results from investigative graph search are shown in Fig. 4.1b. Per-
son 3 (and his related activities) is the only complete match for all indicators and is returned
as the top suspect. Person 1 and 4 (and their related activities) should also be returned as
partial matches due to the posting of radical and extremist n-grams. Note that Person 2,
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despite having a social media account and purchasing a firearm, should not be returned be-
cause neither indicator is important unless there are other suspicious indicators of motivation
or intent to commit targeted violence.
This simplistic, static example, captures the essence of the technical problem we pro-
pose to assist law enforcement and intelligence analysts effectively screen for and prioritize
individuals who may be on pathways to extremist violence. Of course, there are remains
challenges with both scale and dynamics, which we will address in subsequent sections in
this thesis.
4.3. Categorical Node Labeling for Investigations
In order to return such a match results above, it was necessary to recognize the categories
of indicators consistent with the threat assessment literature and to impose this categorical
structure on the nodes. We discuss this important node weighting in this section.
Specifically, investigative queries may contain nodes that are representative of perfectly
legal and innocuous activities that are only potential indicators of a latent behavior of interest
when they occur with other indicators. For example, purchasing a firearm may only serve
as a targeted violence threat indicator if it is accompanied by an overt communication of
threats to others. At the same time, it is possible to identify indicators, should they occur,
which may be individually sufficient to warrant further investigation. While we could use a
numerical node weighting scheme to ensure such indicator/node differences (as in [13] and
[318]), we suspect that node weights may change when in the context of other indicators
and as such complicate the matching process. For example, while we may initially want the
indicator for purchasing a firearm to have a relatively low weight when it is the only indicator
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Table 4.1. Labels for investigative node-types
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of a person as a threat, such an indicator would likely be weighted much more heavily when
it also occurred with the same person making overt threats [81].
93
We thus propose a categorical weighting of nodes to the set of node/edge labels Σ based
upon research from the threat assessment and homegrown violent extremist radicalization
literature, which has generally advocated for condition-based weighting. See Table 4.1 for
the definitions and examples provided. For clarity, we also show in Fig. 4.2 the labeling of
each of the query nodes in the pattern original shown in Fig. 4.1.
The first category query focus (QF) is used to label nodes which are the subject of the
investigative query– namely the people in the data graph. The second category individually
innocuous but related activity (IIRA) is for activities which need to occur in conjunction
with other (more suspicious) indicators to be worth further examination. The third category
indicator (IND) is a broad term to classify unusual behaviors which may suggest a person
is a threat. Lastly, the fourth category red flag indicator (RF) are for activities which are
individually sufficient to warrant further investigation. If a node does not fall in any of these
























Figure 4.2. Consistent with the node category definitions and examples, we
label the nodes in the example graph query pattern Q as follows: query focus
(A), individually innocuous but related activity (B,G), indicator (C, D, and
E), and red flag indicator (F).
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Overall, the purpose of these investigative node categories is either to avoid over-matches
to query patterns based on individually innocuous behaviors or to facilitate alerts when a
match includes a red-flag that is sufficient for further investigation. This modeling extension,
as will be shown in subsequent sections, is a critical component in making existing graph
pattern matching schemes useful to law enforcement and intelligence analysts as well as
developing our own novel graph pattern matching technique.
4.4. Investigative Simulation- Static Graph Pattern Matching
4.4.1. Introduction. Although investigative graph search is largely based social search
and graph-based recommender systems that depend are quite ably handled with existing
graph pattern matching settings, we find that these techniques fall short of achieving de-
sirable results in our setting. We return to the motivating example in Fig. 4.1 in Section
4.2 and recall that we identified the ideal match set for the query Q. For example, dual
simulation [192, 193], which represents the near state of the art in simulation-based graph
pattern matching approaches, technically returns only Person 3 (and his related activities)
as the only matching connected subgraph. Because the algorithmic implementation [192]
[193] of dual simulation also returns remnant individual node matches, the n-grams from
Person 1 and 4 (D1−1, D1−2, C4) as well as the ‘purchase firearm’ node (G2) from Person
2 are partial matches. From this, we identify three shortcomings of dual simulation for
investigative search: 1) the requirement for every node in the query to have some match
(and no allowance for partial matches) is too restrictive when an investigator may include
indicator nodes in the query which need not nor may not all be associated with every person
of interest), 2) any remnant node matches with valid matching indicators do not contain the
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subject of the search, and 3) remnant node matches may contain nodes that are innocuous
activities except when observed with other suspicious indicators.
In this section, we develop our modification to dual simulation, which we call investigative
simulation. It is designed to address these aforementioned shortcomings and returns the ideal
match result in Fig. 4.1b. Person 3 (and his related activities) is still the only complete
match for all indicators. However, Person 1 and 4 (and their related activities) are now
also returned as partial matches due to the posting of radical and extremist n-grams. Note
that Person 2 is no longer returned as a match despite having a social media account and
purchasing a firearm because neither indicator is important unless there are other suspicious
indicators of motivation or intent to commit targeted violence.
4.4.2. Related Work. Our work with investigative simulation builds upon advances
in graph pattern matching in the static setting. Several surveys exist, including [113] and
[23]. Of the two principal types of matching, exact and inexact, we focus our efforts on
the state of the art in inexact matching due to its flexibility for returning results in the
presence of noise or errors in the data [113]. The notable works in static inexact matching
include best-effort matching [297], TALE [295], SIGMA [215], NeMa [162], and MAGE [247].
The ‘inexact’ component of these works primarily involves the allowance for finding nearby
matches for nodes in which an exact match does not exist.
Of these, the work most closely related to ours in intention is [247], which first introduced
a graph pattern matching method that supports exact and inexact queries on both node and
edge attributes as well as wildcard matches. This matching notion specifically cites intelli-
gence analysis as a use-case and offers great flexibility in the query construction that would
allow analysts to explore the unknown or uncertain connections. However, this matching
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scheme still does not truly support uncertain indicator-type matches nor innocuous nodes
which become significant only in the context of other indicators.
Equally important are simulation-based matching schemes, starting with bounded graph
simulation [100, 102] to find meaningful matches given a pattern graph with arbitrary or
specified path lengths in the connections, and dual and strong simulations [102, 192, 193] by
preserving query graph topology through enforcement of both parent and child relationships
in the match and imposing locality constraints.
For the purposes of investigative search where a person may exhibit an indicator behavior
one or more times (and each instance is counted as an appropriate match), we find that
simulation-based approaches may be most appropriate due to the allowance of each query
node to be matched to multiple nodes in the data graph as long as match labels are preserved
at the match-level, as well as with the parent- and child-levels. However, as previously
mentioned in Section 4.4, dual simulation has several shortcomings with investigative search
including the lack of allowance for partial matches, incomplete remnant node matches, and
lack of ability to handle matches of innocuous activities that become important only when
observed with other suspicious indicators.
Lastly, because most graph queries end up returning many matches given a large graph,
researchers have also devised ways to rank the most relevant matches using various goodness
functions. Such criteria include social impact [103], social diversity [103], structural similarity
[13, 162, 297], weighted attribute similarity [13], or label similarity [162]. As sophisticated as
these ranking methods are, we find that none account for intuitive red-flag indicators (i.e.,
those matches which demand the immediate attention of an analyst) that are relevant in
investigative searches.
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4.4.3. Technical Preliminaries and Notation. Before we define investigative sim-
ulation in the next section, we first review graph terminology and notation, as well as the
dual simulation graph pattern matching notion.
Definition 1. Graph [192]. In our work, both the query graph Q and data graph G
are identically defined as a directed graph of the form G(V,E, L), where V is a set of nodes,
E ⊆ V × V is a set of edges, in which (u, u′) denotes an edge from node u to u′; and
L : V ∪ E → Σ is a labeling function which assigns nodes and edges to a set of labels Σ.
Definition 2. Dual Simulation [192, 193] Graph G matches a pattern Q via dual sim-
ulation if there exists a binary match relation SD ⊆ VQ × VG such that:
• for all nodes u ∈ VQ there exists a node v ∈ VG such that (u, v) ∈ S; and
• for each pair (u, v) ∈ S, u ∼ v (i.e., LQ(u) = LG(v)), and for each edge (u, u′) ∈ EQ there
exists an edge (v, v′) ∈ EG such that (u′, v′) ∈ SD, and for each edge (u′, u) ∈ EQ there
exists an edge (v′, v) ∈ EG such that (u′, v′) ∈ SD.
We then refer to SD as a match (via dual simulation) to Q.
Dual Simulation was a significant advancement over graph simulation and previous no-
tions because it preserved not only parent-child relationships but also child-parent relation-
ships in the match (and thus produced more sensible matches). However, as described in
Sections 4.4 and 4.4.2, there are shortcomings when performing investigative search. We
summarize the notations we utilize in this paper in Table 5.1.
4.4.4. Investigative Simulation. The proposed investigative simulation approach is
described next, first by providing a formal definition, and then devising an algorithm for this
new matching notion.
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Table 4.2. Summary of notations
Notation Description/Meaning
G Data graph G(VG, EG, LG)
Q Query graph Q(VQ, EQ, LQ)
SD Binary Match relation (via dual simulation)
SInvSim Match relation (via investigative simulation)
(u, u′) Directed edge from node u to u′
u ∈ VQ, v ∈ VG Nodes with index u (v) are in graph VQ (VG), respectively.
R(u,v) Relevant set of matching node v ∈ VG w.r.t. query node u ∈ VQ.
Definition 3. Investigative simulation: An extension of dual simulation for investigative
search. Graph G contains (partial or complete) matches of pattern Q if there exists a binary
match relation SInvSim ⊆ VQ × VG such that:
• for all nodes u ∈ VQ : L(u) = ‘QF’ and at least 1 node u ∈ VQ : L(u) = ‘IND’ or ‘RF’
there exists a node v ∈ VG such that (u, v) ∈ SInvSim;
• for each pair (u, v) ∈ SInvSim, where u ∈ VQ and v ∈ VG, u ∼ v (i.e., LQ(u) = LG(v)), and
• for each edge (u, u′) ∈ EQ there exists an edge (v, v′) ∈ EG such that (u′, v′) ∈ SInvSim, and
for each edge (u′, u) ∈ EQ there exists an edge (v′, v) ∈ EG such that (u′, v′) ∈ SInvSim.
We then refer to SInvSim as a match (via investigative simulation) to Q.
Instead of all nodes in Q needing a match in G (as in dual simulation), investigative
simulation allows for partial matches by only requiring all ‘QF’ nodes and at least 1 indicator
node (regular ‘IND’ or red-flag ‘RF’) to have a match in G. This keeps matching results
specific to ‘QF’ nodes with at least a single indicator-type that would may make it worthy
of further analysis or investigation.
4.4.5. InvSim- Extension of dual simulation algorithm. One of the merits of
the ‘DualSim’ algorithm for dual simulation found in [192, 193] was that it returns the entire
binary match relation SD, which contains not only complete matches (connected component
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subgraphs for all nodes in Q) but also remnant node matches (those nodes whose parent
and/or child were pruned away as a result of their connections). While [192, 193] never
use these remnant node matches in the construction of the maximum subgraph, they in
fact form the basis of the partial matches that are informative for investigative searches.
However, they are by nature incomplete matches (e.g., in the case of the network schema in
the motivating example problem in Fig. 4.1, the query focus nodes associated with remnant
indicator nodes were not in the match relation). We develop a post-processing extension
to the dual simulation algorithm (Algorithm 1: InvSim, short for Investigative Simulation)
that corrects both issues specific to indicator-type patterns. In it we utilize a modified 2-hop
concept of a relevant set from [103]. Given a match v of a query node u in VQ, the relevant
set of v w.r.t. u (denoted as R(u,v)) includes all matches v
′ of u′ for up to 2-hop descendants
u′ of u in VQ.
Lines 1-9 are those lines found in [192] and [193], which is the implementation of the
dual simulation algorithm and results in the intermediate match relation SD. Our post-
processing extension to this algorithm begins in Line 10, when we iterate through all nodes
in the matching set in data graph G which are labeled as ‘QF’ or query focus (i.e. persons).
If the intersection of the relevant set of v and the match relation SD for nodes ṽ of type
‘IIRA’ or individually innocuous but related activity, then we remove this node from the
match relation and remove its query focus parent if it was in the relation (Lines 11-12). This
effectively removes matching nodes that are considered benign without the presence of other
indicators, as well as the associated person from further consideration.
Next, we ensure that the parent query focus nodes of other matching nodes of type
‘indicator’ are included in the match relation SD. We first search for all nodes ṽ that are
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Algorithm 1: InvSim (for Investigative Simulation)
Input: Query graph Q with investigation category node labels, and data graph G
Output: The match relation SInvSim of Q and G
1 foreach u ∈ VQ do
2 sim(u) :={v |v ∈ VG and LQ(u) = LG(v)}
3 while there are changes do
4 foreach edge (u, u′) ∈ EQ and each node v ∈ sim(u) do
5 if there is no edge (v, v′) in G with v′ ∈ sim(u′) then sim(u) := sim(u)\{v};
6 foreach edge (u′, u) ∈ EQ and each node v ∈ sim(u) do
7 if there is no edge (v′, v) in G with v′ ∈ sim(u′) then sim(u) := sim(u)\{v};
8 if sim(u) = ∅ then return ∅;
9 SD := {(u, v)|u ∈ VQ, v ∈ sim(u)}
10 foreach node v ∈ SD where L(v) =‘QF’ do
11 if L(ṽ) =‘IIRA’ for all ṽ ∈ R(u,v) ∩ SD then
12 sim(ũ) := sim(ũ)\{ṽ}; if node v ∈ SD then sim(u) := sim(u)\{v};
13 if there exists a node ṽ ∈ R(u,v) ∩ SD and v /∈ SD then
14 sim(u) := sim(u) ∩ {v}; if every node v̌ along the shortest path from (v, ṽ) is
not in SD then sim(ǔ) := sim(ǔ)\{v̌}, ∀(ǔ, v̌) ;
15 SInvSim := {(u, v)|u ∈ VQ, v ∈ sim(u)}
16 return SInvSim.
both in the relevant set of v and the match relation SD but whose parent query focus node
v is not yet in SD (Line 13). We join this node v to the match relation (Line 14) as well as
add all nodes in the shortest path from node v to ṽ in the match relation (Line 14). Finally,
we consolidate and return the modified match relation SInvSim (Line 15-16).
4.4.6. Results.
4.4.6.1. Real dataset for a proxy investigative search. In order to test investigative sim-
ulation on real data, we utilized the BlogCatalog dataset,34 which is a scrape taken in July
2009 of a social media site that allows users to register/promote their own blog and connect
with other bloggers. The graph had over 470,000 nodes and over 4 million edges; it is further
detailed in Table 4.3. The network schema shown in Fig. 4.3 describes the node types and
34Available at http://dmml.asu.edu/users/xufei/datasets.html
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connections present the network. In essence, an ID owns a User Id, which in turn both
authors blogs with a Weblog Id as well as forms directed friendship connections with other
User Ids. Lastly, each weblog will provide one or more user-specified tags.
Table 4.3. BlogCatalog Graph Characteristics
Characteristics Value
Total Nodes 471,267
Number of ids 88,781
Number of userids 80,949
Number of weblogs 127,227
Number of unique tags 174,310
Total Edges 4,098,290
Number of links from id to userid 88,784
Number of links from userid to userid 3,223,640
Number of links from userid to weblog 127,227
Number of links form weblog to tags 658,639
Figure 4.3. Network schema of the BlogCatalog graph. IDs own account
User Ids. User Ids author one or more Weblog Ids, and are friends with other
User Ids. Weblog Ids write about one or more tags (which are user specified).
4.4.6.2. Query Description. To test the performance of the matching scheme and algo-
rithm, we devised a proxy query on a benign subject matter with structural parallels to
investigations. The query focus is for user IDs who had been writing blogs about Microsoft
Windows operating systems (XP and/or Vista) and subsequently also began to write about
Windows 7 when it was released in July 2009 (the month in which the data was collected).
Node Z is a true person ID, node A is the user ID query focus, and node B is the weblog
with certain tags. All C nodes are meant to be seen as labels of a post or blog entry (i.e.,
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determined through machine-classified semantic analysis). The labels ‘computer’ (C535) and
‘windows’ (C2033) are IIRA (i.e., relatively frequent labels which help provide context or
additional clarity on the true topic set), and labels ‘xp’ (C23136) and ‘vista’ (C20693) are
indicators that the blog is about Windows operating systems (i.e., necessary but not suffi-
cient for trajectory behavior). Finally, label ‘windows 7’ (C20684) is considered a red flag
indicator.
Figure 4.4. Experiment query for BlogCatalog. Query focus is for User Ids
who had been writing blogs broadly related to ‘computers’ and ‘windows’, and
specifically to Windows operating systems. In this example, we treat the tag
‘windows 7’ as a red flag indicator.
4.4.6.3. Ranking Method and Analysis. As expected, investigative simulation returned
meaningful partial matches to the query. Our intuitive ranking scheme for the top-k results
was to 1) first order by the presence of any ‘QF’ nodes with red-flag (‘RF’) indicators, and
2) followed by the size of the relevant matching set for each ‘QF’ node (i.e., in decreasing
order of |R(u,v) ∩ SInvSim|, where LQ(u) = LG(v) = ‘QF’). This method effectively highlights
to analysts those first who have red-flag indicators, followed by the those who have the most
indicators towards the latent behavior of interest.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.5. (a) A paired bar graph showing the exact correspondence of the
top-20 query focus nodes by match size between both InvSim and exhaustive
search, where |R(u,v) ∩SInvSim|is the number of matching nodes in the relevant
set of the query focus node. (b): Top-4 results of investigative simulation on
the BlogCatalog dataset with the query in Fig. 4.4. The top-match is User Id
‘u65530’ with 5 indicator nodes matching in the relevant set (2 directed hops
from Node A). Note the presence of the red flag indicator ‘windows 7‘ in each
of these matches. The grayed-out nodes were the original query nodes not
matched.
We find that investigative simulation performed well in the matching, as measured with
both quantitative and qualitative methods. First, we quantitatively measured the similarity
between the top-20 results with the original query pattern by using Jaccard similarity and
compared it with the top-20 ground truth results acquired through an exhaustive search.
Qualitatively, we performed subjective validation of the sensibility of each of the top-10
match results. The top-4 partial matches to the query are shown in Fig. 4.5.
4.5. Discussion of the Technical Approach Over Other Possible Approaches
In this section, we briefly discuss the cause for investigative graph search as a proposed
technical approach over other possible approaches.
4.5.1. Pattern detection over anomaly detection detection approach. To
identify and screen for individuals at risk for violent extremism, we chose to utilize the
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investigative graph search technique based on graph pattern matching rather than anomaly
detection. Anomaly detection techniques are methods to identify outliers or “patterns in
data that do not conform to expected behavior” [46]. Used traditionally in credit card fraud
and computer network intrusion detections among other applications [46], it has been most
recently utilized as well in insider threat detection. [240, 265, 277]. Anomaly detection seems
particularly suited for identifying insider threats for a number of reasons including:
• Companies, organizations, or network monitoring services have access to vast amounts
of data related to all aspects of computer usage (login and logout times, normal work
flow, USB usage, etc.) [201]
• Companies and organizations have prescribed computer-use policies from which pol-
icy violations are detectable [216]
• Companies and organizations generally have hierarchical roles and associated norms
for users in the same role. In these cases, it is generally known who should have
access to certain files or programs, and peer activities that can serve as a baseline
of behaviors (See [216] as well as the survey [265] of related work in this area).
Such norms for work procedures or computer/network use as well as the availability of em-
ployee roles for base-lining behaviors do not transfer to the population of individuals at large
outside of established organizations. Rather, in the domain of risk assessments for violent
extremists and the radicalization process, there is a large body of work proffering the likely
early warning indicators and patterns of suspicious behavior that lend to more direct pat-
tern matching techniques. Moreover, outside of established organizations and their closed,
monitored systems, it is much harder to characterize on and off-line behaviors that would be
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considered “normal.” Lastly, [66] also suggests that anomaly detection approaches to iden-
tify the unusual behaviors from normal behaviors are predicated on the broad, “behavioral
monitoring” that would have serious civil liberty issues [66, p. 150]. Because of these reasons,
we initially pursued a pattern matching approach over an anomaly detection approach.
4.5.2. Analyst decision aid using risk indexes over Bayesian inference tech-
niques. As stated from the outset, the proposed technology is designed to mine, monitor,
and screen for those individuals who exhibit behavioral indicators of violent extremist rad-
icalization. Inherent in this is technology is the role of enabling non-actuarial structured
professional judgment instruments at scale and through the integration of specific databases.
On the other hand, Bayesian inference is a key concept that is central to machine learning
and prediction because in many cases, it is easier to get conditional probabilities in one
‘direction’ of inference and Bayes rule can recover the conditional probabilities in the other
direction. For example, in the study of radicalization [116, 168] identified the prevalence of
certain pre-incident indicators or warning behaviors in known violent extremists (i.e., con-
ditioned upon his/her being a violent extremist, this is the probability that this indicator
or behavior is present). Ultimately, however, one is trying to determine whether an indi-
vidual wants to commit extremist violence, given that the presence of certain indicators or
behaviors. Bayesian inference theoretically allows us to determine this through the following
formulation, which is a modified version of the one found in a RAND’s “Using Behavioral
Indicators to Help Detect Potential Violent Acts” [66, p. 191-195].
Let V signify that a person is a violent extremist, and I = {I1, I2, ...Im} be the set of m
indicators of violent extremism. Then Pt(V |I) is the conditional probability that a person






While researchers have provided insights into Pt−1(I|V ) (the set of indicators present
when one is a violent extremist) and an estimate for Pt−1(V ) (the base rate for violent
extremists), no research exists that we have found to address Pt−1(I) (the base joint prob-
ability of indicators present in the population whether one is a violent extremist or not).
The latter is complicated not only because it would involve the estimate for the prevalence
of a particular indicator in the entire population (for example, whether one posts a ‘radical’
statement on social media), but also because we cannot assume independence of the indi-
cators of extremist violence. While several researchers [35, 231] have proposed the use of
Bayesian inference in violent extremist detection, the proposals were never implemented on
real data. In the end, researchers in [66] were skeptical of the true utility of Bayesian infer-
ence in this application and stated that the methods, “are unlikely to go very far...except
for the simplest of instances” [66, p. 195].35
The key point is that this research does not aim for prediction. Our proposed radicaliza-
tion detection system has both a data management component as well as a dynamic pattern
recognition technology. The former emphasizes data fusion and push alerts to help law en-
forcement agencies maintain awareness of the activities of persons of interest, while the latter
tracks indicator behaviors over time to aid law enforcement agencies in screening for those at
higher risk for extremist violence. Ultimately, the system we propose can identify potential
35For instance, the formulation in Eq. 1 would be more realistic and complex if we had to distinguish
different types of violent extremists (such as foreign fighters, those who provide material support, or those
seeking to commit domestic plots) each of whom could have their own set of partially overlapping indicators.
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threats and lower the number of false positives with the benefits of artificial intelligence and
human-factors [201, p. 1].
4.5.3. Assessing risks over providing prediction. Prediction of any human be-
havior is an ambitious goal, especially when we are considering individual intentions and
behaviors rather than group or locality outcomes as is now prevalent in “predictive polic-
ing.” Consider the area of predicting an individual’s physical path trajectory when enabled
by the global positioning systems in smart phones. One paper observed, “Why is there any
hope that good predictions can be computed? Typically, people try not to waste time and
move at least partially on shortest or quickest paths. It is only this observation that allows
us to come up with any prediction at all” [93, p. 7]. However, there is a paucity of terror-
ist and radicalization research that suggests any cognitive or behavioral equivalent, and we
conclude that estimating likelihoods probabilistically is very difficult. Others have outright
dismissed actuarial-based tools that establish a procedure for combining risk factor scores
or producing a likelihood estimate for violence as “patently infeasible” due to the statistical
power needed given the small sample sizes of terrorists [214].
Meloy stated, “The problem of describing risk of intended or targeted violence in any
given individual (as opposed to a group) is the very low base rate in any population under
consideration, and the guarantee of an unacceptably high false-positive rate” [203, p. 257].36
Moreover, the problem is hard because of the terrible consequences of false negatives as
well (i.e., those individuals whom law enforcement deem as low risk, and then who end up
successfully carrying out an attack). False negatives first and foremost put the safety and
36The use of the term “unacceptably” is obviously a subject of debate. Clearly, false positives are less
favorable in the terrorism context than in comparison to, for instance, credit card fraud detection. While the
latter could be resolved with a (sometimes automated) call from the credit card company to the customer
to verify a transaction, the former might involve the use of additional law enforcement time and resources
to resolve and possibly cause significant ill will when one is falsely investigated)[268].
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security of innocent lives at risk, but also erode the trust and confidence in law enforcement
and causes further scrutiny of their actions [266].
Rather, we take a much more established threat risk assessment approach and seek to
assist law enforcement in the prevention task without necessarily needing to predict violent
extremism. Meloy, a consultant for the FBI Behavioral Analysis Units, wrote extensively
about this subject. First, he stated that “Risk factors allow the separation of individuals
into risk groups, typically high, medium, or low. Typing someone as high risk is not a prob-
ability estimate that he or she will behave in a violent way; rather, it is a statement that
the subject shares important statistical associations with that group of people from which
the few individuals who will go on to commit the behavior are most likely to emanate”[203,
p. 257]. Furthermore, he stated that “prevention [of terrorist violence] does not require pre-
diction... detect[ing] the proximal indicators of concern for law enforcement [can] narrow
the focus of an investigation, prioritize cases, and help plan a timely risk-management in-
tervention” [204]. In summary, an empirically-tested dynamic radicalization risk assessment
protocol that more reliably anticipates violent action would greatly assist law enforcement
and NGOs, but a supporting technology that can automatically detect the likely presence
of those radicalization indicators would help them all even further by screening and pro-
viding alerts for those most at risk, and allowing for better decision making under resource
constraints.
4.5.4. Dynamic risk assessment over one-time determinations. We take a dy-
namic approach to risk assessment primarily because risk assessments, particularly for the
fluid processes of radicalization, must be repeated to consider the latest intelligence or behav-
ioral information. Meloy wrote that “Risk is a dynamic process and it is necessary to repeat
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the consideration of risk factors (the “threat assessment”) in the light of new information,
as each occasion that risk is considered constitutes simply a “snapshot” of a moving scene- a
still frame in movie [203, p. 259]. This observation, supported by [271], has empirical support
where unfortunately individuals who were deemed not a risk (or at least not an imminent
risk) by law enforcement agencies previously went on to carry out acts of extremist violence.
See for instance Tamerlan Tsarnaev [106], Omar Mateen [56], and Ahmad Khan Rahami
[217].
4.5.5. Discussion of law base-rates. The base rate fallacy is the “the fallacy of
allowing indicators to dominate base rates in your probability assessments” [9, p. 212]. The
caution against this fallacy, often called base-rate neglect, has been applicable to many
different areas, to include most recently in the detection of potential terrorists or violent
extremists. For example, [264] states that analysts in the intelligence community “suffer
from low base rate neglect for very rare [terrorist] events” and that “[m]uch of their time is
spent investigating obvious false alarms, sometimes losing track of important developments”
[262, p. 10]. Others, such as [266, 268], argue vehemently against the use of quantitative
approaches to conducting these risk assessments, stating “actuarial risk assessment systems
cannot work” [266, p. 283] and “data-mining systems won’t uncover any terrorist plots until
they are very accurate, and that even very accurate systems will be so flooded with false
alarms that they will be useless” [268].
Sarma’s presentation and analysis of the low base rate problem in the risk assessments
of terrorists in a leading psychology journal [266, p. 283] were misleading. He proposed a
hypothetical example of a population of 100 individuals where 80 are non-terrorists and 20
are terrorists (the percentage of true terrorists is inflated to 20%) and a risk assessment tool
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with 90% sensitivity and 70% specificity. He correctly calculated that the tool would detect
18 true positives and 24 false positives with a resulting positive predictive value (PPV) of
18/(18 + 24) = 0.43. But then he wrote that this percentage was “worse than chance,”
implying that a random guessing heuristic would be better at finding terrorists.37 This
can clearly mislead a reader. Indeed, 0.43 is less than 0.50, which is the random chance
for success in an experiment with binary outcomes (i.e. flipping a coin). However, Sarma
fails to mention that 0.43 should, in fact, be compared to 0.20, the original percentage of
terrorists in the population. In fact, the use of this hypothetical risk assessment system
effectively increased the odds of finding the terrorist from 2 in 10 to over 4 in 10, a boost of
215%. Taken another way, Sarma’s mention of chance is not applicable to the subset of 42
(since those were acquired by the merits of the tool), but to the entire original population of
100. Law enforcement following a random guessing heuristic would in expectation identify
as positives 10 terrorists and 40 non-terrorists. The PPV here is 10/(10 + 40) = 0.20. One
must also keep in mind that this random guessing heuristic fails to detect 10 terrorists who
presumably go on to conduct some (devastating) attack, whereas the tool mentioned misses
2.
This critique emphasizes the points by Koehler in [172], who wrote that a decision’s
maker’s goals, values, and task assumptions must be considered in the analysis of low base
rate problems. Law enforcement agencies would most likely value a system that makes it
two times more likely for them to catch a perpetrator of terrorism. On the other hand, if
37A similar misleading argument about data mining technologies being worse than“flipping a coin” using
a Bayesian probabilistic framework can be found in a blog by a research fellow at Harvard University [269].
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the false positives are an unbearable burden for the agencies to sift through,38 then perhaps
those issues can be addressed with other means such as greater funding, changes in policy,
and investment in technologies such as the continuous monitoring system proposed in this
thesis.
Others who, rather than becoming naysayers, proposed other techniques in addressing
low base rate problems. Researchers in [66] point to the low base rates of people of violent
intentions to highlight the importance of future screening technologies that result in pop-
ulation samples in which this propensity is higher. Studies such as [182] have rigorously
examined the effect of the base-rate fallacy in screening tests for child mental health prob-
lems, analyzed the sustainability impacts of even good psychometric tests, and discussed
how sequential screening can be helpful. Once again, as in the case for counterterrorism
policy, the efficacy of procedures is inherently tied to some measure of the costs associated
with both missed identification and incorrect identification.
In this research effort, we do not neglect the base rates of the latent behaviors we are
trying to detect. For example, in Chapter 6 we specifically test the effectiveness of our meth-
ods against a ground truth of low-rate behaviors. In all cases, we analyze the contribution
of the proposed detection system in how effective it is in screening for individuals at higher
risk by comparing the proportions of true positives among the entire population and among
the subset of individuals identified for further investigation as a result of the technology.
38According to Sageman in [264, p. 11], “law enforcement agencies complain that they are drowned by
an ocean of false alarms, which overwhelm their resources. Moreover, he writes, “The major request from
the field is help to distinguish the very few true positives that will turn to violence from the vast majority
of false positives- young people who brag and pretend that they are tough and dangerous, but, in fact, just
talk, talk, talk, and do nothing”[264, p. 11].
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4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced investigative graph search as the process of searching
for and prioritizing persons of interest who may exhibit part or all of a pattern of suspicious
behaviors or connections. We also described our radicalization detection system framework
as a holistic analyst-in-the-loop framework to assist law enforcement and intelligence agencies
in detecting those on trajectories of violent extremist radicalization.
Lastly, we developed investigative simulation and corresponding matching algorithm as
an extension of dual simulation for investigative searches. We show that this form of graph
pattern matching produces more sensible matches, more complete partial matches, and less
false positives through the imposition of categorical node labels related to indicators
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CHAPTER 5
INSiGHT: A Novel Dynamic Inexact Graph Pattern Matching
Technique
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we operationalize the previously defined concept of investigative graph
search in a dynamic variant and formulate the problem of searching for individuals under-
taking latent behaviors such as violent extremist radicalization as a unique dynamic graph
pattern matching problem on a large heterogeneous graph of individuals and their on- and
off-line behaviors. To solve this problem, we develop a dynamic inexact graph pattern match-
ing technique, called INSiGHT (Investigative Search for Graph-Trajectories) that identifies
individuals or small groups with conforming subgraphs to a radicalization query pattern and
follow the match trajectories over time. INSiGHT is aimed at developing tools for assisting
law enforcement and intelligence agencies in monitoring and screening for those individuals
whose behaviors indicate a significant risk for violence, and allow for the better prioritization
of limited investigative resources.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2 provides an overview of related
work. Section 5.3 provides definitions and notation and reviews technical preliminaries.
Section 5.4 outlines our multi-hop class similarity approach for graph pattern matching over
time. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 present the results of basic INSiGHT technique applications on
two datasets. Section 5.7 details the improvements we made to filter by indicator node-type
classes, as well as account for the parameterized time-based decay of indicators and the value
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of repeated indicators. In Sections 5.8-5.11 we present first results on some small synthetic
graphs, and then extensive experimental results on real datasets.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.1. Motivating example for detecting trajectories of homegrown vi-
olent extremists. A small example problem related to the investigative search
for homegrown violent extremists. (a) Query graph Q- an example graph query
of some possible indicators of a homegrown violent extremist. (b) Data Graph
G- a fictitious data graph of 4 people with various associated indicators as on-
and off-line activities. The node class labels are inside the node, and the node
IDs are outside the node. Each edge has a timestamp (in blue) that denotes
the time in which the edge was formed.
5.1.1. A motivating example radicalization detection problem. We begin
with a small dynamic example problem to demonstrate the basic approach of finding poten-
tial homegrown violent extremists among a group of people and following their radicalization
trajectory over time (Fig. 5.1). It is a dynamic variant of the example introduced in Sec-
tion 4.2. It was also previously used in [144] and is based on the radicalization trajectory
framework and methodology from [165] and a sample of behavioral indicators proposed in
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[35, 220]. Nodes in the data graph represent distinct entities such as a person or social media
account, or behaviors such as posting extremist n-gram or purchasing a firearm.
The query graph Q (Fig. 5.1a) represents the pattern of nodes by class that may help
identify potential homegrown violent extremists, but there is no specification on the sequence
of occurrence of those indicators due to its variability. The pattern is a person who 1) posted
radical- and extremist- labeled n-grams from a social media account, 2) underwent suspicious
travel to a foreign country and received terrorist-related training, and 3) purchased a firearm.
As before, this is only an example for illustration, and the behaviors characterizing such
queries need to be generated by experts on radicalization behaviors. The data graph G (Fig.
5.1b) depicts 4 people each with various on- and off-line activities performed over a period
of 4 timesteps. The problem is to find all whole or partial matches of the query Q in G, and
to present results of the top matches and the changes to their match of the query over time.
5.1.2. Assumptions. It is important to note that our approach is predicated on a graph
model where entities perform behaviors and may be connected to other entities through a
limited number of path types. This graph model is exemplified in the previous motivating
example. As a result, we make the following modeling assumptions:
• Data graph is a set of distinct, directed, acyclic, entity-based conforming subgraphs
of the query pattern.
• Distinct behaviors for each entity are modeled as distinct nodes.
• Relationships between entities are periodically assessed and modeled as bi-directional
edges of known path types (such as known direct relations between entities, or known
relations via on-line social networks).
• The query pattern contains at most one occurrence of each node class.
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5.2. Related Work
The related work in the static setting was already covered in Section 4.4.2 when we
developed investigative simulation. Here, we highlight several state-of-the-art dynamic graph
pattern matching methods worth mentioning for further comparison. Researchers in [49]
developed an exact subgraph incremental search algorithm for continuous queries. Their
system relies on partitioning the query graph, tracking and combining matches with small
subgraphs, and specifying a join order in which the small subgraphs are combined. However,
this approach is limited to finding exact matching subgraphs and also does not track the full
or partial matches over time.
Additionally, [290] proposed a time-based extension of the dual bounded simulation form
of graph pattern matching. The data graph was enriched with timestamped edges, which
is a modeling practice we adopted. The query graph was also expanded to include a strict
allowable edge sequence for the matches to occur. However, we note that the strict edge
sequence constraints are likely too restrictive for noisy social graphs that might have con-
nections that appear out of an anticipated sequence. Additionally, this framework still does
not return partial matches nor track the trajectory of the matches to the query over time.
Additionally, continuous subgraph pattern search proposed in [47] is also closely related
to our work. They developed an approach to check for approximate subgraph isomorphism
to a query pattern in graph streams by using a Node Neighbor Tree filtering technique.
While continuous pattern search aspect is very similar, our approach calculates similarity
scores to a query pattern and is not explicitly searching for subgraph isomorphisms, which
is a condition too strict in many real-world applications.
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Building upon the many recent advances in dynamic graph pattern matching, we take
a unique vectorized approach of investigating the dynamics in multi-hop class similarities
between nodes in query graph and data graph over time. By tracking partial match trajec-
tories, we provide another dimension of analysis in investigative graph searches to highlight
entities on a pathway towards a pattern of a latent behavior. To our knowledge, no other
comparable scheme exists. In future work, we seek to modify some of the aforementioned
graph pattern matching approaches to return and track dynamic match similarity scores.
5.3. Technical Preliminaries and Notation
Overall, given a time-independent query graph Q and a time-dependent data graph
G, INSiGHT conducts inexact graph pattern matching defined in Definition 4 to find all
(including possibly partially conforming) subgraphs GS and calculates and tracks the multi-
hop class similarity between nodes.
Definition 4. Inexact Graph Pattern Matching. The graph matching process to find
the binary match relation S ⊆ VQ × VG such that:
• for each of as many nodes u ∈ VQ as possible (but at least one), there exists a node
v ∈ VG such that (u, v) ∈ S, and
• for each pair (u, v) ∈ S, u ∼ v, and
• for each of as many edges (u, u′) ∈ EQ as possible (but at least one) there exists an
edge (v, v′) ∈ EG such that both (u, v) ∈ S and (u′, v′) ∈ S.
We first review the definitions of the heterogeneous information network (or data graph)
as well as the class membership matrix.
Definition 5. Heterogeneous Information Network (or Data Graph). A heterogeneous
information network (or data graph) is defined as a directed graph G = (V,E, fA, fT ), where
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• V is a finite set of nodes, and n is number of vertices (|V | = n);
• E ⊆ V × V , in which (v, v′) denotes an edge from node v to v′;
• fA(·) is a function which associates a node v ∈ V or an edge e ∈ E with a tuple
fA(v) = (A1 = a1, ..., Am = am), where ai is a constant, and Ai is referred to as an
object/edge class of v, and m is the number of classes.
• fT (·) is a function which assigns a timestamp from the set Γ to an edge e ∈ E. A
timestamp indicates the beginning of the existence of the edge.
It is important to point out that node v or edge e can be members of one or more classes.
The presence of more than one class or edge type makes the network heterogeneous. We also
acknowledge that graph G is also a function of time t, but refer to it as G for readability.
Our approach relies on t to be discrete, but graph updates can be of fixed or varying intervals
based upon the application and desire for analysis at regular times or by event.
Definition 6. Class Membership Matrix. A class membership matrix A is an n ×m
integer matrix made up of the tuple class membership vectors associated where every node
v ∈ V has an associated class membership vector ~av = [a1, ..., am]T [297] [102]. In the case
of binary class membership, avk = 1 if node v is labeled with the k
th class; 0 otherwise.
Of course, the class membership value could be weighted as well (to signify the strength of
association or membership in a particular class).
In the field of graph pattern matching, class membership of neighboring nodes is of great
importance. This is seen in the simulation-based pattern matching approaches [100] [192],
where the class memberships of both parent and child nodes are examined before a node is
considered ‘matching’ to a node in the query. Additionally, the inclusion of timestamps in
edges is a relatively new but important development in the field of graph pattern matching
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Table 5.1. Summary of notations
Notation Description/Meaning
G Data graph G(VG, EG, fA,G, fT,G).
Q Query graph Q(VQ, EQ, fA,Q, fT,Q).
(u, u′) Directed edge from node u to u′.
u ∈ VQ, v ∈ VG Nodes with index u (v) are in graph VQ (VG), respectively.
Wh(t)G, Wh(t)Q h-hop Adjacency Matrices at time t for G and Q, respec-
tively.
AG, AQ Class Membership Matrices for G and Q, respectively.
MG,Q Sparse node class match matrix between G and Q.
Ch(t) Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency Matrix at time t,
where Ch(t) = Wh(t)A.
Ph(t) Child-from-Parent h-hop Class Adjacency Matrix at time
t, where Ph(t) = Wh(t)
TA.
Sh(t) Multi-hop class membership similarity matrix at hop h
and time t between the query nodes and data graph nodes
which are class-matching.
S̃(t) Aggregate score vector for all nodes Vn ∈ G for all hops
h for time t and α decay parameter between [0, 1].
[290], and reflects real-life graph dynamics. Given all this, we introduce a modification to
the h-hop connectivity matrix from [185] [208], and define a new structure that we will use
throughout the paper that succinctly captures the class memberships of h-hop neighbors over
time. In this work, an h-hop neighborhood of node v is the set of nodes that are reachable
from v in h hops (following a path of exactly length h, without backtracking).
We note that the value of h leads to a trade-off between the depth of similarity one
desires to consider to matches and computational complexity. Its determination is largely
dependent upon the size of the query graph as well as the knowledge of the structure and
size of the data graph’s network schema.
Definition 7. h-hop Adjacency Matrix. A h-hop adjacency matrix Wh(t) is an n× n
integer matrix with element wh(t)i,j representing the existence at time t of an h-hop relation
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(possibly weighted and/or directed) between vertex i to vertex j in the graph G, where n is
the number of vertices (|V | = n).
Note that this structure is in part a simplification of the h-hop connectivity matrix in [208]
[185], where each entry (i,j) > 0 denotes not only the existence of the relation between at
h-hops but also the h hops necessary to make the connection. However, our h-hop Adjacency
Matrix also is a function of time t.
The h-hop Adjacency Matrix is calculated algorithmically as shown in Algorithm 2.
With this structure established, we can now calculate the h-hop Class Adjacency Matrix.
Figure 5.2. Depiction of the h-hop Adjacency Matrix Wh(t) and the Parent-
to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency Matrix Ch(t)
Definition 8. Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency Matrix. A parent-to-child h-hop
class adjacency matrix Ch(t), an n×m integer matrix with element ch(t)v,k representing the
existence at time t of a h-hop relation (possibly weighted and/or directed) between vertex v
and the class k in the graph G, where n is number of vertices (|V | = n), m is the number of
classes, and m n. This matrix is the result of the product of the h-hop adjacency matrix
Wh(t) and the Class Assignment Matrix A, i.e. Ch(t) = Wh(t)A. Each entry ch(t)v,k
is essentially the (possibly weighted) sum of the number of nodes of a particular class k
adjacent by 1 to h hops to node v at time t. See Fig 5.2.
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In the state of the art for graph pattern matching through simulation, researchers consider
both the match of both parent-to-child relationships as well as child-from-parent relation-
ships. To build on this advancement, we also develop the children-from-parent h-hop class
adjacency matrix denoted as Ph(t), where Ph(t) = Wh(t)
TA.
Algorithm 2: h-hop Adjacency Matrix algorithm
Input: W1(t)G (the 1-hop adjacency matrix of graph G of size n× n),
t : tstart ≤ t ≤ tend, and hmax (the desired number of hops)
Output: Wh(t)G (h-hop Adjacency Matrices of G), t : tstart ≤ t ≤ tend and
h : 2 ≤ h ≤ hmax
1 foreach t = tstart to tend do
2 foreach h = 2 to hmax do
3 Wh(t)G =binary matrix of (W1(t)G)
h, where each entry wh(t)G,i,j = 1 when
w1(t)
h
G,i,j = 1, i 6= j, and wh-prev(t)G,i,j 6= 1 for h-prev < h; and 0 otherwise.
4 return Wh(t)G
5.4. Approach
Given a time-independent query graph Q and a time-dependent data graph G, we inves-
tigate the multi-hop class similarity between nodes by following the approach below. Figure
5.3 is a graphical depiction of steps 4-6 outlined below.
(1) Construct the class membership matrices AQ and AG for query graph Q and data
graph G, respectively.
(2) Construct the (sparse) node class match matrix MG,Q between query graph Q and
data graph G, where each entry mij = 1 if the class of data graph node i ∈ VG
exactly matches the class of the query graph node j ∈ VQ, and 0 otherwise.
(3) Construct the h-hop adjacency matrices Wh(t)Q and Wh(t)G (h of each of them for

















































































Figure 5.3. Graphical depiction of baseline INSiGHT algorithm. This
graphic depicts the basic steps in the INSiGHT algorithms described in [144].
Here n′ is the number of nodes in the query graph Q, n is the number of nodes
in the data graph G, and m is the number of classes. The steps shown are only
for the construction of the parts of Sh(t) that correspond to the Parent-to-Child
class membership similarity; the steps for the Parent-from-Child portions are
not depicted.
(4) Calculate the parent and child h-hop class adjacency matrices Ch(t)Q and Ph(t)Q,
and Ch(t)G and Ph(t)G (h of each of them for each time t) for graph Q and G,
respectively (Algorithm 3).
(5) Calculate the multi-hop class membership similarity matrices Sh(t) at each hop h
and each time t between the query nodes and data graph nodes which are class-
matching. Such conditioning nodes reduces the number of similarity calculations
from O(|VG||VQ|) to O(|VG|) for each hop and each timestep. Using the entries
mi,j = 1 in MG,Q, we calculate the h-th hop class membership similarity between
each i-th row of the h-hop query graph class adjacency matrices Ch(t)Q and Ph(t)Q
and the corresponding j-th row of the h-hop data graph class adjacency matrices
Ch(t)G and Ph(t)G (Algorithm 4).
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(6) Summarize the class membership similarity over multiple hops at each time t by
calculating the weighted sum of similarity scores S̃(t).
The above approach produces structures which would enable analysts to explore numer-
ically and through visualizations the dynamics of changing in similarity scores by hop over
time.
Algorithm 3: Parent and Child h-hop Class Adjacency Matrices algorithm
Input: Wh(t) (h-hop Adjacency Matrices of a graph for a given t), and hmax (the
desired number of hops).
Output: Ch(t) (Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency Matrices of a graph), and
Ph(t) (Child-from-Parent h-hop Class Adjacency Matrices of a graph),
t : tstart ≤ t ≤ tend and h : 1 ≤ h ≤ hmax
1 foreach t = tstart to tend do
2 foreach h = 1 to hmax do
3 Ch(t) = Wh(t)A
4 Ph(t) = Wh(t)
TA
5 return Ch(t),Ph(t)
Algorithm 4: h-hop Class Membership Similarity algorithm
Input: MG,Q (sparse node class match matrix between query graph Q and data
graph G), Ch(t)Q and Ph(t)Q, and Ch(t)G and Ph(t)G (parent and child
h-hop class adjacency matrices for all time tstart ≤ t ≤ tend for graph Q and G,
respectively), and hmax (the desired number of hops).
Output: Sh(t) (h-hop Class Similiarity Matrices between class-matching query and
graph nodes at time t using some similarity metric) where
t : tstart ≤ t ≤ tend and h : 1 ≤ h ≤ hmax.
1 define zero matrices Sh(t) for each hop h..hmax and each time tstart ≤ t ≤ tend of size
n× l, where n and l are the number of nodes in G and Q, respectively.
2 foreach t = tstart to tend do
3 foreach h = 1 to hmax do
4 foreach index pair (i, j) : mi,j = 1 in MG,Q do
5 set {sh(t)i,j in Sh(t)} =
similarity(ch(t)G,i· and ch(t)Q,j·) + similarity(ph(t)G,i· and ph(t)Q,j·)i
6 return Sh(t)
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5.4.1. Similarity Metric. In our analysis, we initially utilized two common similarity
measures— Jaccard and Sorensen-Dice indices— to measure the similarity between two sets.
However, upon further analysis, we realized that the calculated similarities with such metrics
had improperly penalized good matches to the original query because of the presence of
classes in the data graph that were not in the query. In fact, we assume in our problem that
the query graph is generalized with the complete list of all possibly interesting connections
or indicators. Thus, it only makes sense that our similarity metric should be a recall-based





In other words, we are interested in finding the subset of nodes in G which are also in
Q, divided by the total nodes in Q. Nodes with classes that are not in Q do not affect
the similarity calculation and reflect noisy, un-related activities. Despite this, our work is
compatible with other existing metrics or others to be developed in the future. See Section
?? for intended improvements.
5.4.2. Aggregating Similarity Scores. As a way of compactly distinguishing be-
tween both the parent and child similarity between the query and data graphs, we use a
complex number structure where the real component and imaginary components are the
parent and child similarity, respectively (see Algorithm 4, Line 5).
Additionally, Sh(t) for the hmax hops and time from tstart to tend give us a hypercube of
class membership similarity scores. How are we to aggregate the scores by hop and over time
such that trajectories may be easily determined without losing information?
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We propose a method to aggregate the similarity scores for each node Vn ∈ G over
multiple hops h at each time t that is analogous to a technique for exponentially weighted
moving averages (EWMA). The aggregate scores are stored in a n×1 vector S̃(t) where each





Here α is a decay parameter between [0, 1], and max(sh(t)n·) is the maximum value of the
n-th row (corresponding to node n) of the matrix Sh(t). Note that when each node is a
member of only one class, at most one of the entries in the n-th row will be non-zero. When
α = 1, the summation equally weights each term, while α < 1 discounts the weight of each
successive hop in the total value of s̃(t)n.
5.4.3. Complexity Analysis. Our collective algorithm to return the h-hop class sim-
ilarity scores between the query Q and data G graphs over t timesteps has a complexity
bound of O(th2(|VG|3 + |VQ|3)). Thus, the run times are cubic with the number of nodes in
the data and query graphs, quadratic with the number of hops, and linear with the number of
timesteps. Due to the sparsity of both the adjacency (n×n) and membership (n×m) matri-
ces, the utilization of sparse linear algebra packages to implement the matrix multiplications
would take much less than O(n3) and O(n2m) operations, respectively [319].
Algorithm 2 has an overall complexity bounded of O(th2|VG|3). This is because the
matrix power (Line 3) takes O(h|VG|3). We then do this for each timestep and hop (Lines 1
and 2, respectively) for both the query and data graphs.
Algorithm 3 has a complexity bound of O(th|VG|3). This is because each matrix mul-
tiplication (Lines 3 and 4) is upper bounded by O(n2m), where n is number of nodes and m
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is the number of classes, but we can approximate this to O(|VG|3) when we do not account
for the distinction of classes. For a query Q, complexity is O(th|VQ|3).
Algorithm 4 has a complexity bound of O(2m|VG|). There is a total of 2|VG| similarity
calculations between the Q and G class adjacency matrices when we filter operations with
the matrix of class matches MG,Q. Each similarity calculation would take m operations
because it is equivalent to finding the cosine similarity of each class adjacency vector and
calculating the dot product over the m number of classes.
When we combine all three algorithms and take the highest order terms for both |VQ|
and |VG| we get an overall complexity bound of O(th2(|VG|3 + |VQ|3)).
In the following section, we describe the application of our technique on a real, large
dataset in the domain of social media activity detection.
5.5. Results for Motivating Example Problem
The approach detailed in this paper produces Fig. 5.4, a graph of the multi-hop class
membership similarity scores of the 4 persons of interest over time in relation to the query
graph shown in Fig. 5.1. Here we utilized 3 hops and 4 timesteps (hmax = 3 and t = [1, 4]).
As expected through visual inspection of the original data graph G, Person 3 after 4 periods
of time exhibited all the radicalization indicators in query graph Q. However, our time-based
approach also returns the multi-hop class membership dynamics and shows the trajectory
of each of the 4 persons towards exhibiting the indicators of homegrown violent extremism
over time. This analysis could be useful for law enforcement or intelligence analysts who
may be interested not only in the extent to which someone exhibits indicators in a pattern
of potential violence, but also whether an accelerating occurrence of indicators or behaviors
constitutes a trajectory towards violence [203].
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Figure 5.4. Plot of the multi-hop class similarity scores over time S̃(t) for
time-based data graph G for example problem in Fig 5.1. We used α =
1.0 (non-weighted sum over each hop). We focus on the indicators/activities
associated with each of the persons of interest. For each of time t between 1
and 4, we show the changes in class similarity over 3 hops from each person of
interest node.
However, these results also highlight a few shortcoming of the initial version of INSiGHT
for this radicalization detection application. Specifically, one can see that Person 1’s simi-
larity score did not change despite posting a second extremist n-grams at timestep 3. Given
their importance as an indicator, an analyst may desire specific reoccurring indicators to
be accounted for in the score. Additionally, we notice that Person 2 had non-zero scores
for radicalization due to partial matches with perfectly legal activities (e.g., purchasing a
firearm or establishing a social media account). In fact, these activities are only potential
indicators of radicalization when they occur with other indicators. Furthermore, in this
example, the value of each indicator’s contribution to the similarity score does not decay
with time. Accounting for these discounts are important especially in light of the on-going
non-governmental and governmental counter-radicalization efforts. Lastly, we notice that a
person’s score is not linear with the number of indicators, but rather weighted by the total
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number of indicators at that hop distance away from the Person node in the query. For in-
stance, Person 3 had 2 behaviors (Social Media Account and Suspicious Travel) by timestep
2 for a score of 0.50 and another 2 behaviors (Radical n-gram and Received Training) by
timestep 3 for a score increase of 0.75. This is because each of the indicators 1-hop away
from the Person node are valued at 0.25 (4 indicators total), and each of the 2-hop indicators
is valued at 0.50 (2 indicators total). In the subsequent sections, we systematically address
all these shortcomings.
5.6. Real Data Application: Online Blog Behavior Detection
Beyond detecting trajectories for radicalization, we assert that INSiGHT is applicable
in a variety of domains involving other latent behaviors. As a stylized behavioral detection
example involving a real, large dataset, we return to utilizing the real BlogCatalog dataset
[320]. The full description was previously provided in Section 4.4.6.1, and the network
schema was shown in Fig. 4.3.
The original graph had over 470,000 nodes and over 4 million edges (see Table 5.2).
However in preprocessing, we filtered out 98.56% of nodes and 99.65% of edges which had
no connection to indicators in our query. Specifically, we constructed a subgraph from
the user IDs which had tags that contained the words ‘computer,’ ‘windows,’ or ‘windows
7.’ The routine we used produced the subgraph that included all such user IDs and any
interconnections between them, as well as their respective weblog IDs and all tags. The
resulting graph had only about 6,800 nodes and 14,4000 edges and is further detailed in
Table 5.2.
5.6.1. Query Description. To test the performance of the matching scheme and al-
gorithm, we devised a proxy query on a benign subject matter with structural parallels to
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.5. Experiment query for BlogCatalog (a). Query focus is for
User Ids who had been writing blogs broadly related to ‘computers’ and ‘win-
dows’, and specifically to Windows operating systems. In this example, we
treat the tag ‘windows 7’ as a red flag indicator. The top-match in graph
G shown in (b) is User Id ‘u65530’ with 5 indicator nodes matching in the
relevant set (2 directed hops from node class A). Each edge is labeled with a
timestamp. The grayed-out node is one of the original query nodes not
matched.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.6. (a) Plot of the class similarity scores over time s̃(t)n for the top
10 nodes in the BlogCatalog data graph using α = 1.0 (non-weighted sum over
each hop). For each of the timesteps t between 1 and 10, we show the changes
in class similarity over 3 hops for the top user IDs of interest. The top scoring
User Id was ‘u65530’ and the multi-hop parent-child class similarity score over
time is shown in bold red. (b) Histogram of aggregated class similarity scores
for the 1327 ID nodes in the subgraph. The number above each bar is the
number of ID nodes with that respective class similarity score.
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Table 5.2. BlogCatalog full and subgraph characteristics
Characteristics Gfull Gsubgraph
Total Nodes 471,267 6,805
Number of ids 88,781 1,327
Number of userids 80,949 1,327
Number of weblogs 127,227 1,455
Number of unique tags 174,310 2,696
Total Edges 4,098,290 14,483
Number of id-userid links 88,784 1,327
Number of userid-userid links 3,223,640 3,452
Number of userid-weblog links 127,227 1,451
Number of weblog-tag links 658,639 8,253
an investigation for a latent behavior (Fig. 5.5, left). The query’s focus is for user IDs who
had been writing blogs about Microsoft Windows operating systems (XP and/or Vista) and
subsequently also began to write about Windows 7 when it was released in July 2009, which
is the month in which the data was collected. Node class Z is a true person ID, node class
A is the query focus user ID, and node class B is the weblog with certain tags. All C class
nodes are meant to be seen as labels of a post or blog entry which were determined through
machine-classification and semantic analysis. The labels ‘computer’ (C535) and ‘windows’
(C2033) are relatively frequent labels which help provide context or additional clarity on
the true topic set, and labels ‘xp’ (C23136) and ‘vista’ (C20693) are indicators that the
blog is about Windows operating systems. These latter nodes are necessary but not suffi-
cient for the latent behavior of interest. Finally, label ‘windows 7’ (C20684) is considered a
latest-occurring red flag indicator.
Table 5.3. Synthetic Timestamps for BlogCatalog data
Edge Type Timestamp
ID to User Id 1
User Id to User Id Unif(1,3)
User Id to Weblog Id 1
Weblog Id to Other Tags Unif(1,8)
Weblog Id to ‘windows 7’ Tag Unif(9,10)
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5.6.2. Adding Edge Timestamps. While the BlogCatalog dataset has the desirable
attributes of size and heterogeneity as well as the social network connectivity between users,
it lacked the fidelity in dynamics of tags for each blog. Specifically, in addition to the blog
tags themselves, knowledge of when user IDs added or deleted tags is itself important partic-
ularly when one is trying to identify a trajectory towards a latent behavior. In the case of our
query, this behavior is described as augmenting an existing interest in blogging about Mi-
crosoft operating systems with the latest version of Windows. In order to test our approach,
we devised a timestamp labeling function fT (·) to add randomized time steps to each edge
in the graph. Table 5.3 shows the functional rules we utilized to generate the timestamps
for particular types of edges. All IDs, User Ids, and Weblog Ids are existent at time t = 1.
The social network connections between User Ids are formed at times uniformly distributed
(discrete) between timestamps [1,3], and tags for each weblog are developed at times uni-
formly distributed (discrete) between timestamps[1,8], except for the tag ‘windows 7’ which
develops latest uniformly between timestamps [9,10]. The timestamps were generated in
MATLAB R2105b using seed 12345.
5.6.3. Analysis of BlogCatalog Results. Our approach not only produces the top-
k full or partial matches in the large BlogCatalog graph to the query, but also generates a
perspective on the multi-hop class membership similarity trajectory for those top-k matches.
In Fig. 7.7a, we depict the pattern trajectories of the top 10 accounts over 3 hops and 10
timesteps (hmax = 3 and t = [1, 10]). The top scoring account was User Id ‘u65530’, whose
matching partial subgraph is shown in Fig. 5.5b. This account utilized the 4 of the 5
indicator tags, ‘computer,’ ‘vista,’ ‘xp,’ and ‘windows 7’ over the course of time.
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Additionally, in this example, we see the merits of our approach in investigative graph
search by segmenting out only a fraction of the entities who are on pathways of partially
or completely matching a query pattern. As the histogram in Fig. 7.7b shows, most of the
accounts in the subgraph only had none or only 1 of the indicators present for the entire
time frame.
5.6.4. Run times. We also report the tests on the run times of the collective set of our
multi-hop algorithms in a couple of different settings. Initially, we ran an experiment on
the effect of the number of nodes on the overall run time. Utilizing the same experimental
setting as the performance test on the BlogCatalog subgraph dataset, we fixed the query
pattern, query graph size, and hops desired (at hmax = 3). However, in addition to the
principal run on the subgraph of 6805 nodes, we also generated 4 smaller subgraphs of size
100, 500, 1000, and 3000 nodes and ran the suite of algorithms of those graphs. The results
are shown in Fig. 5.7.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.7. (a) Run times for varying data graph size. (b) Run times for
varying timestep range.
Second, we ran an experiment on the effect of the timestep range on the overall run
time. Utilizing the BlogCatalog subgraph dataset, we fixed the query pattern, query and
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data graph size, and hops desired (at hmax = 3). We then generated timestamps for the data
graph edges for the ranges of 1, 3, 5, and 10 units and ran the suite of algorithms of those
graphs. The results are shown in Fig. 5.7.
All experiments were carried out on a laptop computer with an Intel Core i7-4710MQ
CPU @ 2.50 GHz, 8.00 GB RAM, and a 64-bit OS. Our results show that as expected, overall
run times scale linearly with the timestep range and polynomially with the size of the data
graph.
5.7. Enhancements to INSiGHT
In this section, we describe several enhancements we devised for INSiGHT to account for
a variety of real-world dynamics associated with the analysis of radicalization pathways or
trajectories. First, we modify our baseline approach to account for:
(1) Reoccurrences of each indicator.
(2) Time recency of each indicator.
(3) Individually innocuous but related activity (IIRA) indicators occurring by them-
selves.
These adjustments ultimately involve a transformation the Parent-to-Child h-hop Class
Adjacency matrix Ch(t) and the Child-to-Parent h-hop Class Adjacency matrix Ph(t) into
Ĉh(t) and P̂h(t), respectively. Furthermore, we devise a novel approach to matching indi-
cators that occur in the neighborhood of each QF node, as well as define a match goodness
function g(Q,GS, t) between the query graph Q and a conforming data subgraph GS at time
t that integrates all the improvements.
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Table 5.4. Summary of notations for INSiGHT enhancements
Notation Description/Meaning
Ch(t) Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency Matrix at time t, where Ch(t) =
Wh(t)A.
Ph(t) Child-from-Parent h-hop Class Adjacency Matrix at time t, where
Ph(t) = Wh(t)
TA.
Ĉh(t) Weighted Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency matrix at time t.
P̂h(t) Weighted Child-to-Parent h-hop Class Adjacency matrix at time t.
Fr(x, λ) Exponential growth function for the score of an indicator based on
frequency x and parameter λ.
Fd(τ, β, ξ) Hyperbolic tangent decay function for the score of an indicator based
the time from last class occurrence τ and parameters β and ξ.
φv(t, h) Binary indicator variable for each QF node v at time t over h hops.
Fr,mod(φv, x, λ)
Exponential growth function Fr modified with the indicator variable
φv(t, h).
1 Matrix of 1’s.
Λ Diagonal matrix of parameters λ for multiple occurrences of indicators.
β Matrix of parameters β for decay of indicator score based on time of
last activity.
ξ Matrix of parameters ξ for decay of indicator score based on time of
last activity.
χh(t) Last Activity Time h-hop matrix at time t for Parent-to-Child Class
Adjacency matrix.
Πh(t) Last Activity h-hop matrix at time t for Child-to-Parent Class Adja-
cency matrix.
Φ(t) Diagonal matrix of indicator variables φv(t, h).
Ŝh(t) Weight-adjusted multi-hop class membership similarity tensor at hop
h at time step t between the query nodes and data graph nodes which
are class-matching.
5.7.1. Multiple instances of each indicator. Our previous recall-based metric
equally weighs all nodes and limits the count of multiple instances of a connection to the
same node class to only a single edge. Allowing a diverse set of indicator weights and counting
repeated indicators makes intuitive sense in investigative graph search.
We provide a parameterized method to score multiple occurrences of an indicator with




Figure 5.8. Sample parameterized growth and decay curves. (a) Plot of ex-
ponential growth function Fr for repeated indicators using various parameters
for λ. (b) Plot of hyperbolic tangent decay function Fd for diminished signif-
icance of indicators from the last occurrence using various parameters for β
and ξ.
indicator found for each person at time t and hop h, and the parameter λ ≥ 0 determines
how the number of occurrences accumulates to a maximum score of 1. Fig. 5.8a depicts the
exponential function Fr for various parameters λ.
Fr(x, t, h;λ) =

1− e−λx(t,h), x(t, h) ≥ 0
Undefined, x(t, h) < 0
(4)
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To assist the analyst in determining the λ parameters, we devise an equation shown in 5.
The variable x∗ ≥ 0 is the number of indicator recurrences needed to achieve a score equal
to 1− ε, where 0 < ε ≤ 1.
fλ(x
∗; ε) = − ln(ε)/x∗ (5)
This additional modeling feature is an improvement because it provides a means for in-
vestigators to weigh the various frequencies of an indicator in the radicalization trajectory
measure. It makes intuitive sense that eventually after some number of occurrences of a
particular indicator, an investigator will deem the indicator sufficiently present.
5.7.2. Decay of indicator significance over time. Our previous recall-based met-
ric considered an indicator that occurred early in time with the same weight as those that
occurred most recently. Intuitively, we know that we must consider the decay in the sig-
nificance of an indicator over time in the similarity calculation. In an extreme case, one
would likely decide that an indicator of a certain class of activities that occurred 10 years
ago should count less than if the same indicator occurred yesterday. Each indicator score’s
rate of decay should clearly be parameterized and controlled by an investigator or analyst,
who should consider those who may have legitimately turned away from the radicalization
path as well as those who may have only ‘gone dark’ to avoid detection through encrypted
communications in the days, weeks, or months leading up to a planned attack [125, 135].
We provide a parameterized method to decay the significance of an indicator in the
similarity calculation over time. Our intuition is that a sigmoid decay function could be
appropriate because there is slow decay initially (thus the indicator retains a high score
shortly after its occurrence) and slow decay after much time (thus the indicator retains some
trace score to prevent its earlier occurrence from being completely nullified). The same idea
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is posited with the value of different types of documents [65]. While we could have chosen
any one in the family of sigmoid functions, we initially utilize the classical, scaled hyperbolic
tangent decay function Fd shown in 6. Here τ(t, h) is the number of time periods since the
last indicator of this class as of time t and hop h, the parameter β ≥ 0 determines the
timestep when the indicator score decays to 1
2
, and the parameter ξ ≥ 0 determines over
how long the indicator score decays over time. Fig. 5.8b depicts the exponential function
Fd for various parameters β and ξ.










, τ(t, h) ≥ 0,
Undefined, τ(t, h) < 0
(6)
As opposed to the exponential growth function (4), an analyst can determine the β param-
eters more directly because β = τ ∗ ≥ 0 is the number of time periods needed to decay the
score to 1
2




5.7.3. Incorporating categorical node labels for investigations. In this sec-
tion, we seek to utilize the investigative node-type classes defined in Section 4.3 and Table
4.1 to aid a law enforcement or intelligence analyst more effectively identifying those needing
further investigation [142].
First, we seek to incorporate in a similarity metric the filtering of matches based on
the investigative node-type classes, where individually innocuous indicators would not be
counted unless they occurred with other definitive indicators of a latent behavior. This avoids
overmatching by masking the matches of individually innocuous indicators occurring by
themselves. We define in 7 the indicator variable φv(t, h) to toggle the masking or unmasking
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of the v-th row in either the parent-to-child class adjacency matrix Ch(t) or the child-to-
parent class adjacency matrix Ph(t).
φv(t, h) =

1, QF node v is h-hop adjacent to 1 or more IND/RF nodes at time t
0, o/w
(7)
We integrate this indicator variable in the original reoccurence function 4 and define a
modified exponential function Fr,mod in 8.
Fr,mod(φv, x, t, h;λ) =

1− e−φv(t,h)λx(t,h), x(t, h) ≥ 0
Undefined, x(t, h) < 0
(8)
Second, we also develop a module to annotate when each individual exhibits any one of
the red flag behaviors, as designated by the RF node-type category. We accomplish this by
augmenting the previous baseline Algorithm 4 with a procedure that constructs a matrix
recording the timestep of occurrence for each of the Red Flag (RF) indicators. We refer
to this updated version as Algorithm 5. For clarity, the entirety of the new algorithm is
shown below.
Specifically, we added the input of ARF which is the set of node classes which are des-
ignated as red flags. After performing the similarity calculations between the parent and
child h-hop class adjacency matrices for the data and query graphs at each time t and hop
h (Line 6), we then iterate through each of these RF node-type classes (Line 7) (still at each
time t and hop h), and find all nodes who connect to the RF node-type class portion based
upon its entries in the child h-hop class adjacency matrix. As long as no non-zero time was
previously recorded, the algorithm assigns the time t to Fh, the h-hop RF Timestep Tracker
139
Algorithm 5: h-hop Class Membership Similarity algorithm + Red Flag Detection
Input: MG,Q (sparse node class match matrix between query graph Q and data
graph G), Ch(t)Q and Ph(t)Q, and Ch(t)G and Ph(t)G (parent and child
h-hop class adjacency matrices for all time tstart ≤ t ≤ tend for graph Q and G,
respectively), hmax (the desired number of hops), and ARF (set of RF
node-type classes).
Output: Sh(t) (h-hop Class Similiarity Matrices between class-matching query and
graph nodes at time t using some similarity metric) and Fh (h-hop RF
Timestep Tracker Matrix of size n × |ARF |), where t : tstart ≤ t ≤ tend and
h : 1 ≤ h ≤ hmax.
1 define zero matrices Sh(t) for each hop h..hmax and each time tstart ≤ t ≤ tend of size
n× l, where n and l are the number of nodes in G and Q, respectively.
2 foreach t = tstart to tend do
3 foreach h = 1 to hmax do
4 foreach index pair (i, j) : mi,j = 1 in MG,Q do
5 set {sh(t)i,j in Sh(t)} =
similarity(ch(t)G,i· and ch(t)Q,j·) + similarity(ph(t)G,i· and ph(t)Q,j·)i
6 foreach r ∈ ARF do
7 set fh(i, k) = t ∀ datagraph nodes i where ch(t)G,ir = 1 for the first time
and k is the index of r in the set ARF
8 return Sh(t) and Fh
Matrix. The size of this matrix is the number of nodes in the network by the number of RF
node-type classes (n × |ARF |). Just like the Sh(t) similarity matrices, the Fh RF tracker ma-
trices are also summed over all hops in a subsequent step of the overall INSiGHT approach
(see Section 5.4). This record of the occurrence of red flag indicators enables subsequent
visualization and alerts to analysts, as we will demonstrate in later example applications.
5.7.4. Fast similarity calculations with matrices. The matrix versions of this
function that operates on the Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency matrix Ch(t) and the


























Given n and m are the number of nodes and classes in graph G, respectively, Ĉh(t) is the
n×m weighted Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency matrix at time t whose equation is
shown in 9. Here 1 is the n ×m matrix of 1’s, Φh(t) is the diagonal matrix of size n × n
such that each entry (i, i) is equal to 1 if i is the index for a QF node that is adjacent to 1 or
more IND/RF nodes over h hops, Ch(t) is the n×m Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency
matrix at time t, Λ is the m×m diagonal matrix of parameters λ, χh(t) is the n×m Last
Activity h-hop matrix at time t, β is the n × m matrix of parameters β, ξ is the n × m
matrix of parameters ξ. When the j-th column of β is a vector of size n × 1 of the β for
class j.
Essentially, the weight-adjusted Class Adjacency matrix at time t and hop h is equal
to the product of a ‘multiple indicator occurrence’ factor and an ‘indicator decay’ factor
operating on filtered class adjacency matrix that masks stand-alone IIRA indicators.
We propose that we can calculate the Last Activity h-hop matrix χh(t) at time t by taking
the difference between the previous class adjacency matrix at tprevious and the current one
at t, and setting all new connections per class (entries χh(t) to be equal to 0 and advancing
all other χh(t) entries to be equal to time t. Thus the each entry in χh(t) signifies the time
lapse since the last connection to that class occurred.
Additionally, rather than performing pair-wise set comparisons using the recall-based
index QR (Equation 1 in [144]), we adopt a faster matrix-level dot product approach that
is related to cosine similarity [175]. Specifically, we row-normalize and square each entry
of the query Parent-to-Child h-hop Class Adjacency matrix Ĉh(t)Q (size n
′ ×m, where n′
is the number of nodes in the query graph), and then multiply it by the transpose of the
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weighted data graph h-hop Class Adjacency matrix Ĉh(t)
T
G (size m× n) (11). Ŝh(t) is then




h (t) = Ĉh(t)Q · Ĉh(t)TG (11)
Ŝ
(2)










This procedure allows for the similarity score of nodes in the query graph and data graphs
to be calculated quickly and expressed as a fraction over the number of nodes in the query
graph.
5.8. Illustrative Applications on Synthetic Graphs
5.8.1. Small, Synthetic Radicalization Toy Graph. We return to the motivating
problem in Fig. 5.1 and show how the enhancement to INSiGHT has the potential to reduce
false positives by accounting for the categorical node-types of the indicators. The results of
the baseline INSiGHT approach for this problem are reproduced in Fig. 5.9a. We notice that
Person 2 had non-zero scores for radicalization due to partial matches with perfectly legal
activities (e.g., purchasing a firearm or establishing a social media account). Additionally,
Person 4 had a non-zero score at time step 2 due to establishing a social media account only.
These activities are only potential indicators of radicalization when they occur with other
indicators. To correct this effect and minimize false positives for legitimate queries, we label
nodes according to investigative node types established in [142].
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Table 5.5. Class Node-Types and Parameter Sets 1 and 2 for Decay and
Re-occurrence Modules for Radicalization Query
Parameter Set 1 Parameter Set 2
Class Label NodeType λ β ξ λ β ξ
A Person QF 10.0 1000.0 1.0 10.0 1000.0 1.0
B Social Media Account IIRA 10.0 1000.0 1.0 10.0 1000.0 1.0
C Radical n-gram IND 4.6 1000.0 1.0 2.3 6.0 3.0
D Extremist n-gram IND 4.6 1000.0 1.0 4.6 12.0 3.0
E Suspicious Travel IND 10.0 1000.0 1.0 4.6 8.0 3.0
F Received Training IND 10.0 1000.0 1.0 10.0 16.0 3.0
G Purchase Firearm IIRA 10.0 2.0 1.0 10.0 16.0 3.0
H Promote Concert NC 0.0 1000.0 1.0 0.0 1000.0 1.0
I Soccer Club NC 0.0 1000.0 1.0 0.0 1000.0 1.0
Specifically, in Table 5.5 we assign to the node classes in the radicalization graph query
pattern Q a specific investigative ‘node type.’ The logic behind our designations was in-
tuitive. We are trying to distinguish the establishment of a social media account and the
purchase of a firearm as common, innocuous behaviors (‘IIRA’) while recognizing that their
performance can ultimately contribute towards a pathway of radicalization when combined
with indicators. Additionally, we want to designate the receipt of terrorist training as an
indicator which is serious enough to individually generate an alert to analysts. By default,
classes of nodes appearing in the data graph that are not part of the query pattern are
labeled as ‘no category’ or ‘NC.’
By adjustment of the class adjacency matrices with through 10, we obtain the resulting
class similarity score time series plot shown in Fig. 5.9b. Notice that Person 2 now has
a zero class similarity score throughout the window of analysis because its only matching
indicators were of type ‘IIRA’ (Social Media Account and Purchase Firearm). Additionally,
Person 4 has a zero class similarity score until it exhibited first indicator of type ’indicator’
at time step 3 (posting a radical n-gram).
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.9. Multi-hop class similarity for the radicalization example with (a)
and without (b) investigative indicator type filtering. Shown are the results
of the efforts to minimize false positives for legitimate queries, we label nodes
according to investigative node types. Notice that Person 2 now has a zero class
similarity score throughout the window of analysis because its only matching
indicator was of type ‘IIRA.’ Additionally, Person 4 has a zero class similarity
score until it also posted a radical n-gram at time step 3.
5.8.2. Extended Time Synthetic Radicalization Toy Graph. The new data
graph depicted in Fig. 5.10 is an expansion of the one shown in Fig. 5.1b and now has one
more individual and depicts additional reoccurring indicators of the on-line behavior of some
homegrown violent extremists.
Person 1 is an extremist with a smaller number of SM posts, but later indicators of
suspicious travel and firearm purchase. Person 2 is a non-extremist who purchased 2 firearms.
Person 3 is an extremist with a large number of posts and other indicators early-to-mid in
the timeline. Person 4 is a former extremist who made a small number of radical posts
early in the timeline. Finally, Person 5 is an extremist with large number of radical posts
throughout, but only extremist posts late in the timeline.
As in the motivating example problem, we utilize the same query graph Q shown in 5.1a.
Based upon the nature of the indicators, we chose the parameters for the time-decay and
re-occurrence modules as shown in Table 5.5. A λ of 10.0 signifies that just one occurrence of








Figure 5.10. Expanded motivating example for detecting trajectories of
homegrown violent extremists. Beyond the base example from Fig.5.1, the
new data graph Fig. 5.10a now has one more individual and depicts addi-
tional reoccurring indicators indicative of online behavior of some homegrown
violent extremists.
and ‘SM Account’ are basic nodes which need to occur once, while ‘Received Training’ and
‘Purchase Firearm’ may be more threatening indicators whose singular occurrence become
important. A λ of 4.6 equates to 2 or more occurrences of an indicator to achieve a near
maximum similarity score, and a λ of 2.3 equates to 5 or more occurrences of an indicator
to achieve a near maximum similarity score.
For the time-decay parameter β, we selected to equate a timestep in our synthetic dataset
to represent 3 months (thus the 20 timesteps in the dataset account for indicators which
occurred over 5 years). A β of 1000 nearly eliminates the decay for the value of an indicator
class. We chose this for the ‘Person’ and ‘SM Account’ basic classes, but also for the node
classes ‘Promote Concert’ and ‘Soccer Club’ which are not indicators in the query pattern.
A β of 6 results in the decay to half of the maximum score of an indicator class after 18
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Figure 5.11. Class similarity score time series for the expanded radicaliza-
tion example depicting the effect on the similarity score due to the reoccurring
indicators and time decay from inactivity.
months (= 6 · 3 months). The β parameters 8 and 16 obviously signifies that knowledge of
their occurrence remains important for a longer period of time.
Utilizing the improvements to INSiGHT, we produce the time series of behavioral simi-
larities to a profile for each of the individuals in the graph shown in Fig. 5.11. It is clear that
Person 3 has the highest initial gradient towards radicalization and maintains his score with
more instances of indicators over time. However, the trajectories of the other individuals are
also worth noting. Person 1 has a relatively high similarity score throughout due to radical
and extremists posts but also has visible spikes when he goes on suspicious travel (timestep
13) and purchases a firearm (timestep 19). Person 5 also clearly has a sustained spike in his
score later in the time frame due to the posting of radical and extremists and the purchase
of a firearm.
The decay of Person 4’s earlier radical statements is evident with the shape of similarity
score curve. Lastly, Person 6 now has a score of 0 throughout the entire time frame of
analysis because his activities were limited to the IIRA category.
Ultimately, this experiment showed that with a small example, we can indeed detect
those who may be on a radicalization trajectory towards violent extremism based upon a
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simplistic query pattern. Next, we test INSiGHT on real data that contain time-based,
labeled indicators of bona fide cases of radicalization that ultimately led to violent activity.
5.9. Application #1 Real Data: Radicalization Detection
In this section, we first apply INSiGHT on the Klausen dataset as proof of principle that
our technology can be applied to real radicalization data. We first establish the schema for
our heterogeneous data graph. Since the dataset does not contain any known network con-
nections between individuals, the schema shown in Fig. 5.12a is straightforward: each person
is connected to their attributed activities (behavioral indicators). The Klausen dataset con-
tains 135 individuals and coded 1326 time-stamped features. Table 5.6 shows a summary
of the bipartite graph’s characteristics. Furthermore, we construct a bipartite graph query
directly from the behavioral indicators that Klausen utilized in her research. See Fig. 5.12b.
The person is the query focus node and is connected directly to each of the indicator nodes.
We utilize only 23 of the original 27 indicators because Birth, Arrest.Date, and Sentenc-
ing.Date were not relevant in the early detection of violent extremists.
Table 5.6. Radicalization graph characteristics (Klausen)
Characteristics Gfull
Total Nodes 1,461
Number of individuals 135
Number of behavioral indicators 1,326
Total Edges 1,326
Another critical step is the establishment of the investigative node-type categories of
indicators as well as the initial parameterization. In Table 5.7, we provide these details.
The Person node is the query focus (QF). We also designated Convert Date, Disillusion-



























Data graph G Schema
Person Performs Activity ID
(and Class)(Time)
3 MAY 17
This is like a ‘checklist’. Is there any other query that works?
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.12. (a) The schema of the heterogeneous data graph G of individ-
uals and any exhibited radicalization indicators. (b) The query graph Q of the
23 indicators of radicalization modeled as a bipartite graph.
and Underemployment as IIRA due to their innocuous nature. These all either fall under
Klausen’s Stage 0 (Pre-Radicalization) or Stage 1 (Detachment). We also designed the indi-
cators from Klausen’s Stage 3 (Planning and Execution of Violent Action) as red flags (RF).
These were Passive Support, Joins Foreign Insurgency, Issues Threats, and Steps Towards
Violence. The features Date of Criminal Action and Arrest Date, while nearly applicable to
all individuals in the dataset, were designated as No Category (NC) because they are not
indicators of radicalization, but just account for the overall timeline of each perpetrator. All
other behaviors, we designated as IND (indicators). See Appendix C for the definitions of
these indicators provided from [167].
Table 5.7 also shows the parameters we selected for use with INSiGHT. Recalling from
Section 5.7, the parameter λ determines how the number of occurrences of a particular class
of indicator accumulates to a maximum score of 1, while the β and ξ govern the shape of
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Table 5.7. Klausen Radicalization Query- Class Node-Types and Parameter Set
Parameter Set
Class Label NodeType λ β ξ
A Person QF 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
B Convert.Date IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
C Disillusionment IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
D Trauma IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
E Personal.Crisis IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
F Seeking.Information IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
G New.Authority.Figures IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
H Rebellion IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
I Lifestyle.Changes IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
J Educ.Occup.Disengage IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
K Drop.Out.Date IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
L Underemployment IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
M Dawa.Virtual IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
N Dawa.Real.Life IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
O Epiphany IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
P Peer.Immersion IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
Q Physical.Domestic.Training IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
R Marriage.Seeking IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
S Social.Disengagement IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
T Desire.for.Action IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
U Passive.Support RF 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
V Joins.Foreign.Insurgency RF 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
W Issues.Threats RF 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
X Steps.towards.Violence RF 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
Y Date.of.Criminal.Action NC 0.0 1.0× 108 1.0
Z Arrest.Date NC 0.0 1.0× 108 1.0
the decay function to devalue an indicator’s component score based upon the last known
occurrence of that indicator. In this proof of concept, we designated all classes of nodes
except for Date of Criminal Action and Arrest Date with λ = 10.0, β = 1.0 × 108, and
ξ = 1.0. These parameter selections effectively provide a full component score for the single
occurrence of each indicator class and negate any decay. For the node classes Date of Criminal
Action and Arrest Date, we designated λ = 0.0 to mask any matches (because it provides a





Figure 5.13. The radicalization time series plots for (a) all 135 U.S. violent
extremists and (b) only the top 15 scoring individuals in the Klausen dataset.
INSiGHT searches for the whole or partial matches to the radicalization query pattern
among each individual’s behavioral indicators in the heterogeneous network and specifically
enables an analyst to visualize how each is radicalizing over time. See Fig. 5.13a for the time
series plots for all 135 offenders in the dataset, and Fig. 5.13b for only the top 15 offenders
(determined as the 15 individuals with the highest similarity scores achieved by the last
timestep). We include the latter plot simply to better depict how long the radicalization
processes took for a subset of individuals.
The distribution of similarity scores with the radicalization query pattern shown in Fig.
5.14. Similarity scores ranged from 0.130 to 0.696, which reflect that as few as 3 but as many
as 16 behavioral indicators were matched for individuals. It is also important to note that
this dataset specifically deals with known offenders. The number of indicators associated
with each individual was based on research from publicly available sources and based on a
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Figure 5.14. Histogram showing the distribution of final similarity scores for
all 135 U.S. violent extremists.
subjective cut-off from a larger listing of over 300 offenders that there was a suitable amount




Figure 5.15. The radicalization time series plots for (a) only the top 15
U.S. violent extremists and (b) only the bottom 15 scoring individuals in the
Klausen dataset. The red circles represent the exhibition of flags.
At this point of research and analysis, it is not yet possible to definitively determine
a similarity score threshold by which analysts would be alerted for threats and screen for
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high risk individuals. Absent any suitable data of non-violent radicals who exhibit some of
the indicators for evaluation, we are unable to determine if say a 0.2 threshold effectively
achieves a desired true positive rate and acceptable false positive and false negative rates.
Table 5.8. Prevalence of Red Flag Indicators and the Fit in the Klausen
Radicalization Model. Source: [168].
Red Flag Indicator Description Freq Fit






Joins Foreign Insurgency Travel (successful or attempted)
abroad with the intention of taking





Non-violent Support Material, logistical, or financial sup-






Issues Threats Communicates violent threats online






However, it is noteworthy to mention that red flag visualizations and alerts can assist the
analyst in identifying high risk individuals even when they have relatively lower similarity
scores. INSiGHT utilized the red flag module from Algorithm 5 and tracked the timestep
of occurrence of the pre-designated red flag indicator. In Fig. 5.15 we show the top 15 and
bottom 15 scoring individuals and their radicalization trajectories. Despite the difference in
similarity scores, the timing of red flags for each individual can be used as a significant risk
factor. In fact, Klausen’s research team shows that nearly all these red flags occurred in the
last stage of radicalization [168]. This means that very few indicators or cues theorized to
occur earlier in a radicalization process actually occurred after these red flag indicators, and
that the date of criminal action was imminent. See Table 5.8, which is directly extracted
from [168].
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5.10. Application #2 Real Data: MOOC Persistence Detection
5.10.1. Introduction. Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are now a widely pop-
ular form of learning. However, institutions that have offered MOOCs are continually strug-
gling with low completion rates. Researchers most recently have begun to investigate the
possible factors associated with the completions or non-completions, to include a students’
original goals as well as the quality of engagement or content in the beginning of the course
[98, 253]. In this application, we intend to demonstrate the utility of INSiGHT and aim to
identify the latent behaviors that may indicate whether a person is more or less likely to
continue (persist in) a MOOC. Specifically, we wish to examine how predictive is staying on
pace with the course by accessing the breadth of online material, and the prevalence (if any)
of those who may try to “cram” and complete the course in a short amount of time at the
end. We propose to test our previously developed dynamic graph pattern matching tool for
another application for use on the MOOC data set.
5.10.2. Data. We acquired our dataset from the Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
(KDD) Cup 2015 competition for detecting MOOC drop-outs [160]. The original dataset
had 120,542 enrollment ids (students), 5,890 different courses, 8,157,277 registered online ac-
tivities as part of XuetangX, a MOOC learning platform sponsored by Tsinghua University
in China. To scale our work as proof of concept, we selected 1 course with the anonymized
alphanumeric ID fbPkOYLVPtPgIt0MxizjfFJov3JbHyAi which shall be referred to through-
out the rest of this chapter as Course X. The course began on January 17, 2014, and likely
ran through March 2014 based upon the release dates of course material. However, the
competition only provided student activities in Course X from January 17, 2014 to February
15, 2014. The objective of the competition was to predict which MOOC students continued
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in Course X (as opposed to drop-out) after February 15, 2014, which is defined as some
recorded course activity within 10 days after February 15, 2014. Based upon the ground
truth provided, 84 students out of 983 (8.55%) continued. As with many MOOCs, course
completion is considered a low-base rate behavior [154, 253].
For Course X, the competition provided a hierarchy of course content consisting of 221
unique objects as shown in Table 5.9. There were originally 983 students enrolled in the
Course X, who collectively performed 41,033 activities. However, data cleaning was required.
Out of all activities, 22,121 of them were attributed to 7 objects of an unknown type which
were not listed in the course content hierarchy. By removing those unknown activities from
consideration, we were left with 18,912 activities that corresponded to objects of type chapter
pages (8), problems (33), videos (36), or sequential chapter pages (43)(for a total of 120
objects). Additionally, Fig. 5.16a-d show the frequency of each object that was accessed by
the students. As expected in MOOC content, later course materials are much less frequently
accessed than the earlier materials.
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Figure 5.16. Activity histograms for each of the four types of activities: (a)
chapters, (b) chapter-sequentials, (c) problems, and (d) videos.
5.10.3. Set-up. Recent research suggests that participation in course activities (“specif-
ically videos watched per week and posts and comments per week”) are positively associated
with completion rates [251, p. 211]. Based upon this, our intuition is that the more a student
accesses the breadth of content, the higher likelihood of he or she is of continuing.
We model each student’s on-line course activities a dynamic graph where nodes are the
course content accessed and edges represent the hierarchical or sequential organization of the
course content. An example of this hierarchy is that a student needs to access a sequential
chapter landing page before accessing the problem or video included in that portion of the
lesson. This is reflected in the data graph G schema shown in Fig. 5.17a. Another way to
view the data model is to view the query in terms of levels
• Level 0 (root node): Student
• Level 1: Activity accessing a Sequential (43) or Chapter page (8)
• Level 2: Activity accessing a Video (33) or Problem (36)
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Edges between levels were constructed from sequential data. Each time a student accessed
a level 1 activity (sequential or chapter page), a new edge was created between the student
a unique activity node. If the same student accessed the same sequential page twice each
at different times, this would cause the creation of two nodes of the class for that sequential
page and an edge between the student and each of them. When a student accesses Level
2 activity (video or problem), a new node is created with that class and an edge is created
between the last sequential page associated with that Level 2 activity (determined by the
course material hierarchy). The INSiGHT algorithm keeps track of the number of times a
node of a certain class is accessed, but the scoring functions allow us to treat the connections
as binary (occurred or did not occur) or as counts (number of times it occurred).
The resulting data graph G has the characteristics shown in Table 5.10. There is a
node for all 983 students as well as a distinct activity node for each activity the students
performed. The 18,912 edges connect student nodes to their activities of class sequential or
chapter page, as well as the sequential pages to the associated problems and videos.
Table 5.10. MOOC data graph characteristics
Characteristics G
Total Nodes 19,895
Number of students 983
Number of chapters 1,715
Number of problems 2,935
Number of sequentials 10,4434
Number of videos 3,988
Total Edges 18,912
Student to sequential/chapter activity 11,989
Sequential to problem/video activity 6,923
The query graph depicted in Fig. 5.17b is a graph of all 120 course activities. A complete
match of this query would reflect that the student accessed all course materials (every content
reading page, problem, video). The intention for INSiGHT is to find whole of partial matches
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Figure 5.17. (a) Data graph G schema relating MOOC students and activ-
ities. (b) Query pattern for Course X, which reflects the hierarchy of course
materials.
of this query pattern in the data graph of students and their activities over time. By following
content access dynamically for each student, we seek to effectively determine whether each
student is on a trajectory to continue with the course.
Lastly, we utilized a similar parameterization in other applications. Students were desig-
nated as query focus (QF) nodes, while all other activities were equally treated as indicator
(IND) nodes. All query nodes were parameterized with λ = 10.0, β = 1.0×103, and ξ = 1.0.
5.10.4. Results and analysis. INSiGHT readily found the whole or partial matches of
each student to the query Q over time. The similarity score time series plot for all n = 983
students is shown in Fig. 5.18. Benefiting from the availability of ground truth in this
dataset, the similarity score trajectories are colored blue if the student continued with the
course and light red if the student dropped-out. It is clear that many of the students with
the highest similarity scores throughout the window of analysis ended up continuing with
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the course. This confirms our intuition that the breadth of activity is a factor to a student
continuing the course. In fact, only 25 of the 983 students had final similarity scores greater
than or equal to 1.00, and of these 20 were students who continued. However, 5 of these
high scoring individuals did not continue.
Moreover, there are many individuals who scored low (accessed very little course content)
and still persisted past February 15, 2014. The histogram in Fig. 5.19 makes this more
explicit. It is important to determine what other characteristics would help us distinguish
students who accessed very little course content, yet still persisted.
Figure 5.18. Similarity score time series plot for those who continued in the
MOOC (blue, n = 84) and those who did not continue (light red, n = 899).
There are several limitations of the data that are worth addressing. First, as previously
mentioned, nearly half of the online activities provided were attributed to unknown objects
and were therefore removed from consideration. It is possible that these activities would
have been more discriminating between those who continued and those who did not. For
instance, 15 of the 84 ‘continuing’ students (17%) had accessed very few course objects (final
similarity score ≤ 0.20) and had been absent from the course at least 20 days. These students
are depicted in the blue markers in the lower right of Fig. 5.20 who had similarity score of
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Figure 5.19. Histogram of the final similarity scores for the MOOC contin-
uation query pattern.
0.2 or less and day of last activity of 10 or less. Among the disregarded activities could have
been ones that rightfully belonged to these students and therefore aided in the prediction.
Additionally, the competition’s definition for continuing (i.e., at least one activity 10 days
after February 15, 2014) is rather arbitrary and does not necessarily serve as a suitable proxy
for the continuing/drop dichotomy. Considering that the course likely continued until the
end of March 2014, it is possible that 10-day absence (February 16-25) from accessing course
material does not necessarily mean that the student dropped. This may explain why the
few who accessed a wide breadth of activities (i.e., the 5 students with final similarity scores
greater than 1) still may have gone on to access the course after February 25.
We were also interested in whether the inclusion of some additional features besides the
breadth of access to course content apparent in the output of INSiGHT could be used to
achieve better prediction of the students who ‘continued.’ Specifically, we observed from the
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Figure 5.20. Scatter plot of the final similarity score and the day of last
activity for both MOOC students who continued and dropped.
time series plot that those with high similarity scores who did not ‘continue’ seemed to last
activity dates which were earlier than those who ‘continued.’ This led us to construct and
test a logistic regression model with three features: final similarity score, the day of first
activity, and the day of last activity. With 5-fold cross validation, the resulting modeling
with the coefficients shown in Table 5.11 had an AUC of 77%.
Table 5.11. Table of terms and coefficients for a logistic regression model for
MOOC continuation
Term Estimate SE tStat p-value
(Intercept) 4.1098 0.3084 13.0347 7.7699E-39
Start day 0.0481 0.0192 2.5096 0.0121
Last Day -0.0997 0.0209 -4.7608 1.9287E-06
Final Similarity Score -2.0646 0.4433 -4.6571 3.2077E-06
5.10.5. Conclusion. Overall, the use of INSiGHT in this application enabled the screen-
ing for those most likely to continue a MOOC based upon the only one hypothesized factor
of the breadth of course material accessed. This detected over 23% of the true positives.
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Notwithstanding the data limitations previously mentioned, and considering the results of
the logistic regression model, it is likely that the inclusion of some additional features as
outputs of INSiGHT or the development of more robust query pattern or set of patterns
could be used to achieve better prediction of the students who ‘continued.’
5.11. Application #3 Real Data: Consumer Project Detection
We acquired a real, large consumer activities dataset from a home improvement retailer
selling products that customers use in complex and/or multi-step projects. The retailer
was interested in detecting when a customer may be engaged in those projects based on
shopping behavior alone. Unlike other customers who may have one-time and long-term
interests and product affinities, those customers undertaking a project may be interested in
purchasing more associated products but only for a short duration to get the project done. A
retailer would therefore greatly benefit by quickly identifying such customers, and help them
complete their projects through tailored marketing and support. In our investigative search
setting, the latent behavior is a customer undertaking a specific type of project, associated
purchases are indicators of that latent behavior, and the trajectory is the behavioral-temporal
path of indicators towards completion of a project.
Table 5.12. Customer purchases full and subgraph characteristics
Characteristics Gfull Gsubgraph
Total Nodes 11,690,738 271,617
Number of customers 60,000 30,443
Number of purchase ids 11,630,738 241,174
Total Edges 11,630,738 241,174
The original dataset had 60,000 customers and over 11 million transactions from March
5, 2012 to March 4, 2014 (see Table 5.12). Each of the products purchased had a categorical
hierarchy of product id, subclass, class, and group. The retailer also labeled each customer
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as either a professional (contractor) or customer (residential customer). In preprocessing,
we filtered out 97.68% of nodes and 97.93% of edges in this bipartite graph which had no
connection to indicators in our query. Specifically, we constructed a subgraph of those who
made at least one purchase of a product (distinguished by purchase id) whose sub-class
identifier was in the query pattern. The resulting graph had only about 271K nodes and
241K time-stamped edges and is further detailed in Table 5.12 and the schema in Fig. 5.21a.
While each of the edges has a time stamp label with a date and time resolution, we
binned each date into weeks. Thus all purchases made during the 2-year period were covered
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Figure 5.21. (a) Network schema of the Customer Activities graph. (b)
Query graph Q for a tiling wall and floor project.
5.11.1. Query Development and Description. Since the home improvement re-
tailer never specified what constituted a “project,” we needed to develop a suitable set of
project queries that would meet the intent. Accordingly, we decided to focus on a bathroom
renovation project as a proof of principle and extracted the tools and material requirements
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Table 5.13. Home Renovation Project Query- Class Node-Types and Pa-
rameter Set
Parameter Set
Class Label NodeType λ β ξ
A Customer QF 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
B Tile Cutters & Wet Saw RF 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
C Tape Measures IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
D Levels IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
E Tile Surface Preparation IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
F Rags/Cloths/Spongers IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
G Utility Brushes IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
H Caulk Guns IIRA 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
I Mortar/Masonry IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
J Large Ceramic Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
K Small Ceramic Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
L Mosaic Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
M Large Porcelain Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
N Extra Large Porcelain Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
O Large Stone Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
P General Deco/Wall Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
Q General Ceramic Floor Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
R General Stone/Slate Tile IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
S Display Board IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
T Deco and Trim Tiles IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
U Grouts IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
V Cleaners and Sealers IND 10.0 1.0× 108 1.0
listed in [62], a how-to manual for bathroom remodels. Even within the bathroom renova-
tion, we identified numerous sub-projects: removal and demolition, showers and tubs, sinks
and vanities, toilets, lighting, and tiling walls and floors. We matched the tool and material
requirements list with the product sub-class names provided by the retailer and subsequently
developed query graphs for each sub-project in a bathroom renovation project. The query
graph for tiling walls and floors consisting of 21 related product sub-classes is shown in 5.21b.
We found it important to further delineate those product sub-classes by type of inves-
tigative indicator according to Table 4.1 in Section 4.3, and show these labels in Fig. 5.21c.
Among all the indicators, we designated the Tile Cutter and Wet Saw sub-class as a red
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flag indicator of a tiling project. We also selected Tape Measures, Levels, Utility Brushes,
and Caulk Guns as IIRA because they are common items that could be used in many other
projects in addition to tiling. As in the Klausen radicalization parameterization, we selected
λ = 10.0, β = 1.0×108, and ξ = 1.0 in order to provide a full component score for the single
occurrence of each indicator class and negate the effect of any score decay over time.
5.11.2. Analysis of Customer Purchase Dataset Results. We show that our
approach can indeed detect customers who are likely engaged in a specific home improvement
project. Fig. 5.22 shows the similarity scores over the 2-year period for the top-3 scoring
residential customers. We observe that customers 625 and 646 seemed to have initially
purchased a substantial number of items towards the project, but each had long periods
before they purchased additional items. On the other hand, customer 685 seemed to have
purchased items for the project regularly over a much longer period of time.
We first describe the purchase behavior in each of the two market segments. The aver-
age final similarity score among professionals )was statistically higher than customers (0.1
average difference had a p value < 0.0000). This difference in similarity scores is depicted
visually in the histogram in Fig. 5.23a, where the professional similarity score distribution
has a heavier tail than the customer distribution, as well as the box plots in Fig. 5.23b.
We also found that the average duration of the project trajectories among professionals was
statistically higher than customers (20 week average difference had a p value = 0.0003),
as shown in Fig. 5.23c. Both these observations match our intuition because professionals
are likely doing multiple tiling projects over the 2 year period and purchase more items over
time to support them, while residential customers are likely just buying for their single home





Figure 5.22. Plot of the class similarity scores over time s̃(t)n for (a) 150
randomly sampled non-contractor customers and (b) the top 3 non-contractor
customers in the home improvement purchase data graph. For each of the
weekly timesteps t between March 5, 2012 and March 4, 2014, we show the
changes in class similarity.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.23. Histogram of class similarity scores (a) for all 30,443 customers
in the subgraph and the corresponding boxplot (b) of the class similarity scores
which shows a statistically significant difference in distribution means between
professionals and customers. (c) is a box plot of the project durations in weeks
for both groups.
may break) more tools needed for a tiling project, and may buy more tile varieties (which
are counted as distinct indicators in the query pattern).
Fig. 5.22b also shows that over 5000 professionals and nearly 6000 residential customers
had a similarity score of 0 even at the end of the period of analysis (March 2014). This
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is due to these customers purchasing only one or more items among the IIRA sub-classes
specified in the query (Fig. 5.21c). The use of the labels for investigation indicator types
truly helped reduced false positives because it filtered out customers who only purchased
items that could have been used for a number of other projects besides tiling.
5.11.3. Discussion on alert criteria development. The objective of all the ap-
plications featured in this research is the detection of a latent behavior that may be signaled
over time. However, in the detection of both radicalization and evolving blog topics, while
analysts would likely want to be aware of those on pathways towards the behavior, they may
not necessarily have the urgency to detect the behavior at the earliest opportunity. The
occurrence of indicators over time helped analysts follow those who may be of increasing
interest, and some red flags may assist in giving some more concrete signals. However, the
ultimate goal of this home improvement purchases analysis was to detect the commencement
of a specific project at the earliest opportunity for the retailer. Detection achieved at a later
time means potentially lost revenue to competing customers or lost opportunities to increase
customer satisfaction because of a failure to incentivize project completion. Therefore, more
focused analysis is needed on a customer’s related purchases initially over a short period to
determine if the customer was undertaking such a project. Also in this application, red flag
indicators may not occur in a specific sequence. For example, if one were engaging in a tiling
project, we have not found evidence to suggest that the purchase of a critical item item such
as a tiling saw would necessarily occur at the beginning or the end in a period of acquiring
materials and tools.
We discuss here the type of analyses needed to develop useful alert criteria for the retailer
to identify those most likely to be undertaking a project. We propose two promising means:
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association analysis and linear modeling of final class similarity scores based on customer
activities.
5.11.3.1. Association analysis of customer purchases. We first utilized association anal-
ysis, which is a classical technique used to determine purchase patterns in consumer market
baskets [2, 293]. This technique is also known as frequent itemset analysis or association rule
mining. For this particular application, this method finds among all the customers’ itemsets
(collection of items purchased) those k-sized sets of items that occurred with some thresh-
old frequency and determines any predictive associations that exist among the items. We
discovered that it has the potential to reveal the ‘rules’ which allow the vendor to predict
another single item that may be bought given one or more items already purchased, but
seems to be limited to itemsets of size k=3 and only makes prominent those most frequent
itemsets while ignoring other indicators. Ultimately, this analysis did provide insight into
the quality of our initial query pattern and demonstrated just how relatively infrequently
customers bought a significant portion of the items in the query pattern.
Association analysis is based fundamentally on three metrics:
(1) Support: Fraction of all transactions that contain the itemset. This metric describes
the relative prevalence of the itemset in the data.
(2) Confidence: Fraction of occurrences when items in a consequent set appear in trans-
actions that contain the antecedent set. This metric describes the relative prevalence
of the association rule relating the antecedent and consequent sets of items.
(3) Lift: The probability of the consequent set occurring with the antecedent set, divided
by the probability that the consequent set occurs at all. A lift value of 1 means that
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the probabilities of the antecedent and consequent itemsets are independent, while
a lift value greater than 1 means that there is a dependent relationship [2, 293].
There are now several techniques with varying efficiency to calculate these metrics for
a given dataset, but we utilized the popular and well-known a priori algorithm [2] which is
a based on breadth-first search. It efficiently generates candidate sets (starting with sets
of size 1) using the a priori principle39 and then prunes those candidate sets that fail to
meet a relative frequency threshold. We utilized a MATLAB implementation that is readily
available [283].
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Figure 5.24. Histogram and associated table of the size of the itemsets
among customers in the dataset
Given the criticality of itemsets in association analysis, we produced the histogram of
itemset sizes among customers in Fig. 5.24. This histogram is a variant of the one shown in
Fig. 5.23a, without consideration for IIRA items. Based upon this, one can conclude that
over 90% of the customers purchase no more than 3 distinct items from the tiling project item
list, and that it is relatively rare for customers to purchase a total of 4 or more distinct items.
Given the lack of ground truth in the data, it is impossible for us to definitely determine a
39Apriori principle (downward closure lemma) says that if an itemset X is not frequent, then any candidate
set that contains X is guaranteed to be not frequent [2].
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customer’s true intentions with respect to the project regardless of the size of their itemsets.
Clearly, larger itemsets imply a greater likelihood that the customer was pursuing a tiling
project, but a vendor would be interested in identifying those with 2, 3 or 4 size itemsets to
purchase more related items.
Selecting the minimum support threshold involves a trade-off between the number of
rules mined and their relative frequency. In other words, setting a low frequency would get
more association rules but the rules would have a lower relative frequency (and thus in some
sense relevancy). Due to the distribution multi-item sets by customer shown in Fig. 5.24,
it is clear that a minimum support threshold would have to be set fairly low in order to
examine itemsets of size k ≥ 3, where the purchase of at least 2 items would help infer the
third item. Table 5.14 shows the various minimum support thresholds tested with association
rule mining and the resulting number of frequent itemsets that met the threshold and the
maximum level (largest sized itemset) reached.
Table 5.14. Minimum Support and the Resulting Size and Type of Itemsets







We selected a minimum support of 0.02 in order to examine itemsets of least size 3
while still having some support and a confidence threshold of 0.30. See Fig. 5.25 for a
listing of the resulting 22 rules. The results match much of our intuition about products
related to the completing of a tiling project. For example, the rules ‘CLEANERS AND
SEALERS’→‘GROUTS’, ‘DECO AND TRIM TILES’→‘GROUTS’, and ‘MOSAIC’→‘GROUTS’
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are sensible and have greater than 0.05 support and with life values greater than 2. For 3-
itemsets, the rules {‘CLEANERS AND SEALERS’, ‘MOSAIC’}→‘GROUTS’ and {‘LESS
THAN 12” TILE/STONE’, ‘MOSAIC’}→‘DECO AND TRIM TILES’ each have life values
greater than 3 and confidence levels of 78.7% and 63.3%, respectively.
Number Antecdent Consequent Confidence Lift Support
1 12" TO 13" PORCELAIN' 'GROUTS' 0.583 2.414 0.0271
2 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' 0.472 4.820 0.0453
3 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' 0.462 4.820 0.0453
4 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' 'GROUTS' 0.493 2.041 0.0483
5 'MOSAIC' 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' 0.319 3.261 0.0363
6 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' 'MOSAIC' 0.371 3.261 0.0363
7 'CLEANERS AND SEALERS' 'GROUTS' 0.495 2.049 0.0685
8 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' 'GROUTS' 0.533 2.209 0.0512
9 'MOSAIC' 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' 0.329 3.434 0.0375
10 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' 'MOSAIC' 0.391 3.434 0.0375
11 'MOSAIC' 'GROUTS' 0.487 2.015 0.0554
12 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' and 'MOSAIC' 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' 0.614 6.268 0.0230
13 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' and 'MOSAIC' 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' 0.633 6.601 0.0230
14 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' and 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' 'MOSAIC' 0.508 4.466 0.0230
15 'GROUTS' and 'MOSAIC' 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' 0.383 3.908 0.0212
16 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' and 'MOSAIC' 'GROUTS' 0.583 2.415 0.0212
17 'LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE' and 'GROUTS' 'MOSAIC' 0.439 3.858 0.0212
18 'GROUTS' and 'MOSAIC' 'CLEANERS AND SEALERS' 0.365 2.632 0.0202
19 'CLEANERS AND SEALERS' and 'MOSAIC' 'GROUTS' 0.787 3.260 0.0202
20 'GROUTS' and 'MOSAIC' 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' 0.396 4.129 0.0219
21 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' and 'MOSAIC' 'GROUTS' 0.585 2.423 0.0219
22 'DECO AND TRIM TILES' and 'GROUTS' 'MOSAIC' 0.429 3.768 0.0219
Figure 5.25. Association rules generated for the tiling project using the min-
imum support of 0.02 and minimum confidence of 0.30.
In summary, we first found that itemsets of size 4 and greater were rare in the customer
purchase data. Despite this, and the fact that we had accepted very low support (2% of all
transactions) to find 3-itemset association rules, association analysis did provide a set of rules
with high lift that provides confidence estimates of a third item with 60-70% probability.
There are several areas of future work. First, we would recommend to the vendor to expand
its data collection efforts to gain ground truth for project-related purchases. This could
be achieved for instance by the vendor asking customers to register their intended project
in advance through their store account to receive product discounts. We also intend to
incorporate these association rules into INSiGHT to help expand the alert system for emailed
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incentives following the matching of antecedent purchases (indicators) for discounts or sale
of items in the consequent and other related items. Lastly, we intend to use this technique
in a formal process to assist in query pattern refinement. Items that turn out to have very
low support over time could be removed from the query, while other new associated items
beyond the original query could be added and tracked as important new indicators.
5.11.3.2. Modeling final class similarity scores based on customer activities. We first pro-
posed two basic metrics that may be correlated to an individual’s ultimate class similarity
score, each of which is fast to calculate and utilizes only the system output of time-based
similarity scores. The intention is to calculate one or both of these methods in some initial
period in order to determine whether an individual ends up purchasing a preponderance of
the items from the query for their project. For our purposes, we defined ‘initial’ time period
for each customer i as ∆z,i = tz,i− t0,i, where t0,i1 is the week of the first non-IIRA purchase
and tz,i1 is the z-th week after the first non-IIRA purchase by customer i.
(1) Initial similarity score at time period tz,i. Defined as the similarity score achieved
by customer i at tz,i.
(2) Initial similarity score gradient at time period tz,i. Defined as the similarity score
achieved by customer i at tz,i divided by ∆z,i.
Both of these methods were tested against the final (ultimate) similarity scores and the
resulting correlation values are depicted in Fig. 5.26. The error bars are the 95% confidence
intervals around correlation coefficient. At face value, these results show that the correlation
between initial and final similarity scores is monotonically increasing for longer lengths of
the initial period of consideration. Also, the correlation between initial similarity score
gradient and final similarity score steadily decreases for initial periods longer than 1 week
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and is always less than the similarity score correlation after the first week. We conclude that
while the initial set of purchases made within a week period for a project may is moderately
correlated to the final span of items ultimately purchased, this correlation becomes negligible
rather quickly. While we allow that this conclusion is not necessarily generalizable to other
projects or domains, for the remainder of this analysis we will build models to predict final
similarity scores using only the initial scores rather than gradients.
Located at: C:\Users\Benjamin Hung\Documents\PhD Local (Back-up)\WCAI-Home 
Figure 5.26. Correlation coefficients with the 95% CI for both the initial
similarity score and initial gradient metrics against the final similarity score.
Having established a positive correlation between the final and initial similarity scores,
we continue with an effort to build a fast, simple linear model to dynamically predict final
similarity scores (the span of project-related items purchased) in order to enable the vendor
detect customers seemingly on the way towards a project so that it could focus marketing
efforts on them. The dataset of 12,082 customers was divided into a training (70%) and
testing (30%) set consisting of 8,457 and 3,625 individuals, respectively. After trying sev-
eral variants of the dependent variable related to an initial similarity score, we ultimately
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determined a fair performing variable was the similarity score after a specified number of
activities, which is defined as the number of times a customer visited the store (binned into
weeks) where there was the purchase of an item in a new sub-class in the project query. This
variable in some ways mimics the vendor’s receipt of information: “Customer X visited our
store Y times and has now bought up to Z things in this project pattern.” Those who made
just one visit to purchase an item that is classified as IIRA would be considered as having
zero activities towards the project. The number of customers sorted by their highest activity
count in both the training and testing datasets is depicted in the histograms in Fig. 5.27.
Count 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Frequency 4116 2658 1065 412 132 59 11 2 2
Count 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Frequency 1728 1145 496 159 63 25 8 0 1
(a) (b)
Figure 5.27. The histogram of customers by activity counts in both the
training (a) and testing (b) datasets.
Using the training data, we performed the simple linear regression: Final Similarity Score
∼ Similarity Score of x Activities, where a separate model was built for each activity count
x = 1...5. For instance, the first regression was for Final Similarity Score ∼ Similarity Score
of 1 Activity, and utilized the records in the training set who and 1 or more activities (which
as shown in Fig. 5.27a is 4,341 individuals).
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Table 5.15. Model fit for training set using various activity counts
Item Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3 Activity 4 Activity 5
n 4341 1683 618 206 74
RMSE 0.0571 0.0503 0.0445 0.0413 0.0379
R2 0.403 0.559 0.651 0.674 0.752
It is important to note that since we based the dependent variable on activity counts, we
no longer used the week from initial purchase as an overt method of selection. For instance,
for those individuals who make 2 activities (2 visits binned by week when at least one item
from a new sub-class is purchased each visit) could be performing those visits over a period of
time 2 or more weeks long depending upon how much time elapse between visits. Secondly,
because there are fewer customers at each activity increment, each successive model was
built on decreasing sample sizes. The resulting linear models for activity counts of 3, 4, and
5 had greater than 65% R2 values as shown in Table 5.15. In the same table are the root
mean squared errors (RMSE) for each model, which quantifies the spread of the actual final
similarity scores around the predicted final similarity score using the same units. The RMSE
for models using Activity 3, 4, and 5 were also less than the score increment for buying one
product of a new subclass in the query. Since the query had 21 items, each new items
contributed a score of 1/21 ≈ 0.47619. This means that the margin of error of prediction of
the final similarity score is essentially less than the score change by plus or minus one query
item.
The same set of linear models were then run on the test data, which are visually depicted
in Fig. 5.28. As before with the training set, the models for each successive activity set were
developed using smaller and smaller samples. The R2 and the RMSE values are in Table 5.16




Figure 5.28. Plots of the regression models of the final similarity scores
against the test data for similarity scores after (a) 1 activity (n=1897), (b) 2
activites (n=752), (c) 3 activities (n=256), (d) 4 activities (n=97), and (e) 5
activities (n=34).
3 or greater produced RMSE that were smaller than the score increment for a single query
item.
Table 5.16. Model fit for test set using various activity counts
Item Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3 Activity 4 Activity 5
n 1897 752 256 97 34
RMSE 0.058 0.0509 0.0452 0.0376 0.0303
R2 0.379 0.545 0.641 0.694 0.698
5.11.3.3. Conclusion. The point is that even a simple intuitive model can have some
decent results, which can likely be improved upon if one analyzes in closer detail what the
individuals actually purchase (i.e., quantity) as well. This is an important first step towards
integrating models into the INSiGHT technology in order to move towards the prediction of
latent behaviors.
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Located at: C:\Users\Benjamin Hung\Documents\PhD Local (Back-up)\WCAI-Home Depot\NumAct_THD_hist.xlsx
Activity Count 1 2 3 4 5
Training Set RMSE 0.0571 0.0503 0.0445 0.0413 0.0379
Test Set RMSE 0.058 0.0509 0.0452 0.0376 0.0303
Figure 5.29. The RMSE of the linear activity models using activity counts
for both the training and testing data.
5.12. Conclusion
In this important chapter, we formulated INSiGHT, a dynamic inexact graph pattern
matching technique that identifies individuals with conforming subgraphs to a query pattern
and follows the match trajectories over time. Tailorable to the detection of radicalization
indicator patterns, enhancements were also developed to account for the re-occurrence of
indicators, the time decay of indicator significance, and the incorporation of red flag and
other conditional filters. We demonstrated the performance of our approach on a variety of
real-world and synthetic datasets of various sizes and domain applications.
On small synthetic radicalization datasets, we successfully validated the matching me-
chanics and enhancements, and demonstrated that our technique was useful in producing
consistent, informed, and reliable judgments about those stylized individuals who posed a
significant risk for violent extremism. On a BlogCatalog dataset of over 470K nodes and 4
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million edges, where 98.56% of nodes and 99.65% of edges were filtered out with preprocess-
ing steps, INSiGHT successfully detected the trajectory of the top 1,327 nodes towards a
query pattern. INSiGHT also ably determined the radicalization pattern match trajectory
of all 135 U.S. violent extremists in the real Klausen time-stamped behavioral dataset. We
noted a wide distribution of similarity scores on even just these positive cases of extremists
and the difficulty of determining a suitable threshold to distinguish positive and negative
cases. Importantly, however, we demonstrated how the inclusion of red flag visualizations
and alerts could greatly assist analysts in identifying high risk individuals even when they
had relatively lower similarity scores.
Using a real, large proprietary consumer activities dataset from a home improvement
retailer with 60K customers and over 11 million time-stamped transactions, INSiGHT was
indeed useful in the detection of customers likely undertaking certain home improvement
projects based upon the number of project items purchased. However, we were unable to
truly validate the utility of INSiGHT to screen for true positives because the data did not
contain ground truth. Through secondary analysis for the features which best predict a
customer’s final similarity score, we found that models using activity sets of three or more
produced RMSE values that were less than the score increment for a single query item.
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CHAPTER 6
Synthetic Data Generator for Latent Behaviors
6.1. Introduction
The research into the commercial applications such as the detection of project-related
purchases revealed a need for large, non-proprietary datasets for training and testing that
contain individual-level, time-stamped activities, and, as much as possible, a balanced ground
truth on the latent behavior. The deficit is also applicable more broadly to the domain of
detecting other behaviors such as radicalization to violent extremism. In this latter case, the
challenge is two-fold. First, researchers have difficulty gaining access to sensitive and even
classified details of individuals which are held closely by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. See [264, p. 6-7] for a more detailed discussion on the “lack of comprehensive and
reliable data” impeding scholarship in terrorism studies. The second challenge is the lack
of balanced training datasets because extremist violence is relatively rare (but often times
causing horrific mass casualty events). These same or similar challenges in other domains
has led to the development of empirically-based synthetic data generators. Notable ones
exist in the area of network traffic data [7] and insider threat data [120].
In this section, we take the first step in devising synthetic data generators for the further
development and testing of INSiGHT and specifically describe a rule-based synthetic data
generator to replicate individual consumer purchases of home improvement projects over
time. In rule-based simulation, human behavior is replicated using a set of causal if/then
associations to select actions [239, p. 128].
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6.2. Related work
There is a quite a large body of literature on modeling customer behaviors. We briefly
cover some of the most relevant, and recent research in this section. The probability dis-
tributions to model various customer behaviors were discussed by Fader et al in [99], which
also includes a proposal for the use of Weibull in purchases times. Leeflang also produced
another relevant work which proposed individual demand models related to four customer
decision: “whether to buy,”, “what to buy,” “how much to buy,” and “when to buy” [183].
Researchers in [324] also developed an agent-based model of consumer purchase decision-
making they specifically used to test for an emergent behavior called the decoy effect. Lastly,
we based some the fundamental concepts for our synthetic data generator on [202], who pro-
vided the GNU code for a simulator of customers movie purchases based on an assigned
genre preference.
6.3. Assumptions
This generator was based upon the following assumptions.
(1) Customers can plan 1 or more projects in 2 year period. Support: 2013 Houzz &
Home survey [138] showed that there were more planned projects than respondents,
meaning some customers must be planning 2 or more projects.
(2) Customers have a loyalty to a particular retailer. Support: Accenture survey in
2015 said 28% of consumers are loyal to their providers and brands [43].
(3) Customers purchase of the number of items in a home renovation project supply
list decreases exponentially. The support for this came from our analysis of real
consumer purchase data from major home improvement retailer.
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(4) Some customers do not complete a planned project and project completion rates are
independent of the customer. Support: Black+Decker 2014 Home Project Survey
[28] showed that 52% of respondents said that they had 1 or more unfinished projects
at home.
(5) Project start dates are independent and identically distributed over a 2 year period.
Support: This is a simplification of a commonly accepted seasonal model for home
renovations, which can be improved upon later with additional data.
(6) Customers purchase project items with equal probability from their project list.
Support: This is likely a simplification of reality but can modified after more analysis
of real purchase data.
(7) Customers purchase unknown project items (noise) through a weighted random
sample of an empirical item distribution. The support for this came from our
analysis of real consumer purchase data from major home improvement retailer.
(8) Customers item purchase times per project occur at a diminishing rate. The support
for this came from our analysis of real customer purchase data from major home
improvement retailer.
(9) Order of items purchased per project is determined randomly. This is likely a
simplification of reality but can modified after more analysis of real purchase data,
particular the sequence of frequent itemsets by the customer.
6.4. Rule-Based Purchase Activity Generation
The steps for the product purchase generation are described below. Table 6.1 summarizes
the notation used for the sets, random variables, and parameters.
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Table 6.1. Defined sets and random variables in the synthetic data generator
Sets and RV Notation Description/Meaning
A = {a1, ..., anp} Set of np project types (includes ‘unknown’ project for noise)
Ω Set of all items related to any project type ∈ A
Ba· ⊆ Ω Set of items for each project type a· ∈ A
C = {c1, ..., cnr} Set of nr proportions of planned purchases actually made by cus-
tomers
Xi Random variable for the number of projects customer i undertakes
within a period of 1, ..., tmax days, where 1 ≤ s ≤ np.
Yi,k Random variable for project type of customer i’s k-th project,
where k = 1, 2, .., xi
Li Random variable for the customer i’s loyalty percentage for all
projects
Gi,k,a· Random variable for percentage of items in project item list Ba·
that customer i plans to purchase
Hi,k Random variable for the proportion of planned purchases actually
made for customer i’s k-th project, where k = 1, 2, .., xi
J Random variable for purchase times (in days) for each item pur-
chased in a project counted from the day of the first purchase for
that project
Parameter Notation Description/Meaning
nc Number of customers to simulate
tmax Time horizon in days
s Number of different project types that a customer may undertake
(possibly simultaneously) within the period of 1, ..., tmax days,
where 1 ≤ s ≤ np
f(Xi) Probabilities for each of the s projects in the PMF for Xi (appli-
cable ∀ i)
f(Yi,k) Probabilities for each of the np projects in the PMF for Yi,k (ap-
plicable ∀ i)
λ for f(Gi,k;λ) Parameter λ (decay) for the exponential PDF of Gi,k (applicable
∀ i)
f(Hi,k) Probabilities for each of the nr proportions in the PMF for Hi,k
(applicable ∀ i)
α, β for f(J ;α, β) Parameters α (shape) and β (scale) for the Weibull distribution
PDF of J





tnoise Time horizon in days for the start of purchases for project ‘misc’
(noise)
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(1) Data requirements. The user of the synthetic data generator must have apriori a
large listing of items Ω, which can be sorted into one or more elements in A, the
set of np project types. Each of these project types (a1, ..., anp) will have a set Ba·
of items assigned as a product/materials list; items can belong to one or more item
sets.
(2) Create customer profiles and planned projects. Profiles for all np customers are
determined by the outcome of several random variables. First, Xi is the random
variable for the number of (possibly simultaneous) projects customer i undertakes
over a period of tmax days. The number of projects is randomly assigned to each
customer according to the PMF f(Xi). Once each customer has assigned a total
project capacity k of one or more projects, the random variable Yi,k determines the
project type for each project. The first of these project types is randomly assigned
according to the PMF f(Yi,k). All subsequent projects (if any) are uniformly at
random assigned from the remaining unassigned project types without replacement.
Next, each customer i is uniformly at random assigned a purchase loyalty percentage,
which is defined as the percent of products bought from the favored store over




(3) Determine planned and actual purchases. The percentage of project items that cus-
tomer i plans to purchase for each of the known k projects of type a· is determined by
the random variable Gi,k,a· and is instantiated through a normalized PMF derived
from an empirical exponential decay function with parameter λ over the domain
of the size of the item list for project a·. For the unknown project (“noise”), the
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and using the inverse of an empirically derived exponen-
tial decay function with λmisc. By rounding the result to the nearest integer, we
directly generate the number of unique sub-class purchases. After this, the ac-
tual percentage of planned items purchased is determined by the random variable
Hi,k and draw randomly according to the PMF f(Hi,k). The resulting number of
project items customer i purchased for project a· is determined by the product of
|Bak | (cardinality of the item set Bak), gi,k (percentage of project items planned
for purchase), hi,k (percentage of items actually purchased), and li (primary vendor
customer loyalty percentage). The actual purchased items for each known project
are drawn uniformly without replacement from the full project itemset. For the
unknown project (“noise”) the purchased items are determined randomly through
the empirical weightings of all subclasses project.
(4) Determine purchase times for all purchases. The project initiation day for each of
customer i’s non-miscellaneous projects is selected uniformly at random from
[
1, tmax
For the unknown project, the initiation date is selected uniformly at random over[
1, tnoise
]
days, which effectvely places the “noise” purchases near the beginning of
the analysis window. The purchase time for each item actually purchased for a
known project is determined by the random variable J and random draws from the
Weibull PDF f(J, α, β) and added to the project initiation day. For the unkwown
project, the time of actual purchases is selected uniformly at random from 1 to
(tmax − tnoise).
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6.5. Example Run of the Synthetic Data Generator
In order to derive a well-founded list of project-related material and tools for an inter-
esting set of projects, we followed the same process as the development of the tiling query
described in Section 5.11.1. This included references to home improvement books and se-
lected online resources with tools and material lists such as [78, 191] and the search for
relevant item subclass names in the real product list from the home improvement vendor.
The resulting project items lists for a minor kitchen remodel, tiling, and attic insulation
project are shown in Fig. 6.1. One of the features that we intended to test with this simula-
tion is the ability to analyze how customers undertaking one project could be distinguished
from customers undertaking another project when a number of item sub-classes in each of
the projects overlap. Specifically, in the project item lists show in Fig. 6.1, one can deter-
mine that the Kitchen project has 7 out of 15 item sub-classes which overlap with the Wall
and Floor Tiling project (MORTAR/MASONRY/STUCCO, MOSAIC, GROUTS, CAULK
GUNS, TILE SURFACE PREPARATION, TILE CUTTERS & WET SAWS, and CLEAN-
ERS AND SEALERS). Likewise, the Wall and Floor Tiling project has 7 out of 16 item
sub-classes which overlap with the Kitchen project. It is also important to note that the
Attic project has no item sub-class overlap with either the Kitchen nor the Wall and Floor
Tiling project.
Additionally, we designated a Project 4 as an unknown in order to generate noisy pur-
chases in the data from 1778 sub-classes of items. This is to introduce for analysis who
may have bought ‘random’ items for other projects. False positives can come about when
those individuals bought items which by chance happened to be from the list of project
items. False negatives come about when they analyst confuses people who were actually
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Minor Kitchen Remodel Sub-Class Type
1 Kitchen sink ACRYLIC SINKS RF
2 Drain DRAIN PIPE FITTINGS IND
3 Undercabinent Lighting UNDERCABINET LIGHTING IND
4 Cabinet hardware S/O CABINET/HARDWARE IND
5 Faucet S/O FAUCETS IND
6 Laminate, Marble countertop F&D LAMINATE COUNTERTOPS RF
7 Kitchen lighting S/O INTERIOR LIGHTING IND
8 S/O RECESSED LIGHTING IND
9 Thinset tile mortar MORTAR/MASONRY/STUCCO IND
10 Backsplash (mosaic tile) MOSAIC IND
11 Tile Grout GROUTS IND
12 Caulk CAULK GUNS IND
13 Notched trowel TILE SURFACE PREPARATION IND
14 Wet saw TILE CUTTERS & WET SAWS IND
15 Grout sealer CLEANERS AND SEALERS IND
Wall and Floor Tile Sub-Class Type
1 Tile cutters/Wet saw TILE CUTTERS & WET SAWS RF
2 Tape measure TAPE MEASURES IND
3 Level LEVELS IND
4 Notched trowel TILE SURFACE PREPARATION IND
5 Foam brush ECONOMY/UTILITY BRUSHES IND
6 Caulk gun CAULK GUNS IND
7 Thinset tile mortar MORTAR/MASONRY/STUCCO IND
8 Ceramic/Stone wall tiles 12" TO 13" CERAMIC RF
9 S/O CERAMIC FLOOR TILES RF
10 LESS THAN 12" TILE/STONE RF
11 S/O NATURAL STONES/SLATE RF
12 GREATER THAN 12" STONE RF
13 Trim tiles DECO AND TRIM TILES IND
14 MOSAIC IND
15 Tile grout GROUTS IND
16 Grout sealer CLEANERS AND SEALERS IND
Attic Insulation Sub-Class Type
1 staple gun STAPLING IND
2 Protective/safety glasses PERSONAL SAFETY IND
3 Gloves WORK GLOVES IND
4 Coveralls PAINT APPAREL IND
5 loose-fill insulation INSULATION RF
6 LOOSE FILL INSULATION RF
7 pipe insulation PIPE INSULATION IND
8 Insulation covers INSULATION ACCESSORIES IND
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Figure 6.1. The project item lists for three projects (a) minor kitchen re-
model, (b) wall and floor tiling, and (c) attic insulation.
undertaking the project, but we set our detection threshold too low to find them (to avoid
for instance all the others who are false positives).
Next, we describe the process of determining the two other parameters λ and λmisc for the
exponential distribution for the random variable Gi,k,a· based on empirical data. Utilizing
the data on-hand, we determined the percent of 12,082 customers who purchased one or
more of the items in the 21-item tiling project query from Fig. 5.21b. For a given query, Fig.
6.2 shows many customers bought a few items, no one purchased all the items, and only a
few purchased as many as 11 items. An exponential function could reasonably approximate
this drop-off in item subclasses purchased given a query, but resulting percentages would
need to be normalized into a PMF over the number of query items. Given that Qtotal is the
total number of item sub-classes for a project query, q ∈ {1, 2, ..., Qtotal} (the number of item
sub-classes purchased for a project query), and S =
∑Qtotal
i=1 e
−λq (the normalization constant
of the sum of the exponential functional values over discrete domain up to the total number
of query item sub-classes), Eq. 14 is the function utilized to determine the exponential PMF
for project type a·.





Figure 6.2. Percent of customers by the number of unique item sub-classes
purchased in a 21-item project materials and tools list. The orange and grey
curves depicts a normalized exponential function with λ = −1.0 and λ =
−0.20, respectively.
As Fig. 6.2 shows, a λ = −1.0 would approximate fairly well the number of item sub-
classes purchased, but in simulation we desired the opportunity to examine the utility of
finding customers who purchased more item sub-classes in the query. Therefore, we chose a
notional λ = −0.20 for Eq. 14 that achieves this effect of a heavier tail and utilized it with
the specific known project queries of sizes Qtotal = {15, 16, 8} according to Fig. 6.1. This
process generated an exponential PMF for the random variable Gi,k,a· for each project of
type a·.
To select the parameter λmisc, we again drew on the data and determined the empirical
distribution of unique sub-classes purchases by each of the customers (irrespective of the
project queries). The result is shown in Fig. 6.3. We fitted the exponential function
Frequency = 1457.1e−0.034·Number of Subclasses with a R2 = 0.9729 to the data. This function
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was then scaled to 1, and utilized as a continuous PDF to generate the number of unique
“noisy” item sub-class purchases for customers assigned the unknown Project 4.
Figure 6.3. Histogram of the total number of unique item sub-classes pur-
chases by customers in the real dataset. The fitted exponential curve is shown
in dotted red.
Table 6.2 provides the additional details for this particular run of the synthetic data
generator. The simulation was implemented in MATLAB using a single random number
generator seed 123456. Additionally, the 2 year period (730 days) was designated to start
on January 1, 2013. The portion of the typical output as a simulated purchase table with
project ground truth intention is shown in Fig. 6.4.
6.6. Modeling with Ground Truth
Utilizing the parameterization provided for the sample run of the data generator, we
obtain a set of simulated customers and their associated purchases over the course of 2
years (730 days). Most importantly, this dataset contained the ground truth of the a priori
intentions of each customer as they made their purchases. Table 6.3 provides the statistical
summary. The simulated results were validated at face-value. For example, given the PMF of
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Table 6.2. Sets and parametrization for sample run of the synthetic generator
Notation Description/Meaning
A = {Kitchen, Tiling, Attic, Unknown} Set of np = 4 project types
Ω Set of all items related to any project type ∈ A
Ba· ⊆ Ω Set of items for each project type a· ∈ A
C = {1.00, 0.80, 0.60} Set of nr = 3 proportions of planned purchases
actually made by customers
nc = 1000 Simulate the purchase activities of 1000 customers
tmax = 730 Time horizon of 730 days
s = 4 Customers may undertake (possibly simultane-
ously) up to 4 projects within the 730 day period
fXi(xi) =

0.67 if xi = 1
0.20 if xi = 2
0.10 if xi = 3
0.03 if xi = 4
Probabilities for the number of projects (up to
s = 4) a customer may undertake in a period of
tmax = 730 days
fYi,k(yi,k) =

0.12 if yi,k = Kitchen
0.08 if yi,k = Tiling
0.10 if yi,k = Attic
0.70 if yi,k = Unknown
Probabilities for each of the np projects in the
PMF for Yi,k (applicable ∀ i)
λ = −0.20 for f(Gi,k;λ) Parameter λ = −0.20 (decay) for the exponential
PDF of Gi,k (applicable ∀ i)
fHi,k(hi,k)

0.75 if hi,k = 1.00
0.15 if hi,k = 0.80
0.10 if hi,k = 0.60
Probabilities for each of the nr proportions in the
PMF for Hi,k (applicable ∀ i)
α = 0.95, β = 30 for f(J ;α, β) Parameters α = 0.95 (shape) and β = 30 (scale)
for the Weibull distribution PDF of J
a = .80 for f(Li; a, 1.00) Uniform distribution PDF of Li between[
0.80, 1.00
]
tnoise = 45 Time horizon of 45 days as the latest date for the
start of purchases for ‘Unknown’ projects
Xi (number of projects each customer undertakes), the expected value of the number of total
number of projects given 1,000 customers is 1, 000(0.67 ·1+0.20 ·2+0.10 ·3+0.03 ·4) = 1490,
which is close to the total simulated of 1, 488.
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Figure 6.4. Screenshot of the MATLAB output from the synthetic data generator.
Table 6.3. Statistics of synthetically generated customers and purchases
Category Count
Number of customers 1,000
Number of purchases 25,444
Number of projects 1,488
-Number of customers with Kitchen (Project 1) 263
-Number of customers with Tiling (Project 2) 223
-Number of customers with Attic (Project 3) 258
-Number of customers with Unknown (Project 4) 744
Table 6.4 shows the number of purchases which contain items from a specific project sub-
class list broken down by intended project (ground truth). For example, there were 1,750
purchases that contained items in the Kitchen project sub-class list. However, since there
was a query sub-class overlap with the Tiling project, as well as the possibility of individuals
undertaking the Unknown project who purchase an item of sub-classes that happen to match
the Kitchen project sub-class list, these 1,750 purchases are distributed according to ground
truth as shown. There were 1,115 purchases that were the result of an intended Kitchen
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project, 406 purchases that were actually for a Tiling project, and 229 purchases that were
purchased ‘by chance’ that were part of the Unknown project. This table reflects the reality
that purchases have the potential to be attributed to the incorrect project without additional
corroborating purchases.






































6.7. Analysis of Results
Like the previous applications, the initialization of INSiGHT required the development
of a total of three query patterns (one for each of the three projects). Each of the query
patterns followed the same structure as the one in Fig. 5.21b, except each leaf node was
limited to the sub-classes for each particular project. The data graph schema was identical
to the one in Fig. 5.21a, as well as the parameterizations shown in Table 5.13.
Fig. 6.5 shows the distribution of the final similarity scores as an output of INSiGHT
run for each of the project query patterns. In blue are the histogram bars for the number
of customers undertaking the respective project by purchasing sub-classes of items in that
project query. Within each histogram are light red bars for the number of customers who
also purchased items in that project query but were actually undertaking another project
(including the Unknown project). These results are expected given the discussion of Table
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6.4. By varying the final similarity score thresholds for each of the projects, one can construct
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves as shown in Fig. 6.6. The area under the
curve (AUC) for Kitchen, Tiling, and Attic are 0.9352, 0.9367, and 0.9642, respectively. We
observe that the AUC for the Attic project is higher given the lack of overlap in sub-class
items with the other two projects. In fact, our intuition is that a given project’s AUC is
likely a function of at a minimum 1) the overlap of sub-class items with the other project
patterns, 2) the prevalence of the sub-class items among the universal set Ω from which
“noisy” purchases are down from, 3) the frequency for each project based upon Xi and
Gi,k,a· , 4) the percentage of planned items actually purchased Hi,k, and the customer loyalty
percentage Li. In future work, we intend to make this theoretical function more specific.
It is important to note that while these AUC values are reasonably high, one must
recall that these performance curves are based strictly on the final similarity scores for each
customer and for this particular application. In order to achieve a 100% True Positive Rate
(TPR) based on final similarity scores alone, one would need to accept a 32%, 38%, and
18% False Positive Rate (FPR) for the Kitchen, Tiling, and Attic projects, respectively. In
the given commercial application, but an analogous number in a radicalization application
might be considered insufficiently discerning for law enforcement and lead to an exorbitant
number of false leads. In fact, a stepwise logistic regression model can be readily built using
11 product-level features (rather than aggregate matches to a query) to achieve an AUC for
the Tiling project at 0.9616. This means that even simplistic machine learning models can
outperform the simplistic similarity scoring method.
Another key point of INSiGHT is to perform periodic screening and analysis over time
to enable early watching of likely customers for a particular project.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.5. The final similarity scores for simulated purchase data for those
with indicators from (a) Kitchen project, (b) Tiling project, and (c) Attic
project. Blue bars are the customers who undertook those projects, while the
red bars are the customers who made those purchases for other projects.
Figure 6.6. ROC curve for the classification of three projects based upon
the final similarity score. The AUC for Kitchen, Tiling, and Attic are 0.9352,
0.9367, and 0.9642, respectively.
6.8. Combining Investigative Graph Search and Machine Learning
A main focus of the future research is the integration of investigative graph search with
machine learning models to make predictions on data stored in dynamic heterogeneous
graphs. Graph databases are good for dynamically storing and querying large amounts
of interrelated pieces of information. But in order to utilize machine learning classification
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or prediction models on such data, it is important first to find the features and associate
them with each record (even over multiple hops). The investigative graph search component
finds the connected indicators that match a hypothesized pattern of latent behaviors for one
or more entities (query focus nodes). Then, once the pattern is detected in whole or in part,
the indicators act as features in machine learning models to perform the classification or
prediction.
This extension is trivial for 1-hop graph query patterns because presently analysts already
keep track of which features are associated with which individuals and the models can be run
continuously or periodically for near real-time classification or prediction. However, when
latent behaviors may be indicative through more intricate patterns with 2-3 hop connections,
the investigative graph search function becomes ever more important.
We propose the following steps to this direction or research and then provide a proof of
concept of its potential utility.
(1) Build a machine learning model that can classify latent behaviors based on the
presence of indicators (binary for now). Ideally, this model provides a list of features
that are statistically significant.
(2) Build graph query with these features as indicators.
(3) Use INSiGHT to find the presence of indicators associated with query focus nodes
in heterogeneous graph databases over time.
(4) INSiGHT calculates a) the similarity score to the pattern at each timestep (tells
how many indicator matches there are with the query), and b) the classification
score at each timestep to provide the classification or prediction.
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In order to build the right machine learning model with the interest of providing an early
warning to the vendor, we segmented the data into activity counts. For example, Activity 1
refers to using all purchase activities that occurred in the first week of a customer’s activity,
while Activity 2 refers to using all purchase activities that occurred in the second week of a
customer’s activity. We envision that a vendor would desire models which need only a partial
set of all purchases in order to make a prediction about whether the customer is pursuing a
particular project. We iteratively built 9 logistic regression models through a forward step-
wise process, each using a specific activity set (Activity 1, Activity 2, ... Activity 9). We
then evaluated each of the 9 models on each of the activity sets and determined the AUC.
This result is shown in Fig. 6.7. Models built on more data (i.e., more activities) generally
had good performance for more data. On the other hand, decreasing AUC curve for ‘Act
1 Items’ model shows that models built using very few activities may only be appropriate
for classification using a few activities (Activity 1 and 2), but performance will diminish as
more activities are considered. The notable exception is ‘Act2 Items’ model, which has a
relatively high AUC at Activity 1 and Activity 2 (0.916 and 0.969, respectively), and remains
competitive for all other Activity Counts. Also the dotted blue plot in Fig. 6.7 labeled ‘Act
Scores’ is the resulting AUCs of the best performing a forward step-wise logistic regression
model utilizing the just similarity scores and gradients. Notice that these aggregated features
have poorer performance than nearly all models which consider specific item granularity.
We, therefore, chose the ‘Act 2 Items’ model as the machine learning model which would
be evaluated using the whole or partial query matches from INSiGHT to dynamically predict
whether a customer is undertaking the Kitchen Project. The terms and coefficients and their
significance are shown in Table 6.5.
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Figure 6.7. AUC performance of stepwise logistic regression models on ac-
tivity sets of various sizes.
Table 6.5. Table of terms and coefficients for the ‘Act 2 Items’ Logistic
Regression Model for the Kitchen Project (Project 1)
Term Estimate SE tStat p-value
(Intercept) -4.108 0.281 -14.633 1.731E-48
SINK 90.424 1.097E+07 8.243E-06 1.000E+00
PIPE 2.806 0.386 7.263 3.795E-13
UCABINET LIGHTING 4.173 0.615 6.783 1.179E-11
CABINET HARDWARE 90.707 1.138E+07 7.972E-06 1.000E+00
FAUCET 86.057 1.058E+07 8.133E-06 1.000E+00
COUNTERTOP 5.359 1.115 4.804 1.555E-06
LIGHTING 4.776 0.847 5.639 1.712E-08
RECESSED LIGHTING 5.419 1.095 4.947 7.550E-07
MORTAR 1.620 0.341 4.755 1.984E-06
GROUTS 1.455 0.332 4.388 1.146E-05
CAULK 1.964 0.415 4.732 2.223E-06
TILE PREP 2.323 0.370 6.276 3.482E-10
TILE CUTTER 1.838 0.415 4.432 9.332E-06
CLEANER SEALER 2.276 0.359 6.337 2.344E-10
CAULK:TILE PREP -5.881 1.791 -3.283 1.027E-03
CAULK:TILE CUTTER -4.968 3.449 -1.440 1.500E-01
As a proof of concept, the ‘Act 2 Items’ model was inserted into the INSiGHT implemen-
tation, and the classification score was returned for each customer at each timestep. Figs.
195
6.8a and 6.8b show the plot of classification scores for all 1000 simulated customers and only
Kitchen Project customers, respectively.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.8. Classification scores for the Kitchen Project (Project 1) over time
for (a) all 1000 simulated customers and (b) only the 263 simulated customers
who were actually undertaking the project. The dashed black line in (b) is the
threshold classification score of 0.51639.
Recall that logistic regression models the probability of success as a logit function. That
is, the dependent variable in a logistic regression model (as well as a general linear model with





, where x is the binary
vector of active terms, β0 is the intercept, and β is the vector of term coefficients. The model
implies the log odds of a customer being a positive outcome (undertaking Kitchen Project)
increases with every purchase whose coefficient β > 0. Therefore, with an integration of both
a logistic regression classification model with an investigative search over time, increases in
the classification time series plot implies a greater log-odds of the entity being ‘positive.’ Fig.
6.9a shows the dramatic accentuation of the separation between Kitchen Project customers
and others, especially when compared to Fig. 6.5a (which was based on a simplistic similarity
score). However, we note that an increasing classification score does not necessarily imply
the entity is always going to be predicted as a positive case. This is clearly seen in Fig. 6.9b.
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We note that two interaction terms CAULK:TILE PREP and CAULK:TILE CUTTER
have negative coefficients. Thus if either combination was purchased, the log-odds of the
project designation decreases, as visible in Fig. 6.8. This is because the exponential function
is strictly increasing.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.9. (a) Distribution of classification scores for all 1000 simulated
customers undertaking the Kitchen Project (in blue), and those who were not
(in light red).(b) The scatter plot of the final similarity scores the correspond-
ing classification scores for all 1000 simulated customers. Dots in blue are
those customers undertaking the Kitchen Project.
Selecting the ‘Act 2 Items’ model and determining which features for detection by IN-
SiGHT is only one step. For various threshold levels, the logistic regression model will have
different specificity and selectivity rates. By analyzing the AUC curves of the ‘Act 2 Items’
model on various Activity sets (Activity 1 and Activity 9), we determined that a threshold
value of 0.51639 achieved suitable selectivity and specificity rates as shown in Fig. 6.10, with
a deference towards selectivity especially because the negative cases are nearly three times
the number of positives. This threshold became the value that an analyst would utilize to
predict those customers who were likely pursuing Kitchen Projects. Fig. 6.8b shows the









Figure 6.10. ROC curves for the ‘Act 2 Items’ logistic regression model
evaluated on (a) Activity 1 data, and (b) Activity 9 data. A common threshold
of 0.516388 in both curves achieved suitable selectivity and specificity.
Lastly, we proceeded to evaluate the dynamic performance of this technique by determin-
ing the timestep (if any) in which each customer’s classification score exceeded the threshold.
All those whose score exceeded the threshold (at the time it occurred) was labeled a ‘Yes’
for Kitchen Project. The confusion matrix against the ground truth is shown in Table 6.6.
This dynamic classification achieved a TPR of 0.8555, FNR of 0.1445, and an FPR of 0.0570.
Overall the accuracy was 92.0%. This performance exceeded the classification using the final
similarity score, which at best had a TPR of 0.8441, FNR of 0.1559, an FPR of 0.1479 and
an overall the accuracy was 85.0%.





Recognizing from the outset that latent behavior data are often difficult to acquire for
research, in this section we developed a tunable and empirically grounded synthetic data
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generator for customer purchases. Its greatest value is the a priori knowledge of ground
truth for the type of project(s) that a simulated customer is pursuing. The synthetic dataset
also allowed us to more rigorously validate INSiGHT and examine the final similarity scores
with an understanding of ground truth. We determined that AUC is dependent upon several
characteristics of the query and underlying data, namely any overlap in the query items and
the overall prevalence of query items in the universal set of items.
Significantly, we utilized synthetic data to explore the pairing of investigative graph search
and machine learning. The former finds the connected indicators that match a hypothesized
pattern of a latent behavior, and the latter performs the classification or prediction (rather
than just screening). We demonstrated the utility of this approach with a proof of con-
cept and achieved 92.0% classification accuracy dynamically as the consumers were making
purchases.
In the future, we also intend to utilize this synthetic generation framework in order
to create large-population, hybrid (synthetic and anonymized) datasets for researchers to
test their algorithms related to the detection of radicalization and violent extremism. This
contribution has the broader impact of facilitating future development of evidence-based risk
assessment technologies.
A proposal for future work is a collaborative effort with the Western Jihadism Project
at Brandeis University for the development of a textual database of indicators of a specific
radicalization indicator. During the course of data collection, the Brandeis research team
will read a text corpus, classify it as indicative of a particular radicalization indicator, and
capture the specific text (sentence or paragraph) that led them to make that classification.
With enough samples of coded training text and subject-matter expert feature selection,
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data scientists will employ natural language processing algorithms to tokenize different texts
and utilize machine learning to automatically identify the indicators present for an individ-
ual. This achievement will be tremendously helpful for any future efforts to automate the
classification of law enforcement data points as specific radicalization indicators
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CHAPTER 7
INSiGHT with Neighbor Matching
7.1. Introduction
As discussed previously, recent cases of violent extremism have demonstrated that per-
petrators can operate in a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. While individual actions may
not rise up to some threshold of suspicion, the collection of individuals supported by close
ties may be able to reveal more obvious threats. In our graph pattern matching approach,
this means that conspiratorial graph matches, which we define as match complementarity
over more than one query focus node, may further assist law enforcement and intelligence
analysts. To our knowledge, such matches are not addressed by current matching notions.
Here we formulate a definition for this neighborhood matching technique, describe its im-
plementation in INSiGHT, and demonstrate its functionality on a small example dataset.
7.2. Technique
Definition 9. (l, k) neighbor matching of query Q to data graph G. The graph matching
process to find the augmenting sets of distinct conforming subgraphs of G from a binary
match relation S ⊆ VQ × VG such that:
• for each of as many nodes u ∈ VQ as possible (but at least one), there exists a node
v ∈ VG such that (u, v) ∈ S, and
• for each pair (u, v) ∈ S, u ∼ v, and
• for each of as many edges (u, u′) ∈ EQ as possible (but at least one) there exists at
most l edges ∈ EG which form a directed path (v1, ..., v′l+1) such that both (u, v1) ∈ S
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and (u′, v′l+1) ∈ S and the directed paths (v1, ..., v′l+1) spans at most k distinct QF-
based conforming subgraphs.
Note that this definition allows for each edge in EG to possibly involve up to k−1 different
QF nodes other than the ego QF node of the subgraph. Additionally, we observe that (1, 1)
neighbor matching reduces to the Definition 4 for Inexact Graph Pattern Matching, where
any edge (u, u′) ∈ EQ must be matched by at most 1 edge (v, v′) ∈ EG and must occur
within the entity’s own subgraph. When k = 2 we are limiting the matches that result from
dyadic relationships (i.e., an edge in the query graph can only be fulfilled by connections
involving at most 2 QF nodes). When k = 3, we are limiting the matches that result from
triadic relationships (i.e., an edge in the query graph can only be fulfilled by connections
involving at most 3 QF nodes).
The algorithm for (l, k) Neighbor Matching is shown in Algorithm 6, which is executed
for each timestep in the window of analysis (line 1). We first construct filtered adjacency
matrices W′1(t)G by removing the QF-QF edges which only connect nodes of type QF (line 2).
We also construct W′′1(t)G by removing the edges QF
(2)-QF(2) (which connect QF forum nodes
with each other) as well as edges QF(2)-QF (which connect QF forum nodes back to the QF
node originator, as a representation for the receipt of influence for others’ messages/content
which is communicated online) (line 3).
We then construct modified h-hop adjacency matrices Ũh(t)
(k)
G for the specified parameter
k, the maximum number of QF nodes that can be involved in the fulfillment of an edge in
EQ. For each hop h up to l · hmax, each modified h-hop adjacency matrix is a result of the
product of the original 1-hop adjacency matrix and/or one or more of the filtered adjacency
matrices, depending upon the k (line 4-5). We allow up l ·hmax hops because each edge in EQ
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Algorithm 6: (l, k) Neighbor Matching algorithm
Input: W1(t)G (1-hop Adjacency Matrices of a graph for a given t), hmax (the
desired number of hops), l (maximum path length allowed in GS to fulfill an
edge in EQ), k (maximum number of QF nodes that can be involved in a
fulfilment of an edge EQ), AG (class membership matrix of G), Φh(t) (binary
matrix of φ indicator variables, MG,Q (sparse node class match matrix
between query graph Q and data graph G), Ch(t)Q (child h-hop class
adjacency matrices for all time tstart ≤ t ≤ tend for query graph Q)
Output: Ĉh(t)
(l,k)




(l,k) (parent-to-child class similarity score matrices
between G and Q for (l, k) Neighbor Matching), where t : tstart ≤ t ≤ tend
and h : 1 ≤ h ≤ hmax
1 foreach t = tstart to tend do
2 Construct W′1(t)G by removing all QF-QF edges in W1(t)G
3 Construct W′′1(t)G by removing all QF
(2)-QF(2) and QF(2)-QF edges in W1(t)G
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9 foreach h = 1 to hmax do
10 Ĉh(t)
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can be fulfilled by paths of up to length l (line 4). For instance, if k = 1, then only the filtered
adjacency matrix W′1(t)G is used to obtain the h-hop adjacency matrices. However, if k = 2
and h = 3, the algorithm calls for multiplying the original 1-hop adjacency matrix W1(t)G
first with the filtered adjacency matrix W′1(t)G and then second with W
′′
1(t)G. This allows
the QF-QF edges and (weighted) neighboring attributions due to QF(2)-QF(2) and QF(2)-QF
to be used once in determining the reachability from each node. We then convert these h-hop
adjacency matrices into binary matrices, remove any possibility of self-loops, and make each
203
successive h-hop matrix reflects only new connections (and not previous ones) (line 6). Just
as in Algorithm 2 in [144], we can obtain the class adjacency matrices from the product
of the h-hop adjacency matrices with the class membership matrix (line 7). As in 9, we also
account for stand-alone ‘IIRA’ indicators, reoccurring indicators, and indicator recency with
the transformation in line 8.
Next for each hop h up to hmax, we construct the modified class adjacency matrices
Ĉh(t)
(l,k)
G for (l, k) neighbor matching by combining class adjacency matrices for specific
hops (lines 9-10). For example, for (2-2)-neighbor matching (where l = k = 2), line 10 first




G to account for any matches
of an edge in EQ that is up to h = 1 hop away (but can be fulfilled by up to 2 hop lengths
in G). Then for h = 2 hop matches, line 10 sums together the second, third, and fourth
hops of the class adjacency matrices. This is because we are matching for indicators which
occurred over two edges in EQ and thus is allowed to be fulfilled by up to 4 hop lengths in
G. Within each h aggregation and for each summed entry Ĉi(t)
(k)
G we utilize the min{·, 1}
function to ensure that only new indicators are counted.




each node in G with the class-matching node in Q, we follow the same procedure in [144]
using Algorithm 3 (lines 11-12). Note that in neighbor matching we no longer consider
child-to-parent relationships. These score matrices are of size n×m for each h and t; each row




i· , where each row i is the vector of weighted class adjacency values
which match the class adjacency values in row j of the query graph Q’s class adjacency
matrix.
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It is important to note that our (l, k)-Neighbor Matching procedure is not combinatorial.
Specifically, it does not seek to find all groups of QF nodes of size 2, 3, 4,... and select among
the greatest resulting scored results. Rather, our procedure captures all resulting QF-based
conforming subgraphs which involve up to k = 2, 3, 4, ... other QF nodes for each edge in
EQ. In the simplest sense, our procedure highlights to the analyst all those who would fulfill
many, if not all, of the violent radicalization indicators when considering associates’ activities.
A combinatorial strategy would significantly increase the computational complexity of the
search and it is not altogether clear that such results would be more helpful to an analyst.
7.3. Match Goodness Function
Now given the ability to obtain conforming matches by using up to l hops to fulfill
each edge ∈ EQ, it becomes important to measure the goodness of the matches, as well as
incorporate the allowances for the reoccurrence or time-decay of occurrence of indicators. In
Definition 16 we provide a such a measure.




i· is the 1×m row vector for node
i ∈ VG of weighted class adjacency values which match the class adjacency values in row
j of the query graph Q’s class adjacency matrix for each hop h and timestep t. If i ∈ VG
and j ∈ VQ are of the same class (i.e. L(i) = L(j) where L(·) is the labeling function), we
know that their class adjacency vectors should have entries in the same positions over time.
Since our data model for our connected query pattern graph assumes that a particular class
of node occurs once in the query pattern (|VQ| = number of classes m) and that only the
non-QF nodes are connected to with only one edge (|EQ| = m − 1), we can also aggregate
across the query graph depth (hops hmax) of the node-class adjacency scores for a given
allowable neighbor match path length l and timestep t. Each row vector of size 1×m could
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have at most |EQ| = m − 1 nonzero entries, and the column for the QF class is always 0.
Thus for node i, we denote the multi-hop aggregate class match score vector with γ(t)
(l,k)
i· ,

























For neighbor match path length l = 1, this aggregation is simply the sum across hops (15,
top). For neighbor match path lengths l > 1, we avoid double counting the match scores










match path length of l > 1) (15, bottom).
Since the summations are from 1 to hmax each time, the first subtracted sum removes
from consideration those weighted class adjacency scores that were achieved from the shorter
match path lengths. The second subtracted sum leaves only the class adjacency remnant
scores which exceed the match scores from the shorter path lengths. In effect, for 2-2 neighbor
matching, we use 15 and l = 1 to get the class adjacency match scores which result from
direct connections and 15 and l = 2 to get the marginal class adjacency match score increases
from neighboring connections. With this in place, we can now define the match goodness
measure.
Definition 10. Match goodness
Consider a query graph Q and a resulting conforming data subgraph GSi determined through
(l, k)-neighbor matching based on QF node i. |EQ| is the number of edges in Q, α is a decay
parameter between (0, 1], and γ(t)
(l,k)
iz for node-class pair (i, z) is the multi-hop class match
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score defined in 15. Then the measure of match goodness of conforming data subgraph GSi
to query graph Q at time t is defined by 16.








This function obtains a match goodness score for the conforming subgraph for node i ∈ VG
by utilizing an exponential weighting of a match score over the path lengths l that facilitated
the match and normalizes by |EQ|. The numerator in 16 for a particular l multiplies each
class match score for node i with a decay factor and sums up the |EQ| entries. If l = 1, then
each class match score in γ(t)
(l,k)
iz contributes a value of α
0 = 1 to the numerator. However,
if l = 2, then the contribution is α times the class match score. The outer summation in
the numerator then sums up the (weighted) match scores achieved at each allowable path
length l. Given our construction of γ as defined in 15, the contributions from l = 2 are only
those which exceed that which was achieved at l = 1.
We note that the value of a multi-hop connection between nodes depends only on the
path length between them. For now, we make no distinction of the type or class of any
intermediary nodes along the path. However, it follows that one could also designate different
α decay parameters for each (QF,QF) pair to model the varying strength of ties between
individuals. We intend to investigate the effect of various decay parameters for various pairs
of QF nodes in future work.
Our match goodness definition also allows a QF node to achieve indicator matches
through k · |EQ| number of neighbors because there are at most a total of k QF nodes
involved in the fulfillment of each edge in EQ. However, we anticipate that a future im-
provement to the match goodness function that obtains a score for the κ most impactful
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neighbors would better quantify whether a QF node is a high-scoring match due to its con-
nection with a few neighbors, or to a larger number of neighbors who would each contribute
a few indicators.
7.4. Experiments
In this section, we detail the experiments we conducted on three datasets to demonstrate
the utility of INSiGHT on the detection of radicalization trajectories. First, we continue to
utilize the small, synthetic radicalization toy graph we introduced in Fig. 5.1 to specifically
test the INSiGHT enhancements. Next, we use an expanded and extended time version of
the first dataset, now consisting of 61 nodes and 59 edges, to detect the match trajectories of
individuals towards a hypothesized pattern of violent extremism. Lastly, we tested INSiGHT
on a large, real world BlogCatalog dataset of over 470K nodes and 4 million edges, which
serves as our proxy because it contains structural and behavioral parallels to intelligence
networks which could be utilized to investigate radicalization.
7.4.1. Small, Synthetic Radicalization Toy Graph. We return to the motivating
problem in Fig. 5.1 and note that the match goodness function now corrects a shortcoming
of the earlier class similarity score: scores did not vary linearly with the number of total
indicators. The previously presented class similarity score times series plot (from Fig. 5.9)
is shown next to the match goodness time series plot in Fig. 7.1 a and b, respectively. Class
similarity scoring is the sum of the fraction of node matches at each hop-level from a node.
Thus its maximum value is the number of hop-levels in the query Q (which is 2 in this case),
and each node match is equally weighted from among all the other nodes at its hop-level (all
4 of the 1-hop nodes are all weighted 0.25, and both of the 2-hop nodes weighted 0.50 in class
similarity). The match goodness function, on the other hand, equally weighs all matching
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edges in the conforming subgraph (which in this case is 1/6 = 0.167 for each of the 6 edges in
EQ) and has a maximum value of 1. In Fig. 5.9b, Person 3’s straight match goodness score
line indicates that this new scoring function gives equal weight to all indicators whether they
occur at either the first or second hop.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.1. Multi-hop class similarity (a) and match goodness (b) scores for
radicalization example, with investigative indicator type filtering.
7.4.2. Small, Synthetic Radicalization Toy Graph with Additional Person
Links. To initially validate neighbor matching, we continue to utilize the small, synthetic
radicalization toy graph but now add 3 edges symbolic of person-to-person links shown in
Fig. 7.2a. We added a bi-directional edge between Node 1 and Node 6 (representing a
close familial relationship, for example), a bi-directional edge between Node 1 and Node 17
(representing a direct phone contact, for example), and a bi-directional edge between Node
18 and Node 10 (representing friendship linkage between social media accounts). As in the
motivating example problem, we utilize the same query graph Q shown in 5.1a.
7.4.2.1. Neighborhood Matching Only, No Effect of Reoccurrence or Time Decay. We
observe that Fig. 7.2b-g show the match goodness score time series for each of the people in
the graph for varying α parameters. To confirm the validity of neighbor matching (without







Figure 7.2. Expanded motivating example for detecting trajectories of home-
grown violent extremists with additional person-to-person links. Beyond the
base example from Fig.5.1a, the new data graph Fig. 7.2a above now has
additional person-to-person links (in yellow). Fig. 7.2b-g depicts the match
goodness scores over time for α = {0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 1.00}, respec-
tively.
results show in Fig.7.2g when α = 1.00. Recall that at this α, each indicator match at all
path lengths l is given the same weight.
Person 1 at timestep 1 has 2 personal indicators (Social Media Account and Extremist
n-gram). Note also that at this timestep Person 1 is also connected through person-to-person
links to Persons 2 and 4, each of whom also established Social Media Accounts. Because
those duplicate social media account matches are reachable at path length l = 2 for the
‘Person-to-Social Media Account’ edge ∈ EQ, they do not provide a marginal contribution
above the edge match for a Social Media Account at l = 1. Therefore, Person 1’s match
goodness score at timestep 1 is simply 2/6 = 0.33. At timestep 2, Person 1’s score increases
by 1/6 due to its neighbor connection to Person 2 who purchased a gun. This connection
occurred at l = 2 but fully counts because Person 1 did not have a similar indicator on its
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own. At timestep 3, Person 1’s score increases again by another 1/6 due to its neighbor
connection to Person 3 who posted a radical n-gram. Again, because that indicator at l = 2
was unique to Person 1, the full score is added. Given inactivity at timestep 4, Person 1’s
final match goodness score is 4/6 = 0.66.
We now explain the final match goodness scores for the others. Person 2 has a final
match goodness score of 3/6 = 0.50 because it has 2 personally suspicious indicators (Social
Media Account and Purchase Firearm, which are no longer considered ‘IIRA’ for α > 0) and
1 new indicator from associates (Extremist n-gram from Person 1). Person 1’s Social Media
Account node is not counted because one is already matched at l = 1. Also, because we do
not yet have scoring for reoccurrence in effect, one of the repeated Extremist n-gram nodes
from Person 1 occurring at the same reachability when l = 2 is not counted.
Person 3 has a final match goodness score of 6/6 = 1.00 because it has all 6 personally
suspicious indicators. The 2 indicators from other associates (Social Media Account and
Radical n-gram both from Person 4) do not provide a marginal contribution above those
achieved at l = 1.
Finally, Person 4’s final match goodness score is 3/6 = 0.50 because Person 4 has 2 per-
sonally suspicious indicators (Social Media Account and Radical n-gram), plus 1 others from
associates (Extremist n-gram from both Person 1 and 3). The Radical n-gram from Person
3 and Social Media Accounts from Person 1 and 3 do not provide a marginal contribution
above the same matches already achieved at l = 1.
Now we discuss the effect of α on the ability of our neighbor matching technique for
identifying potentially suspicious conspiracies. While it may not be advisable for analysts to
utilize α = 1.00 where all neighbors’ suspicious behaviors are equally weighted to those that
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one personally performed, there may be acceptable parameter values that empower analysts
to maintain awareness of one’s increasingly suspicious neighbor activities and tempered by
law enforcement resource constraints to investigate further. For example, if the connection
between Person 1 and Person 2 is strong, it is possible for Person 1 to use Person 2’s firearm
in some attack (as in the case of San Bernardino). For any level of α > 0 and t ≥ 2,
we observe Person 1’s match goodness score for a hypothetical violent extremism query
pattern is greater than had we not taken neighbors into account. Overall, it is clear that our
neighbor matching technique credits activities which occur at varying distances from person
nodes and and gives analysts a better sense for how embedded or entrenched a suspect may
be among like-minded individuals doing similar or complementary activities on the path
towards radicalization. In future work, we intend to explore designating different α decay
parameters for each (QF,QF) pair to model the varying strength of ties between individuals.
7.4.2.2. Effect of Reoccurence and Time Decay. We now examine changes in the match
goodness scores when we consider the effect of both the reoccurrence and time decay of indi-
cators. Based upon the nature of the indicators, we chose the parameters for the time-decay
and re-occurrence modules as shown in Parameter Set 1 in Table 5.5. A λ of 10.0 signifies
that just one occurrence of that indicator class is necessary to achieve a near maximum score
contribution. The classes ‘Person’ and ‘Social Media Account’ are basic nodes which need
to occur once, while ‘Received Training’ and ‘Purchase Firearm’ may be more threatening
indicators whose singular occurrence become important. We chose λ = 4.6 for both the
Radical and Extremist n-gram indicators, which equates to 2 or more occurrences of each




Figure 7.3. Multi-hop match goodness scores for radicalization example,
without (a) and with (b) the effect of indicator reoccurence and time decay.
Using Parameter Set 1 in 5.5, we artificially established the need for more than
2 occurrences each the Radical and Extremist n-gram indicators to achieve an
effectively full score for that indicator. We also chose to examine the effect of
decaying score contribution of the the Purchase Firearm indicator to half after
2 time steps.
In order to designate the time-decay parameter β, we notionally decided to equate a
timestep in our synthetic dataset to represent 3 months (thus the 4 timesteps in the stylized
dataset account for indicators which occurred over 1 year). A β of 1000.0 nearly eliminates
the decay for the value of an indicator class. We chose this for the ‘Person’ and ‘SM Account’
basic classes, but also for the node classes ‘Promote Concert’ and ‘Soccer Club’ which are
not indicators in the query pattern. We chose β = 2.0 for the Purchase Firearm indicator,
which effectively decays the score contribution from that activity to a half after 2 time steps










Figure 7.4. Expanded motivating example for detecting trajectories of home-
grown violent extremists over an extended time. Beyond the base example
from Fig.5.1a, the new data graph Fig. 7.4a now has one more individual
and depicts additional reoccurring indicators of the on-line behaviors of some
homegrown violent extremists. Fig. 7.4b is the match goodness score time
series for 1-1 neighbor matching and shows the effect on scores due to the
reoccurring indicators and time decay from inactivity. Fig. 7.4c and Fig.
7.4d are the match goodness score times series for 2-2 neighbor matching at
α = 1.00 and α = 0.50, respectively.
in reality, we observe that firearms can be purchased much earlier or shortly before a violent
extremist attack.
The time-decay parameter ξ allows the analyst to select the time duration of the decay.
In this parameter set, we utilized ξ = 1.0 for all node classes, which implies a time duration
of approximately 3ξ time units to decay the indicator significance to reach 1
2
.
Fig. 7.3 a and b, we show the match goodness score time series for α = 1.00 without
and with the reoccurrence and time decay effect, respectively. When comparing the results
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to Fig. 7.3a, Person 1 in Fig. 7.3b has diminished scores at both timestep 3 and 4 because
the contribution of Person 2’s Purchase Firearm indicator decreased as expected with time
decay. Also, because it now takes more than 2 occurrences to achieve a full score for an
Extremist n-gram, Person 1’s score is further slightly diminished at timestep 1 (where the
first Extremist n-gram received a value of 0.9899 · 1
6
)and increased slightly at timestep 3 due
to its repeated Extremist n-gram (which collectively now have a value of 0.9999 · 1
6
).
Like Person 1, Person 2 also has diminished match goodness scores at both timestep
3 and 4 because of the time decay of its Purchase Firearm activity. Person 3 has slightly
diminished scores because both its own Radical n-gram and Person 4’s Radical n-gram from
which it receives a connection score is lower for the first occurrence at a given path length
l of reachability. Also, Person 4’s Purchase Firearm activity (which occurred at timestep
4) has only decayed slightly. Finally, Person 4’s score was diminished at timestep 1 due
to the single occurrence of Person 1’s Extremist n-gram and timestep 3 due to the single
occurrence of its own Radical n-gram. However, both Person 1’s repeated Extremist n-gram
at timestep 3 and Person 3’s new Extremist n-gram at timestep 4 give Person 4 a very small
score increase due to reoccurrence.
We conclude that the results from this sample test show that the improvements to IN-
SiGHT perform as intended.
7.4.3. Small, Extended Time Synthetic Radicalization Dataset. The new
data graph depicted in Fig. 7.4a is an expansion of the one shown in Fig. 5.1b and now
has one more individual and depicts additional reoccurring indicators indicative of online
behavior of some homegrown violent extremists.
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As we developed this stylized, synthetic dataset, we first sought to have each of the 5
individuals fit some profile (without yet considering the Person-to-Person edges in yellow).
Person 1 (Node 1) is an extremist with smaller number of social media posts, but later
indicators of suspicious travel and firearm purchase. Person 2 (Node 6) is a non-extremist
who purchased 2 firearms. Person 3 (Node 9) is an extremist with large number of posts
and other indicators early-to-mid in timeline. Person 4 (Node 17) is a former extremist who
made a small number of radical posts early in timeline. Finally, Person 5 (Node 43) is an
extremist with large number of radical posts throughout, but only extremist posts late in
the timeline.
As in the motivating example problem, we utilize the same query graph Q shown in 5.1a.
This time, we utilized Parameter Set 2 in 5.5. We designated both Extremist n-gram and
Suspicious Travel to have a λ of 4.6, which equates to 2 or more occurrences of an indicator
to achieve a near maximum score contribution. We also designated Radical n-gram to have a
λ of 2.3, which equates to 5 or more occurrences of an indicator to achieve a near maximum
score contribution.
For the time-decay parameter β, we again notionally equated a timestep in our synthetic
dataset to represent 3 months (thus the 20 timesteps in the dataset account for indicators
which occurred over 5 years). We designated Radical n-gram to have a β of 6, which results
in the decay to half of the maximum score contribution of an indicator class after 18 months
(= 6 · 3 months). The indicators with β parameters 8, 12, and 16 obviously signify that
knowledge of its occurrences remains important for longer periods of time. To effectively
mask any decay effect for the Person and Social Media Account classes, we set β = 1000.0.
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Lastly, in this parameter set, we selected ξ = 3 for all node classes in which time decay was
in effect.
Utilizing the improvements to INSiGHT, we produce the match goodness score time
series plots in Fig. 7.4b-d for each of the persons of interest in the data graph to quantify
the behavioral similarities to a violent extremist profile. We first discuss the results of 1-1
neighbor matching shown in Fig. 7.4b. It is clear that Person 3 has the highest initial
gradient towards radicalization, and maintains his score with more instances of indicators
over time. However, the trajectories of the other individuals are also worth noting. Person
1 has a relatively high similarity score throughout due to radical and extremists postings,
but also has visible spikes when he goes on suspicious travel (timestep 13) and purchases a
firearm (timestep 19). Person 5 also clearly has a sustained spike in his score later in the time
frame due to the posting of radical and extremists and the purchase of a firearm (timestep
19). The decay of Person 4’s earlier radical statements is evident with the shape of its match
goodness score curve. Lastly, Person 2 has a match goodness score of 0 throughout the entire
time frame of analysis because its activities were limited to the IIRA node-category.
Next, we now consider the Person-to-Person edges shown in yellow in Fig. 7.4a and
examine the match goodness score time series for 2-2 neighbor matching. The 3 additional
edges are between 1) Person 1 and Person 6 at t = 5, 2) Person 6 and Person 43 at t = 8,
and 3) Person 9 and Person 17 at t = 15. Just as in the earlier small radicalization toy
graph, these edges are intended to represent evidence for direct contact and/or established
relationship ties between each pair of individuals.
Fig. 7.4c shows the times series plot of match goodness scores or neighbor matching when
α = 1.0, meaning that neighboring activities are given equal weight as those performed by the
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individual itself. As previously mentioned, this is likely not the desirable level for an analyst,
but we start here because it better illustrates what match changes result from considering
neighbor activities.
We make the following observations related to each individual as a result of the visibility
obtained from neighbor matching:
• Person 1 now has a significant increase in score at t = 5 due to its Person-to-Person
connection with Person 2, who had previously purchased a gun. That activity is
now counted among the rest of the activities of Person 1. We observe that the
score increases again at t = 13 (suspicious travel), but not at t = 19 despite its
firearm purchase. This is because while the attribution of the Purchase Firearm
node changes Person 1, the score contribution of this indicator at α = 1.00 transfers
in its entirety from match scores at l = 2 to l = 1.
• Person 2, who had personally only done IIRA activities and had a score of 0 through-
out the window of analysis, now at t = 5 has a high score due to its connection with
Person 1. Note that while Person 2 connects to another extremist Person 5 at t = 8,
Person 2’s score does not increase because all of the indicators at that path length
were already matched by Person 1.
• Person 3, who had maintained the highest radicalization scores over time at 1-1
neighbor matching, continue to exhibit the same scores at 2-2 neighbor matching
and is not marginally affected by its only neighbor Person 4.
• Person 4 was a ’former’ extremist but becomes very suspicious again at t = 15 when
it connects with Person 3. All of Person 3’s suspicious activities are attributed to
Person 4 initially without the effect of time-decay that has been afforded Person 4.
218
The treatment of time decayed indicators at the point of a neighbor connection is a
subject to different modeling strategies. For now, new indicators acquired through
QF-QF connections have their time of last occurrence τ reset, but in future work
we intend to investigate the possibility of adopting the existing τ from the QF node
in which the indicator occurred.
• Person 5 now has a relative increase in score at t = 8 due to its connection with
Person 2, who had purchased a gun earlier. Note that Person 4 had personally
not purchased a firearm until t = 19, but its connection to Person 2 makes it
more suspicious and at a higher potential threat. The neighbor match time series
captures this. As in 1-1 neighbor matching, Person 5 had a significant increase in
match goodness score at t = 15 due to the initiation of more Extremist n-grams (as
opposed to the Radical n-grams it had previously only made).
Lastly, we show the times series plot of match goodness scores for this dataset when
α = 0.50 in Fig. 7.4d to illustrate what a different, more realistic parameter would pro-
vide. Namely, at this setting, neighbor activities are given some (albeit not full) weight
to the individual so that analysts can still keep track of collective threats without making
individuals more overly suspicious than they likely are. The plots still show the increases
mentioned above as relatively smaller increases, and still differentiates in rank order those
who are suspicious as a result of more personal actions rather than the actions of neighbors.
This experiment demonstrated that with a small example, we can indeed detect those
who may individually be on a radicalization trajectory towards violent extremism based
upon a simplistic query pattern. This may lead to possibilities of testing INSiGHT on real
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data, that contains time-based, labeled indicators of bona fide cases of radicalization that
both did and did not ultimately lead to violent activity.
Table 7.1. BlogCatalog full and subgraph characteristics
Characteristics Gfull Gsubgraph
Total Nodes 382,482 2,387
Number of userids 80,949 1,138
Number of weblogs 127,227 1,245
Number of unique tags 174,306 5
Total Edges 4,009,467 4,918
Number of userid-userid links 3,223,634 2,329
Number of userid-weblog links 127,226 1,245
Number of weblog-tag links 658,607 1,344
(a) (b)
Figure 7.5. Log-Log Plot of the In- (a) and Out- (b) degree distributions
of the BlogCatalog directed graph. X is the random variable for the degree
distribution. The dotted lines in each plot show the theoretical power law for
α = 2.27 and x ≥ 251, and α = 2.42 and x ≥ 373, respectively.
7.4.4. Large Real Data Set. Finally, we test our approach on the BlogCatalog
dataset,40 a large, real corpus of user activities and the social network in between them
[320]. We are using this as a proxy for the type of intelligence or law enforcement data
networks that could be used to track the radicalization of violent extremists. This dataset
was first described and utilized in our earlier work [144], but we summarize it here for our
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Figure 7.6. The schema and partial datagraph of the BlogCatalog graph and
the query graph Q. Fig. 7.6a depicts the node types and connections present
in the network, while Fig. 7.6b is a partial graph that is illustrative of the























Figure 7.7. INSiGHT results on the BlogCatalog dataset. The match good-
ness time series plots for all nodes in Gsubgraph for 1-1 neighbor matching (a)
and 2-2 neighbor matching at α = 0.50 (b) and α = 1.00 (c). The correspond-
ing histograms of the final match goodness scores (at t = 10) are shown in
Fig. 7.7 d-f. The number above each bar is the quantity of nodes with that
respective match goodness score.
The BlogCatalog dataset is a scrape taken in July 2009 of a social media site that allows
users to register and promote their own blogs, as well as connect with other bloggers. The
network schema shown in Fig. 7.6a depicts the node types and connections present in the
network, and Fig. 7.6b is an illustrative example of a portion of the data graph. The original




x 1 u720 1.0000 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 2 u51596 1.0000 windows computer vista windows 7 xp 5
x 3 u25445 1.0000 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 4 u73676 1.0000 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 5 u76962 1.0000 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 6 u19892 1.0000 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 7 u7033 1.0000 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 8 u17014 1.0000 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 9 u10938 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 10 u65530 0.8333 computer vista windows 7 xp 4
x 11 u11097 0.8333 windows vista xp computer 4
x 12 u14849 0.8333 windows vista windows 7 computer 4
x 13 u9659 0.8333 windows vista xp computer 4
x 14 u58109 0.8333 windows vista xp computer 4
x 15 u25736 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 16 u41741 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 17 u5398 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 18 u30406 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 19 u44654 0.8333 windows computer vista windows 7 4
x 20 u44719 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 21 u62456 0.8333 windows computer vista windows 7 4
x 22 u13252 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 23 u5815 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 24 u3534 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 25 u32162 0.8333 windows 7 computer windows vista 4
x 26 u13911 0.8333 computer windows windows 7 xp 4
x 27 u19624 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 28 u78860 0.8333 windows 7 computer windows vista 4
x 29 u65625 0.8333 windows computer vista windows 7 4
x 30 u14265 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 31 u48129 0.8333 windows computer vista xp 4
x 32 u73317 0.8333 computer vista windows 7 xp 4
x 33 u39033 0.8333 computer windows vista windows 7 4
Matching indicators (2-2 neighbor matching) with α=1.00# UserID Score
x 1 u65530 0.8333 computer vista windows 7 xp 4
x 2 u11097 0.7500 windows vista xp computer 4
x 3 u14849 0.7500 windows vista windows 7 computer 4
x 4 u9659 0.7500 windows vista xp computer 4
x 5 u25736 0.7500 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 6 u58109 0.7500 windows vista xp computer 4
x 7 u12361 0.6666 computer windows vista 3
x 8 u4779 0.6666 computer windows vista 3
x 9 u8454 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
x 10 u9574 0.6666 windows windows 7 xp 3
x 11 u76768 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
x 12 u27611 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
x 13 u15307 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
x 14 u30982 0.6666 computer vista xp 3
x 15 u48573 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
x 16 u2198 0.6666 windows windows 7 vista 3
x 17 u18213 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
x 18 u10938 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 19 u41741 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 4
x 20 u720 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 21 u51596 0.6666 windows computer vista windows 7 xp 5
x 22 u25445 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 23 u73676 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 24 u76962 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 25 u19892 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 26 u7033 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
x 27 u17014 0.6666 computer windows vista windows 7 xp 5
Matching indicators (2-2 neighbor matching) with α=0.50# UserID Score
1 u65530 0.8333 computer vista windows 7 xp 4
2 u12361 0.6666 computer windows vista 3
3 u4779 0.6666 computer windows vista 3
4 u8454 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
5 u11097 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
6 u14849 0.6666 windows vista windows 7 3
7 u9659 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
8 u9574 0.6666 windows vista windows 7 3
9 u25736 0.6666 computer windows vista 3
10 u76768 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
11 u27611 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
12 u15307 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
13 u30982 0.6666 computer vista xp 3
14 u58109 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
15 u48573 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
16 u2198 0.6666 windows vista windows 7 3
17 u18213 0.6666 windows vista xp 3
Matching indicators (1-1 neighbor matching)
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7.8. Top scoring UserIDs in BlogCatalog Experiment. Fig. 7.8a
depicts the top 17 scoring UserIDs in 1-1 Neighbor Matching. Fig. 7.8b
depicts the top 27 scoring UserIDs in 2-2 Neighbor Matching at α = 0.50. Fig.
7.8c depicts the top 33 scoring UserIDs in 2-2 Neighbor Matching at α = 1.00.
The grey colored indicators denote those matches which were tags established
by the corresponding User ID, while those not shaded denote tags that were
established by the User ID’s immediate neighbors. The ‘windows 7’ red flag
indicators are highlighted in red.
distributions in this directed social network follow the power law of a scale free network,
where power α for the in- and out-degree distributions are estimated to be 2.27 and 2.42,
respectively (see Fig. 7.5). To simplify the dataset first presented in [142], we retained only
one person identifier (‘User ID’) for each individual and ignored the ‘ID’ node class.
In keeping with both the consistency and minimization principles established in surveil-
lance ethics research (see Marx in [195]), we developed a preprocessing screening procedure
to filter out nodes and edges which have no connection to the indicators in our query41.
Specifically, we employed a routine that produced a subgraph that included only user IDs
which had tags that consisted of the 5 words in the query, any interconnections between the
user IDs, as well as their respective weblog IDs. The resulting graph has only 2,387 nodes
41Consistency refers to whether individuals have an equal chance of being subjected to a query. Mini-
mization is the principle to “minimize the invasiveness” and “extent of personal and personably identifiable
information collected” [195]. While Marx cites numerous other important considerations in the justification
and implementation of any proposed surveillance-based approach, those considerations are beyond the scope
of this work.
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and 4,918 edges (0.624% of original nodes and 0.123% original edges) and is further detailed
in Table 7.1.
It is important to mention that we modeled each tag as its own node, regardless of how
many blogs utilized it. In Algorithm 6, every subsequent hop’s adjacency matrix contained
only new connections. Any nodes that were connected to previously were not included for
that particular hop. So, in this modeling setting, 2-2 neighbor matching does not score for
both what the individual and neighbors did, but only credits neighbor activities beyond what
the individual did itself.
7.4.4.1. Query Description. We utilize the same query pattern developed in [144], which
was a proxy query on a benign subject matter with structural parallels to an investigation
for a latent behavior (Fig. 7.6c). The query’s focus is for user IDs who had been writing
blogs related to Microsoft Windows operating systems (XP and/or Vista) and subsequently
also began to write about Windows 7 when it was released in July 2009 (which is the month
in which the data was collected). Node class A is the query focus user ID, and node class
B is the weblog with certain tags. All C class nodes are self-identified tags of the blog,
which were meant to be analogous to the behavioral indicators or n-gram topics determined
through machine-classification and semantic text analysis in a radicalization application.
The labels ‘computer’ (C535) and ‘windows’ (C2033) are relatively frequent labels which
help provide context or additional clarity on the true topic set, and labels ‘xp’ (C23136) and
‘vista’ (C20693) are indicators that the blog is about Windows operating systems. These
latter nodes are necessary but not sufficient for the latent behavior of interest. Finally, label
‘windows 7’ (C20684) is considered a latest-occurring red flag indicator.
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As in [144] we are trying to detect individuals who undertake this ‘latent behavior.’
However, in this work, we also desire to use the INSiGHT’s advancements, particularly
neighbor matching, to gain visibility on each neighbors’ tags and identify any full or partial
complement matches. This test on a benign application helps confirm that our approach
can work on radicalization-specific data where the detection of conspiratorial clusters is
important.
7.4.4.2. Adding Edge Timestamps. The BlogCatalog dataset did not contain the times-
tamps when each of the links occurred, information that is critical to detecting latent be-
havior trajectories. As detailed in [144], we developed a procedure to generate artificial
timesteps over a short time window of analysis (10 timesteps) as a proof of principle.
7.4.4.3. Analysis of BlogCatalog Results. INSiGHT successfully identified all the Blog-
Catalog accounts that match the query in full or in part, as well as produced the match
trajectory for each account. In Fig. 7.7 we provide the match goodness time series plots for
all nodes in Gsubgraph for 1-1 neighbor matching (a) and 2-2 neighbor matching at α = 0.50
(b) and α = 1.00 (c) over the 10 timesteps. The corresponding histograms of the final match
goodness scores (at t = 10) are shown in Fig. 7.7 b-d. The number above each bar is the
quantity of nodes with that respective match goodness score. Note that in each histogram,
there are 1250 nodes (all nodes which are not User IDs) which have a match goodness score
of 0. In Fig. 7.8 we also provide the User Ids, match goodness scores, and matching in-
dicators for the top 17 accounts due to 1-1 neighbor matching (a), top 27 accounts due to
2-2 neighbor matching with α = 0.50 (b), and the top 33 accounts due to 2-2 neighbor
matching with α = 1.00 (c). The grey colored indicators denote those matches which were
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tags established by the corresponding User ID, while those not shaded denote tags that were
established by the User ID’s immediate neighbors.
We see the merits of our approach in investigative graph search by segmenting out only
a fraction of the entities who are on pathways of partially or completely matching a query
pattern. As the histograms show, it is possible to focus investigative efforts on the top-k or
top bins of accounts with the highest match goodness scores.
For 1-1 neighbor matching, the top scoring account was User Id ‘u65530’ who utilized
the 4 of the 5 indicator tags (‘computer,’ ‘vista,’ ‘xp,’ and ‘windows 7’) over the course of
time. After this match, there were 16 others identified in Fig. 7.8a that utilized 3 of the 5
indicator tags. These 1-1 neighbor match results are exactly those found based on our early
development of INSiGHT in [144].
For 2-2 neighbor matching, we utilized two parameter settings for α to examine the
resulting differences in match results. At α = 0.50, neighbors’ tags are being considered
at half weight for each User ID. Accordingly, the match goodness score trajectory in Fig.
7.7b shows more various scores throughout the window of analysis, and Fig. 7.7e shows that
the distribution of final match goodness scores is more positively skewed due to User IDs
receiving marginal score increases due to neighbors’ tags. For instance, although the top
scoring match in this setting was still User ID ‘u65530,’ the next 5 other high scorers were
those who personally selected 3 of the 5 indicator tags and had at least one neighbor who
made one additional tag.
At α = 1.00, neighbors’ tags are being considered at the full weight for each User ID.
The match goodness score trajectory in Fig. 7.7c shows that accounts are achieving higher
scores earlier due to connections with neighboring indicators. While the ranking of neighbor
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matches seems to make sense for α = 0.50, we observe that the results for α = 1.00 puts too
much allowance on neighbors’ matches and the resulting rankings less sensible. Specifically,
Fig. 7.8f shows that the top 9 scorers in this setting are those User IDs who personally
exhibited only one indicator, but relied on one or more neighbors for their indicators to
make up a partial complement to the set. Recalling the fact that the dual goal of this
problem was to detect both individuals and groups performing this latent behavior, the use
of the parameter α = 0.50 is more sensible because it first brings forth to analysts those
accounts which directly perform a preponderance of the indicators and shows the possibility
of neighbors completing the query pattern. Overall, these results demonstrate the importance
of α in controlling the visibility and impact on match scores for neighbor activities.
7.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we extended INSiGHT to find full or partial matches against a radical-
ization query pattern from a single node to a node cluster, while still quantifying the pace of
the appearance of the indicators or neighbors’ indicators. Its performance was demonstrated
on small synthetic radicalization data sets as well as a real data graph of 470K nodes and
4 million edges. It holds promise for assisting law enforcement and intelligence agencies in
the radicalization detection problem especially in the presence of linked co-conspirators who
are on the trajectory towards violent extremism. In future work, we intend to investigate
the effectiveness of varying the α exponential weighting parameter for various pairs of QF
nodes in order to model any strong or weak ties between neighbors. Also, we intend to con-
duct additional experiments on other real-world datasets and are presently seeking real data
that contain time-based, labeled indicators of bona fide cases of radicalization that both did
and did not ultimately lead to violent activity. Lastly, we intend to devise an incremental
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graph pattern matching approach like those found in [49, 101] in order to dynamically and
efficiently update the match scores in the presence of new data points.
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CHAPTER 8
Analyses of Dynamic Radicalization Indicators
8.1. Introduction
In the field of dynamic risk/threat assessment of violent extremists, much of the extant
literature provides itemized behaviors (in checklist-type lists) gathered from empirical evi-
dence and case studies. There is growing recognition that such lists are inadequate for law
enforcement personnel and tend to make many more people seem suspicious beyond the
relatively small number of those who would commit terrorist acts [67]. In this chapter, we
contribute to the body of research on radicalization pathways in the modeling radicalization
as a discrete dynamical process and the use of state transition analysis. Our objective here to
find more discerning patterns among the behavioral indicators of radicalization of violent ex-
tremists that could help law enforcement officials more effectively recognize risks and screen
for those more likely to be on paths to violence. These patterns could be set-based (which
sets of indicators frequently occur together in a case) or sequence-based (which indicators
follow or immediately follow another indicator).
Our efforts are centered on analyzing the unique, restricted-use dataset “A Behavioral
Study of the Radicalization Trajectories of American ‘Homegrown’ Al Qaeda-Inspired Ter-
rorist Offenders, 2001-2015,” assembled by Professor Jytte Klausen at Brandeis University
and offered by the National Institutes of Justice through the National Archive of Criminal




The anonymized dataset contains 331 individuals (Group A) whom the researchers iden-
tified as meeting three study conditions: “1) he or she must have spent some or all of their
formative years in the United States, 2) the radicalization process must have taken place
primarily within the United States, and 3) the first instance of verifiable illicit activity lead-
ing to charges related to terrorism took place after September 11, 2001” [168]. There are
9 features/variables in this portion of the dataset: ID, Year of Birth, Sex, Ethno-National
Origin, Religious Conversion Status, Educational Status, Criminality Before Radicalization,
Year of Radicalization (start), and Year of Criminal Action [168].
From this group, 135 individuals (Group B) were selected for more detailed study. De-
tailed forensic biographies were collected for each of the subjects in Group B, and were
compiled from publicly available court documents and investigations into their activities
conducted by the United States government and news media, which may include online
communications posted by the terrorist offenders [168]. For each of the 135 U.S. violent
extremists, this dataset contains the actual or inferred dates (to the closest month, if appli-
cable) when any of the 27 behavioral indicators were exhibited. The dataset also contains 4
researcher-coded binary features (Online/Real Radicalization, Foreign Fighter, Undercover
Agent, and Mental Illness), which we intend to utilize as conditioning factors in future anal-
ysis. The codebook for these indicators is available in Appendix C, and is directly excerpted
from [167] and provides the research team’s definitions. Table 8.1 shows the listing of the 27
date features.
The original research reports based upon this data [165, 168] already provided some
insights into the duration of the radicalization process. For example, Klausen concluded,
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Table 8.1. Data features in Klausen Radicalization Dataset. Source: [167].
Date of Birth Epiphany Date
Religious Conversion Date Peer-Immersion Date
Disillusionment Date Domestic Physical Training Date
Trauma Date Marriage Seeking Date
Personal Crisis Date Societal Disengagement Date
Information Seeking Date Desire for Action Date
New Religious Authority Date Non-Violent Support Date
Ideological Rebellion Date Joins Foreign Insurgency Date
Lifestyle Changes Date Issues Threats Date
Occupational/Educational Disengagement Date Steps Towards Violence Date
School Dropout Date Date of Criminal Action
Underemployment Date Arrest Date
Dawah- Virtual Date Sentencing Date
Dawah- Real Life Date
(1) The average time period from the initial exploration of extremist ideas to criminal
action was over 3 years (38 months) (excluding a few outliers).
(2) Conditioned on those committing criminal action in 2015, the average time period
of radicalization was 2 years or less.
(3) Excluding pre-radicalization activities (indicators signaling an initial exploration
of belief systems), the average time to criminal action was 6.25 months for those
individuals radicalized after 2010 [165].
As mentioned earlier, these statistics ought to aid both practitioners and policy-makers.
Klausen also provided summary statistics on the general prevalence of individual indicators
and commented on either the consistency or deviation in their order of appearance in the
case studies [165, 168].
8.3. Methodology: Modeling Radicalization as a Discrete Dynamic Process
Beyond the analyses in the original research, we modeled an individual’s radicalization
as a discrete time dynamical process that produces indicator outcomes at timesteps t =
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1, 2, 3, .... We based our preliminary analysis framework on the path-dependence theory in
[236] and utilized state transition analysis and network analysis techniques to determine
the relative frequencies of transitions between certain states (indicators) and which ones are
more or less exhibited. The 26 radicalization date features are possible outcomes in the
state space.42 Following [151], a state refers to an outcome at any moment in time, which
in our case can be a single behavior or a set of behaviors. While the rigorously coded and
timestamped dataset is a major contribution in the field, we acknowledge upfront that the 26
radicalization features may not completely characterize radicalization processes. We also do
not make the assertion that the indicators recorded empirically are in fact the only indicators
that occurred. However, research suggests that radicalization is a complex, path-dependent
process where ones behavioral history matters in subsequent behavior. As Horgan observed,
“Overall, for any given individual, becoming involved in terrorism will reflect a dynamic,
though highly personalized, process of incremental assimilation and accommodation” [133,
p. 85]. With the current state of knowledge, we clearly cannot make the path independence
assumption in order to cast the problem as Markovian. This subsequently precludes us from
utilizing traditional Markov chain and Hidden Markov Models analysis methods.
However, it is still possible to utilize state transition diagrams to graphically represent the
radicalization phenomenon as a means to glean critical insights into detecting those on such
pathways. The structure and detailed contained in the Klausen’s dataset specifically enables
this level of analysis [167, 168]. This is state transition diagram, each of the 26 observable
behaviors appears as its own node. In this model, the discernible radicalization behavioral
sequence for each of the 135 U.S. radicalized violent extremists would appear as a pathway
42All date features were considered, except for sentencing date which we deemed as more a characteristic
of the criminal justice system response.
231
from a ‘Year of Birth’ node to the ‘Arrest Date’ node. Because of the available of information
(either by fact or by the granularity of the data sources), dates for various behaviors were
inferred to the same date, thus creating an outcome (state) which may include multiple
behaviors. We first attempted to model each unique outcome as its own state, whether
it was a single behavior or a unique set of behaviors. This resulted in state space of 149
unique states (26 single behavior states and 123 combined behavior states) that was less
interpretable.
For example, one of the violent extremists studied was assessed to have exhibited disillu-
sionment on July 1, 1993, and then next was assessed to have exhibited a personal crisis, a
converted to Islam, and engaged in dawa (proselytizing) in person all on July 1, 1995. The
first-pass model involved a transition arrow from the state of ‘disillusionment’ to a combined
state of ‘personal crisis, conversion, and dawa in person’ signified that the individual first
exhibited one behavior and then next the other three at (approximately) the same time.
When considering the multitude of combined states that may vary just slightly or greatly
from each other based on possible incomplete information among all 135 cases, this approach
proved unwieldy and offered less meaningful insights.
For simplicity and clarity, we devised an alternative method of analysis that focused on
which behaviors may immediately follow one another in time sequence while considering
that multiple behaviors could be exhibited at the same time. We defined a modified state
transition matrix P ∈W26×26 where each entry pij is the number of times a state (outcome)
which contains behavior i leads to a state (outcome) which contains behavior j among all 135
individuals in the dataset. This specifically allows for state transitions in which one behavior
can lead directly to combined set of behaviors, as well as a combined set of behaviors can lead
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directly to a single behavior or another combined set of behaviors. This matrix is depicted
in Fig. 8.1, where it is also shaded in green according to the number of transitions. There
are 388 distinct sequences of behaviors (transitions where pij > 0) and 1651 total transitions
(sum of all entries in P).
New 20170502
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
1:  Year.of.Birth 0 13 31 16 17 29 27 1 8 5 12 4 6 1 1 10 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 0
2:  Convert.Date 0 0 3 3 1 5 3 1 7 0 2 1 3 1 1 7 1 1 1 5 0 0 0 1 0 0
3:  Disillusionment 0 4 0 3 4 16 9 3 9 2 2 0 5 5 0 4 2 1 3 5 1 1 0 0 1 0
4:  Trauma 0 2 2 0 5 5 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 3 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
5:  Personal.Crisis 0 3 4 0 0 12 6 0 6 1 1 2 1 2 0 3 2 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0
6:  Seeking.Information 0 12 5 0 1 0 21 1 15 2 4 2 5 2 0 12 2 2 3 4 0 2 0 2 1 0
7:  New.Authority.Figures 0 2 4 0 1 3 0 0 10 1 4 0 10 4 3 26 4 1 3 17 1 3 0 4 0 0
8:  Rebellion 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 5 0 1 1 1 3 0
9:  Lifestyle.Changes 0 1 4 1 4 2 6 0 0 0 2 4 8 11 1 17 3 2 3 10 1 3 2 1 4 0
10:  Educational.Occupational.Disengagement 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 2 1 5 4
11:  Drop.Out.Date 0 2 3 2 2 5 3 1 4 0 0 4 2 2 0 2 1 3 1 5 0 1 0 2 6 5
12:  Underemployment 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 0 8 1 2 0 2 3 0
13:  Dawa..Virtual 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 1 4 0 0 1 2 7 3 2 2 14 3 3 1 6 4 0
14:  Dawa.Real.Life 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 6 4 3 0 8 1 3 0 5 4 0
15:  Epiphany 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 2 1 0 1 0
16:  Peer.Immersion 0 1 1 1 4 2 0 4 5 1 4 3 7 2 1 0 17 4 3 30 3 6 3 12 4 0
17:  Physical.Domestic.Training 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 6 1 1 0 4 2 0 3 0 2 0 7 1 9 0 12 14 4
18:  Marriage.Seeking 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 0 0 1 3 1 3 1 5 6 3
19:  Societal.Disengagement 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 3 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 1
20:  Desire.for.Action 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 2 4 5 5 2 6 4 0 6 8 7 2 0 6 28 5 31 24 5
21:  Passive.Support 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 4 9 4
22:  Joins.Foreign.Insurgency.Org. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 8 19 18
23:  Issues.Threats 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 11 2
24:  Steps.towards.Violence 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 1 1 2 0 3 0 1 0 5 1 0 3 2 5 2 0 46 18
25:  Date.of.Criminal.Action 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 3 0 103
26:  Arrest.Date 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 8.1. Radicalization feature/behavior transition matrix P ∈ W26×26
where each entry pij is the number of times a state (outcome) which contains
behavior i leads to a state (outcome) which contains behavior j.
8.3.1. Identification of frequent behavioral transitions. With this in place,
we now first discuss how we identified the most frequent behavioral transitions. Beyond
inventory lists of static behavioral indicators, we intend to extend the level of analysis first
performed by Klausen and identify the most frequent radicalization indicators which follow
certain indicators in confirmed cases of violent extremism. We seek dynamic behavioral
indicators.
The green shading on the transition matrix P aides the reader in identifying those indi-
cators which most frequently follow a specific indicator. However, we can also represent the
data as a state transition diagram.
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Our first thought was to obtain a right stochastic matrix P′ by row-normalizing P. This
allows us to examine the proportion of transitions from each behavior to another behavior.
We note, however, that our row normalization of P by dividing each entry by the total number
of transitions by row results in an inaccurate view of the prevalence of a transition. Again,
this is based on the fact that transitions from a behavior to one or more behaviors occurred
simultaneously. For example: suppose that a particular person only exhibited 3 behaviors
X, Y, and Z on the pathway towards radicalization where behaviorX is subsequently followed
by behaviors Y and Z inferred to have occurred on the same day. Standard row normalization
would weight the transition X → Y and X → Z would be weighted 0.50 and imply that the
transition occurred only half the time. In fact, in this one transition from behavior X, both
behavior Y and Z followed.
To correct this accounting, we determined the total number of ‘transition occurrences’ for
each behavior (row), and normalized each row of entries of P with this total. This resulted
in a modified (no longer right stochastic) behavior transition matrix P′′. In this previous
example, the modified row normalization would result in weights of 1.00 for both behaviors Y
and Z since each occurrence would be divided by 1 (the total number of transition occurrences
for this person) rather than 2 (the total number of subsequent behaviors involved in the single
transition).
All the transitions aggregated from among the 135 violent extremists in this way are de-
picted in Fig. 8.2a, where the 26 nodes are features/behaviors and weighted paths represent
instances when a feature/behavior sequentially followed another. The varied behavioral radi-
calization paths towards criminal action clearly supports the conclusion by many researchers
that there is no single path towards violent extremism [133, 165, 167, 224, 241].
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New 20170502b
Edge weights are proportional to transition probabilities
Edges with weights ≤ 0.1 [Removed]
Edges with weights > 0.1 & < 0.2 GREY
Edges with weights ≥ 0.2 & < 0.3 LIGHT RED
Edges with weights ≥ 0.3 RED
(a) (b)
Figure 8.2. Radicalization transition diagrams. Nodes are fea-
tures/behaviors and paths represent instances when features/behaviors se-
quentially followed one another. (a) Contains all instances of paths from one
feature/behavior to another. Edge weights are also proportional to the tran-
sition probabilities in P′′ for that edge. (b) Filtered and color-coded version
of (a). Direction arrows indicate the pairwise sequence of behaviors.
However, we can nevertheless derive some meaningful insights from this analysis. By
removing all transitions that comprise less than 10% from each behavior, and color coding
the remaining transitions according to their weight, we are able to identify the common
or frequented sequences of behavioral indicators. See Fig. 8.2b. It is important to note
that ‘Arrest.Date’ is considered an absorbing state because nearly all the violent extremists
examined in the Klausen dataset [168] ends with an arrest.43
In Fig. 8.3, we provide the weights of the light red and red edges in the Fig. 8.2b, which
correspond to the entries p′′ij ≥ 20% in the radicalization behavior transition matrix P′′.
We note the high proportion transitions as particularly informative of what behaviors may
immediately come next for those confirmed cases of violent extremism. For example, out
of the 135 perpetrators, 73.3% (11 out of 15) who had issued threats subsequently followed
43Only a few permanently relocate abroad or die to a terrorist-related activity.
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Figure 8.3. Edge weights for the modified radicalization behavior transition
matrix P′′ for edges where p′′ij ≥ 20%.
with some form of criminal action. Other notable transitions that would be informative to
intelligence and law enforcement analysts include:
• 53.5% (46 out of 86) who took discernible steps towards violence subsequently fol-
lowed with some form of criminal action.
• 27.8% (30 out of 108) who immersed themselves with like-minded peers subsequently
communicated some desire for violent action.
• 27.5% (14 out of 51) who undertook dawa (proselytized) online subsequently com-
municated some desire for violent action.
• 24.2% (31 out of 128) who communicated some desire for action subsequently took
steps towards violence.
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There are several important usability considerations to discuss. First, our dynamic in-
sights into the radicalization process go beyond the prevalence statistics that have been
traditionally proffered by researchers (see for example [116, 117, 220]. An example would
be that 86 out of the sample of 135 perpetrators (63.7%) exhibited some discernible steps
towards violence sometime along their path towards violent radicalization. The additional
analysis that our methodology allows answers the question, “What may come next?” In this
case, empirical evidence shows that the very next step for around 53% of these individuals
would be some form of criminal action. In future work, when these positive cases of violent
extremism are examined along with a complementary analysis of behaviors of non-violent
radicals (see for example, [11, 12]), we can then better discern if these dynamic radicalization
indicators do in fact signal a possible approach towards violence.
Knowledge about these transitions would then subsequently be incorporated in a system
to detect radicalization trajectories through two possible methods. First, each of the paired-
state transitions could be included into a new query pattern as their own uniquely weighted
indicator and a Red Flag (RF) investigative node type designation. Second, the insights from
these state transitions could be incorporated into a conditional scoring scheme to highlight
the increased significance of a transition that commonly occurred among positive cases of
extremist violence. We intend to develop these two alternative methods in future versions
of INSiGHT.
This is first-pass analysis, but much more could be done. For instance, a simultaneous
strength and shortfall of determining the proportions of behaviors that immediately follow
others is that we do not provide second, third, and subsequent chains of implications for
exhibiting a specific behavior.
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8.3.2. Analyses of the individual radicalization pathways. We now delve into
a more micro-level analysis of each individual’s radicalization process. By extending the
state transition model, we can view the radicalization process of each individual as a ‘path’
of discrete steps from birth to arrest or death in the commission of an act of extremist
violence and discernible behavioral indicators along the way. We recall that that certain
‘path segments’ may lead to combined states of more than one behavioral indicator (due to
one or more indicators occurring in fact on the same day, or just due to the granularity of
the data source or reporting). In the previous section, we also developed a unique transition
matrix P′′ to record the relative frequency of a subsequent behavioral indicator, whether they
occur singularly at that time step or concurrently with other indicators. By normalizing the
number of transitions involved from each indicator, we then determined the proportion of
specific transitions among all transition occurrence from that indicator.
The histogram of the non-zero transition probabilities in P′′ in Fig. 8.4. Importantly,
this shows us that over 77% (301 out of 388) of the non-zero transitions have less than
0.10 probability. There are 61 transitions with probabilities between 0.10 and 0.20, and 26
transitions with probabilities 0.20 or greater.
The prevalence of low probability transitions supports the conclusion of the multitude
of radicalization paths towards extremist violence and that no single pathway exists [133,
165, 167, 224, 241]. While true empirically, researchers heretofore have failed to make any
more specific, quantifiable characterizations of individual-level commonalities along the entire
radicalization path. At the individual level, the most rigorous research is from Gill [116–118],
but it still did not include an analysis of each individual’s set of characteristics or indicative
behaviors and comparing it with another individuals’ set. Our interest here is to characterize
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165
Figure 8.4. Distribution of the non-zero transition probabilities (n = 388
unique non-zero transitions in P′′).
each individual’s radicalization pathway utilizing these frequency-based proportions and gain
insights into the commonalities among any portions of the pathway.
We began by first visualizing the distribution of transition probabilities from each in-
dividual along radicalization paths towards extremist violence. See Fig. 8.5. Note that
transitions from ‘Date of Criminal Action’ to ‘Date of Arrest’ because it occurred over 94%
of the time and are more reflective of law enforcement response than an individual’s radi-
calization path. A visual inspection of the lengths of each boxplot reveals that while many
individuals exhibited both low and high frequency behavior transitions.
To better characterize the occurrence of frequented behavioral transitions, we introduce
the notion of a normalized path probability in Definition 11.
Definition 11. Normalized Path Probability
Given a state transition matrix P where each entry ps1,s2 is the probability of transition from
states s1 and s2, and a path π of k states {s1, s2, ..., sk}, then normalized path probability






Figure 8.5. Box plot of each individual’s set of transition probabilities along
the radicalization path (n = 135 individuals).
Performing the calculation is an extension of the classical method calculating probabilities
of independent events using tree diagrams and conditional probabilities. Specifically, in that
procedure, one would multiply each of the probabilities of each path segment along an entire
path of a tree, where each level represents another independent event. Normalization of a
path with k segments multiplied together involves taking the k-th root of the product in
order to quantify the ‘mean’ probability for each segment.
In the case of when the state space when transitions from a single indicator to a set of
indicators occurring concurrently, a meaningful greedy heuristic to determine a normalized
path probability is to utilize the largest transition probability among the indicators. We call
the result of this heuristic the maximum normalized path probability. When a single indicator
transitions to more than one indicator each with their associated transition proportions, the
largest proportion is used as the multiplicative factor in the path probability. Based upon the
data model where every path first involves a birth state leading to another single indicator
state or a multiple indicator state, we know that the indicator resulting in the maximum
240
transition probability is always selected before there is a transition from a combined indicator
state to a single indicator state. Thus for such transitions, we simply utilize the transition
probability from the max achieving start indicator to the single end indicator. Note, we
could have re-calculated which start indicator and end indicator had the largest transition
probability at each occurrence, which would have resulted in maximum normalized path
probabilities greater than or equal to the ones that resulted from our heuristic.
However, we also need to consider the maximum normalized path probabilities for each of
the 135 perpetrators. The histogram of these path probabilities is shown in Fig. 8.6a. Like
earlier, we disregarded any of the transitions from ‘Date of Criminal Action to Date of Arrest’
because it occurred over 94% of the time and would have easily skewed the normalized path
probabilities higher without providing much insight on frequented indicators. We notice
that only 11% (15 out of 135) of the individuals had ‘mean’ path probabilities less than
0.10, which could only be achieved if predominantly all path segments were among the rare
transitions. For all the others (89%, 120 out of 135), to achieve maximum normalized path
probabilities greater than 0.10, there must have been at least several frequented transition
path segments whose probabilities were greater than 0.10.
(a) (b)
Figure 8.6. (a) Distribution of the max normalized path probabilities for
each individual (n=135) (b) Distribution of the mean of the max path proba-
bilities for each individual (n = 135).
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For completeness, we also calculated the mean transition probability among each individ-
ual’s radicalization pathway, which we calculated by averaging all the transition probabilities
along an individual’s path. The distribution of these means is shown in Fig. 8.6b.
Lastly, we determined the maximum transition probability utilized in each pathway. It
turns out that among 135 perpetrators, only 1 individual had a pathway that utilized only
behavioral transitions with probability less than 0.10, and 3 individuals had only utilized
transitions with probability less than 0.20. These individuals’ sequence of behaviors could
truly be seen as unique and without any of the commonalities with other violent extremists.
Fig. 8.7 shows that many others had utilized at least one path segment that was more
frequented.
Figure 8.7. Distribution of the maximum transition probability in each in-
dividual’s radicalization path (n = 135).
8.4. Conclusion
This chapter presented an approach for modeling radicalization as a discrete dynamical
process of individuals exhibiting indicators on pathways towards extremist violence. Signifi-
cantly, we determined from real-data the presence of highly frequented indicator transitions,
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which could then subsequently be incorporated in a system to detect radicalization trajec-
tories.
Additionally, our analysis showed that while indeed perpetrators took widely various
paths in total, an overwhelming majority of them followed at least some highly common
segments of paths. In other words, the radicalization pathway for each of the perpetrators
exhibited infrequent pair-wise sequences of behaviors, but almost invariably included a few
highly frequent pair-wise sequences that could prove useful for law enforcement and intel-
ligence analysts. In future work, we also intend to perform association (frequent itemset)
analysis to find sets of indicators that occur frequently in the data [2]. Utilizing a tech-
nique traditionally for determining purchase patterns in market baskets, we propose casting
a person’s pathway as a single basket and the indicators he/she exhibits as the purchases.
This would then allow us to determine those sets of indicators which occur frequently in
radicalization paths, and which indicators strongly suggest other indicators that may follow.
Such information would be useful to law enforcement analysts to better distinguish those
may truly be radicalizing.
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we undertook a systems approach to evaluating both the need and feasibil-
ity of a radicalization detection system. We introduced an overarching analyst-in-the-loop
framework and specific technology called INSiGHT to assist law enforcement and intelligence
agencies in mining and screening for the individuals with a risk of extremist violence. Our
vectorized, dynamic graph pattern matching approach, provided analysts with the ability
to find full or partial matches against a query pattern as well as a means to quantify the
pace of the appearance of the indicators. Tracking partial match trajectories provides an-
other dimension of analysis in investigative graph searches to highlight entities on a pathway
towards a pattern for a latent behavior such as violent radicalization.
We demonstrated the performance of INSiGHT on small, synthetic radicalization data
sets, the real Klausen radicalization behavioral dataset, and a large, real-world BlogCatalog
dataset serving as a proxy for the type of intelligence or law enforcement data networks that
could be utilized to track the radicalization of violent extremists. We successfully validated
the matching mechanics using the small synthetic datasets and identified all the BlogCatalog
accounts that match the query in full or in part, as well as produced the match trajectory for
each account. INSiGHT also ably determined the radicalization pattern match trajectory
of all 135 U.S. violent extremists in the real Klausen time-stamped behavioral dataset. We
noted a wide distribution of similarity scores on even just these positive cases of extremists
and the difficulty of determining a suitable threshold to distinguish positive and negative
cases. Importantly, however, we demonstrated how the inclusion of red flag visualizations
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and alerts could greatly assist analysts in identifying high risk individuals even when they
had relatively lower similarity scores.
We also extended INSiGHT by developing a non-combinatorial neighbor matching tech-
nique as an important first step in enabling analysts to maintain visibility of potential collec-
tive threats and conspiracies and account for the role close social ties have in an individual’s
radicalization. This enhancement was validated first on two small, synthetic radicalization-
specific datasets, where we successfully detected over time those who may individually or
collectively be on a trajectory towards violent extremism based upon a query pattern. Neigh-
bor matching was also validated on the BlogCatalog dataset through the use of the real social
network connections and tagging behaviors for over 80K accounts. The results showed that
our algorithm returned whole and partial subgraph matches that enabled the analyst to gain
and maintain visibility on each neighbors’ tags. Our results also demonstrated the impor-
tance of α parameter in controlling the extent of this visibility and impact on match scores
for neighbor activities. These tests on a benign application help confirm that our approach
can work on radicalization-specific data if real social ties between persons of interest were
available and when the detection of conspiratorial clusters is important.
Overall, INSiGHT led to consistent, informed, and reliable assessments about those who
pose a significant risk for violent extremism in a variety of settings. Based on these results,
we maintain that it is a feasible and useful supporting tool with the potential to optimize
law enforcement investigative efforts and ultimately to enable the prevention of individuals
from carrying out extremist violence.
The applicability of INSiGHT to detect latent behaviors in other domains such as on-line
student assessment and consumer analytics was also demonstrated through experiments with
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real data. For on-line student assessment, we tested INSiGHT on a portion of the Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) Cup 2015 competition dataset [160] of approximately
1K students and 19K on-line activities to predict those students who persisted in the MOOC
course. INSiGHT readily found the whole or partial matches of each student to the query
of course materials over time. While it was clear that the preponderance of the students
who ultimately ‘continued’ in the course had some of the highest similarity scores, there was
also a significant number with high scores who did not ‘continue.’ In the end, we found
that including just two additional features of ‘start day of activity’ and ‘last day of activity’
enabled us to achieve an AUC of 77% with 5-fold cross validation.
Using a real, large proprietary consumer activities dataset from a home improvement
retailer with 60K customers and over 11 million time-stamped transactions, INSiGHT was
indeed useful in the detection of customers likely undertaking certain home improvement
projects based upon the number of project items purchased. However, we were unable to
truly validate the utility of INSiGHT to screen for true positives because the data did not
contain ground truth. Through a secondary analysis for the features which best predict a
customer’s final similarity score, we found that models using activity sets of three or more
produced RMSE values that were less than the score increment for a single query item. In
the end, the challenges with evaluating performance on this real dataset without ground
truth motivated us to generate our own synthetic datasets with ground truth.
We, therefore, developed a synthetic data generator of large population, time-stamped,
individual-level consumer activities data consistent with an a priori project set designation
(latent behavior). We confirmed that the relatively high AUCs (93-96%) that INSiGHT can
achieve at various thresholds was largely determined by the overlap of the query indicators
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with other latent behaviors of interest, as well as the prevalence of the indicators that can
occur by chance or with intention among a universal set of indicative and benign (unrelated)
behaviors. These results also spurred us to explore the improved ability at prediction if
one integrates investigative graph search with machine learning. While prediction is not
necessarily the goal in the radicalization application, it may very well be in other commercial
applications. We proposed and tested a modification to INSiGHT that utilized graph pattern
matching to find statistically significant indicators in a large heterogeneous graph database
and then simultaneously produced a classification score and match similarity score. Since
predictive performance had markedly improved, we consider this integrated approach an
important extension to formalize and test more thoroughly in future work. This formulation
of the synthetic data generator also sets the stage for future work in developing an analogous
synthetic data generator for radicalization indicators to serve as a testbed for INSiGHT and
other data mining algorithms.
We also intend to press forward in several areas of future work which we describe below.
9.1. Further Enhancements to Radicalization Detection
Besides affirmative indicators of radicalization in the literature, there is some discussion
of “mitigating” factors that would dissuade individuals to continue along a radicalization
process [302, p. 19]. Pressman, who developed VERA2 calls these indicator items “pro-
tective.” We envision future work where these key mitigating/protective factors are either
added to the original query pattern with negative weights (thus lessening an individual’s
risk score), or are put into a different query pattern altogether and tracked as a different
behavior that is then reconciled with the radicalization scoring.
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The discussion may be benefited by a more concrete example. While recent violent
extremists motivated by Salafi-jihadism have been shown to predominantly be married with
with children (when information was available) [16, 134],44 this characteristic does not make
for a very discerning or informative indicator. However, an example of a discerning, related
mitigating indicator is whether a spouse or significant other was supportive of non-violence
[249]. This is ably representable in a graph database.
9.2. Incremental Graph Pattern Matching and Distributed Approaches
We intend to devise an incremental graph pattern matching approach like those found in
[49, 101] in order to dynamically and efficiently update the multi-hop class similarity scores
for new data in the form of additional or deleted edges or nodes. We also plan to deploy
INSiGHT on distributed systems in order to handle streaming Big Data and capitalize on
multi-core processing.
9.3. Expanding the Scope to Other Forms of Targeted Violence
We also demonstrated that INSiGHT can be applied to other domains, to include the
prediction of MOOC persistence and whether a customer is undertaking a home improvement
project requiring the purchase of part or all of a set of related items. We are interested in
expanding the use of INSiGHT on targeted violence in general and seeing if the early warning
behaviors in those cases can also be tracked and the threat detected. This includes the study
of violent extremism motivated by other ideologies besides Salafi-jihadism, as well as other
targeted violence such as mass murders [203], school shootings [275] .
44We recall at least three high profile cases of homegrown violent extremism in which the perpetrators
were married with a child (e.g., Tamerlan Tsarnaev, Sayed Farook, and Omar Mateen).
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9.4. Suicide Risk Assessment in the Military
There is potential for our work to be applicable to the monitoring the suicide risk among
current military members and veterans in the U.S. For several years, U.S. military veterans
have been experiencing higher risk for suicide; the research now suggests that at as many 20
veterans are committing suicide per day [80]. Suicide also continues to be a significant prob-
lem in the active military. According to the latest report by the Defense Suicide Prevention
Office (DPSO), there had been 1,392 suicides within the active component and 1,009 within
the reserve component [110].
The problem area is also large, but analytic efforts are greatly benefited here primarily
because of the public awareness of and general concern about veteran suicide (which is much
more prevalent than deaths from violent extremist), as well as the availability of data because
both current and former military members receiving health care through the VA are part of
the same integrated medical system.45
The U.S. Army has a large research effort called the Army Study to Assess Risk and
Reslience in Servicemembers Longitudinal Study (STARR-LS)46, with a multitude of inter-
related data collection and analysis studies. We are currently seeking collaborative opportu-
nities with STARR-LS researchers and explore the utility of our work on the Soldier Health
Outcomes Study A and B datasets (for suicide attempts and suicides, respectively). Addi-
tionally, the data from longitudinal studies are also very promising for our work, especially
considering if any of the survey respondents ended up attempting or committing suicide.
45Recently in April 2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) launched a innovative predictive
analytics tool nation-wide called Recovery Engagement and Coordination for Health Veterans Enhanced
Treatment (REACH-VET) [80]. The details are currently unavailable, but the public announcement states




Figure 9.1. Army Composite Life Cycle Model. Source: [139, p. 36].
We envision INSiGHT as a supplementary system to current efforts, with a focus on current
service members and the integration of graph pattern matching to identify latent behavioral
indicators and predictive machine learning models by utilizing on- and off-line longitudinal
activities data.
The services have seemed to adopt a “whole of life” approach to understanding the risk
factors and develop prevention strategies [110]. The U.S. Army, in particular, utilizes the
Composite Life Cycle Model shown in Fig. 9.1 as a means to understand the stressors that
appear a service member’s individual life, professional life, and the life of his or her family.47
47“The Composite Life Cycle Model...was designed to provide an aggregate view of the unique ‘transitions’
that occur in each of the three separate military life cycle strands of Unit, Soldier and Family...The model
provides two ways to view the impact of the innumerable transitions and subsequent stressors impacting
Soldiers and Families: (1) horizontally across time within a particular strand, and (2) vertically across all
three life cycle strands at a particular point in time. The first view illustrates the potential acute and
recurring stressors associated within each strand, while the second illustrates the potential for cumulative
stressors from all three strands” [139, p. 36-37].
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Ultimately, our future research relates to exploring the utility of operationalizing the
Armys Composite Life Cycle Model [139, p. 36] for each Soldier to dynamically identify for
commanders those most at risk for suicide given the totality of his/her indicator history
and current conditions. In addition to tracking unit, soldier, and family strands of indica-
tors/stressors, one could add any diagnosed pre-enlistment mental disorders and possibly
even social media signature data over time. Any additional thoughts or suggestions towards
this end would be greatly appreciated.
9.5. Cybersecurity Insider Threat Detection
http://www.cert.org/insider-threat/best-practices/index.cfmFigure 9.2. CERT insider threat graphic. Source: [45].
Lastly, we see the potential applicability of INSiGHT on detecting insider threat for
cybersecurity. Current research suggests that threat actors may exhibit behavioral cues
(both physical and psychological) in addition to electronic signatures in the course of their
use of workplace computer systems and networks [45, 120]. Fig. 9.2 is a conceptualization
from the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) division in the Software Engineering
Institute (SEI) on how these behavioral cues and technical indicators manifest and how
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organizations can deal with them at the appropriate time. According to the Department of
Homeland Security, the behavioral indicators of malicious threat activity includes:
(1) “Remotely accesses the network while on vacation, sick or at odd times.
(2) Works odd hours without authorization.
(3) Notable enthusiasm for overtime, weekend or unusual work schedules.
(4) Unnecessarily copies material, especially if it is proprietary or classified.
(5) Interest in matters outside of the scope of their duties.
(6) Signs of vulnerability, such as drug or alcohol abuse, financial difficulties, gambling,
illegal activities, poor mental health or hostile behavior, should trigger concern. Be
on the lookout for warning signs among employees such as the acquisition of unex-
pected wealth, unusual foreign travel, irregular work hours or unexpected absences”
[73].
In proposed future work, we intend to explore the utility of INSiGHT in detecting insider
threats through the testing various threat behavioral patterns on large heterogeneous dataset
of an organization’s computer network activity augmented with person-centric, performance-
related information that may be available in human resource departments or supervisors.
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[128] R.Hämäläinen, T. Lahtinen, “Path dependence in Operational ResearchHow the mod-
eling process can influence the results,” Operations Research Perspectives, Vol. 3, p. 14-20,
2016.
[129] L. Harding and V. Dodd, “ Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s YouTube account shows ji-




[130] C. Haskins, ed., INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook, Version 3, Washington, D.C.,
June 2006.
[131] P. Helsel, “Terror bomb plotter arrested in NYC,” New York Post, November 20,
2011, available at http://nypost.com/2011/11/20/terror-bomb-plotter-arrested-
in-nyc/.
[132] K. Hill, “The Disturbing Internet Footprint of Santa Barbara Shooter Elliot Rodger,”
Forbes, May 24, 2014, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/
05/24/the-disturbing-internet-footprint-of-santa-barbara-shooter-elliot-
rodger/print/.
[133] J. Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psy-
chology on Radicalization into Terrorism,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 618, July 2008, p. 80-94.
[134] J. Horgan, N. Shortland, S. Abbasciano, and S. Walsh, “Actions Speak Louder than
Words: A Behavioral Analysis of 183 Individuals Convicted for Terrorist Offenses in the
United States from 1995 to 2012,” Journal of Forensic Sciences, Vol. 61(5), p. 1228-1237,
2016.
[135] Homeland Security Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, “Going Dark, Going
Forward: A Primer on the Encryption Debate,” version 2.0, September 2016.
271
[136] U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
“Media Leaks Facts and Context (Long Version),” August 1, 2013, avail-
able at http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/
documents/talkingpointslong.pdf, accessed April 7, 2017.
[137] P. Hoyer, “Non-negative Matrix Factorization with Sparseness Constraints,” Journal
of Machine Learning Research, volume 5, pp. 1457-1469, 2004.
[138] Houzz & Home, “Renovation in America: Findings from the 2013 Houzz & Home Sur-
vey,” available at http://info.houzz.com/rs/houzz/images/Houzz%20%26%20Home%
202013%20Report.pdf, accessed January 18, 2017.
[139] Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army 2020: Generating Health and Disci-
pline in the Force Report,” Washington, D.C., 2012.
[140] J. Huang, K. Venkatraman, and D. Abadi, “Query Optimization of Distributed Pattern
Matching,” Proceedings of the IEEE 30th International Conference on Data Engineering,
2014.
[141] B. Hung, S. Kolitz, and A. Ozdaglar, “Optimization-Based Influencing of Village Social
Networks in a Counterinsurgency,” Association of Computing Machinery Transactions on
Intelligent Systems and Technology (ACM- TIST), Volume 4, June 2013.
[142] B. Hung and A. Jayasumana, “Investigative Simulation: Towards Utilizing Graph
Pattern Matching for Investigative Search,” Proceedings of the Conference on Foundations
of Open Source Intelligence and Security Informatics (FOSINT-SI), 2016.
[143] B. Hung, A. Jayasumana, and V. Bandara, “Detecting Radicalization Trajectories
Using graph Pattern Matching Algorithms,” Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI), 2016.
272
[144] B. Hung, A. Jayasumana, and V. Bandara, “Pattern Matching Trajectories in Inves-
tigative Graph Searches,” Proceedings of the IEEE Conference Data Science and Advance
Analytics (DSAA), 2016.
[145] B. Hung, A. Jayasumana, and V. Bandara, “INSiGHT: Detecting the Radicalization
Trajectories of Homegrown Violent Extremists with Dynamic Graph Pattern Matching,”
Proceedings of the IEEE Homeland Security Technologies (HST) Symposium, 2017.
[146] K. Ilgun, R. Kemmerer, and P. Porras, “State Transition Analysis: A Rule-Based
Intrusion Detection Approach,” Proceedings of the IEEE Transactions on Software En-
gineering, Vol 21(3), 1995.
[147] INCOSE, “What is Systems Engineering?” Internet: http://www.incose.org/
AboutSE/WhatIsSE, accessed on March 30, 2017.
[148] Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, De-
partment of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security, “Unclassified Summary
of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon
Bombings,” April 2014, available at https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/
organizations/ic-ig/ic-ig-news/1604, accessed May 21, 2017.
[149] “Israel is using social media to prevent terrorist attacks,” The Economist,
April 18, 2016, available at http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21697083-new-paradigm-intelligence-israel-using-social-media-
prevent-terrorist, accessed April 3, 2017.
[150] M. Isikoff, “Unaware of Tsarnaev warnings, Boston counterterror unit tracked




[151] J. Jackson and K. Kollman, “Models of path dependence with an empirical applica-
tion,” Annual Political Methodology Conference, State College, PA. 2007.
[152] J. Jashinsky, S. Burton, C. Hanson, J. West, C. Giraud-Carrier, M. Barnes, and T. Ar-
gyle, “Tracking Suicide Risk Factors Through Twitter in the US,” Crisis, Vol. 35, p. 51-59,
2014.
[153] S. Jeon, Y. Khosiawan, and B. Hong, “Making a Graph Databse from Unstructured
Text,” Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Computational Science and
Engineering, 2013.
[154] K. Jordan, “Massive open online course completion rates revisited: Assessment, length
and attrition,” International Review of Research in Open and Distributed Learning, Vol.
16(3), p. 341358, 2015.
[155] J. Jouvenal, “The new way police are surveilling you: calculating your









[157] Z. Kastrati, A. Imran, S. Yildirim-Yayilgan, and F. Dalipi, “Analysis of Online Social
Network Posts to Investigate Suspects Using SEMCON,” Social Computing and Social
Media, Vol. 9182 of LNCS, p.148–157, 2015.
[158] R. Katz, ”Christopher Cornell Expressed Support for Islamic State, Lone Wolf Jihad
on Social Media,” SITE INSITE Blog on Terrorism and Extremism, January 15, 2015,
accessed July 7, 2015 at http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/
344-chris-cornell-professed-love-of.
[159] R. Katz, ”Information about the Chattanooga Shooter is Disappearing from the Inter-
net,” SITE INSITE Blog on Terrorism and Extremism, July 23, 2015, accessed August
13, 2015 at http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/categories/jihad/
entry/390-information-about-the-chattanooga-shooter-is-disappearing-
from-the-internet.
[160] KDD Cup 2015 Competition, May 1, 2015, originally available at https://biendata.
com/competition/kddcup2015/, accessed December 5, 2016.
[161] M. Key, “Elliot Rodger, Santa Barbara mass shooting suspect, “My Twisted World”
manifesto,” May 24, 2014, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/225960813/
Elliot-Rodger-Santa-Barbara-mass-shooting-suspect-My-Twisted-World-
manifesto.
[162] A. Khan, Y. Wu, C. Aggarwal, and X. Yan, “NeMa: Fast Graph Search with Label
Similarity,” Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, Volume 6, Issue 3, January 2013.
[163] A. Kimery, “Jihad in Texas: In-Depth Look at the Shooters, Islamist





[164] M. King and D. Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of
Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence,” Terrorism and Political Violence,
23: 602–622, 2011.
[165] J. Klausen, S. Campion, N. Needle, G. Nguyen, and R. Libretti, “Toward a Behavioral
Model of ‘Homegrown’ Radicalization Trajectories”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
39:1, 67-83, 2015.
[166] J. Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters
in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38:1, 1-22, 2015.
[167] J. Klausen. A Behavioral Study of the Radicalization Trajectories of American
“Homegrown” Al Qaeda-Inspired Terrorist Offenders, 2001-2015 [UNITED STATES].
ICPSR36452-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research [distributor], 2016-12-15. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36452.v1.
[168] J. Klausen. A Behavioral Study of the Radicalization Trajectories of American “Home-
grown” Al Qaeda-Inspired Terrorist Offenders,” Final Report to the U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs/National Institutes of Justice, August 2016, forth-
coming in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.
[169] J. Klausen, personal correspondence to the author, March 2016,
[170] J. Klausen, C. Marks, T. Zaman, “Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks,”
arXiv, available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.06242.pdf, 2016.
276
[171] J. Klausen, “The Myth of Homegrown Terrorism,” The Georgetown Security Studies
Review, Special Issue: What the New Administration Needs to Know About Terrorism
and Counterterrorism, p. 50-60, 2017.
[172] J. Koehler, “The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and method-
ological challenges,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 19, p. 1-53, 1996.
[173] D. Koller, A. Ng., C. Do, and Z. Chen, “Retention and Intention in Mas-
sive Open Online Courses: In Depth,” Educause Review, June 3, 2013, avail-
able at http://er.educause.edu/articles/2013/6/retention-and-intention-in-
massive-open-online-courses-in-depth, accessed June 1, 2017.
[174] A. Kossiakoff, W.N. Sweet, S. Seymour, and S.M. Biemer, Systems Engineering Prin-
ciples and Practice, 2nd edition, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[175] D. Koutra, A. Parikh, A. Ramdas, and J. Xiang, “Algorithms for graph similarity and
subgraph matching,” Technical report, Carnegie-Mellon-University, 2011.
[176] C. Kurzman, D. Schanzer, and E. Moosa, “Muslim American Terrorism Since 9/11:
Why So Rare?” The Muslim World, Vol. 101(3), p. 464-483, 2011.
[177] G. LaFree, “Lone-Offender Terrorists,” editorial introduction, Criminology and Public
Policy, Vol. 12(1), p. 59-62, 2013.
[178] G. LaFree and L. Dugan, “Global Terrorism Database,” National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), available at https://www.
start.umd.edu/gtd/about/, 2017.
[179] G. LaFree, M. Jensen, and P. James,“Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United
States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/profiles-
individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus, accessed April 9, 2017.
277
[180] V. Lampos, T. Bie, and N. Cristianini, “Flu detector- Tracking Epidemics on Twitter.”
Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases, LNCS 6323, pp. 599-602, 2010.
[181] A. Langville, C. Meyer, and R. Albright, “Initializations for the Nonnegative Matrix
Factorization,” ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and
Data Mining, Philadelphia, PA, 2006.
[182] J. Lavigne, M. Feldman, K. Meyers, “Screening for Mental Health Problems: Address-
ing the Base Rate Fallacy for a Sustainable Screening Program in Integrated Primary
Care,” Journal of Pediatric Psychology, Vol. 41(10), p. 1081-1090, 2016.
[183] P.S.H. Leeflang, J.E. Wieringa, T.H.A. Bijmolt, K.H. Pauwels, “Individual Demand
Models,” chapter in Modeling Markets, p. 261-305, New York: Springer Science + Busi-
ness Media, 2015.
[184] M. Leiter, “U.S. Policy to Counter Violent Extremism is Incoherent,” The Cipher




accessed April 27, 2017.
[185] S. Lee, Z. Liu, C. Kim, “An Agent Using Matrix for Backward Path Search on
MANET,” Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, Lecture Nodes
in Computer Science Vol. 4953, p. 203-211, 2008.
[186] D. Lee and H. Seung, “Learning the parts of objects by non-negative matrix factoriza-
tion,” Nature, volume 401, pp.788791, 1999.
278
[187] K. Leggiero, “Countering ISIS Recruitment in Western Nations,” Journal of Po-
litical Risk, Vol. 3(1), available at http://www.jpolrisk.com/countering-western-
recruitment-of-isis-fighters/, 2015.
[188] J. Li and A. Wang, “A framework of identity resolution: evaluating identity attributes
and matching algorithms,” Security Informatics, Vol. 4(6), 2015.
[189] Y. Liao and V. Rao Vemuri, “Using Text Categorization Techniques for Intrusion
Detection,” Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Association,
2002.
[190] B. Llenas, “Fort Hood Shooter Ivan Lopez’s Chilling Facebook Post: ’The Devil Will
Take Me...Green Light And Finger Ready,’ ” Fox News Latino, April 3, 2014, avail-
able at http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/04/03/fort-hood-shooter-
ivan-lopez-facebook-status-devil-will-take-megreen-light-and/.
[191] Lowe’s, “How to Install a Tile Backsplash,” available at https://www.lowes.com/
projects/kitchen-and-dining/how-to-install-a-tile-backsplash/project#
noop, accessed January 3, 2017.
[192] S. Ma, Y. Cao, W. Fan, J. Huai, and T. Wo, “Strong Simulation: Capturing Topology
in Graph Pattern Matching,” Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, Vol 5, No. 4, 2012.
[193] S. Ma, J. Li, C. Hu, X. Lin, and J. Huai, “Big graph search: challenges and techniques,”
Frontiers of Computer Science, May 5, 2015, Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg, 2015.
[194] S. Malthaner and L. Lindekilde, “Analyzing Pathways of Lone-Actor Radicalization: A
Relational Approach,” unpublished manuscript presented at Constructions of Terrorism
Conference at University of California in Santa Barbara, December 2015.
279
[195] G. Marx, “An Ethics for the New (and Old) Surveillance,” in Effective Surveillance for
Homeland Security, F. Flammini, R. Setola, and G. Fanceschetti, eds., CRC Press, New
York, 2013.
[196] K. Mather, R. Winton, and A. Flores, “Deputies didn’t view Elliot Rodger’s videos
in welfare check,” Los Angeles Times, May 29, 2014, available at http://www.latimes.
com/local/la-me-rodger-welfare-20140530-story.html.
[197] M. McCaul, “A National Strategy to Win the War Against Islamist Terror,”
U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, September 2016, avail-
able at https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/A-National-
Strategy-to-Win-the-War.pdf, accessed April 17, 2017.
[198] C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, “Individual and group mechanism of radical-
ization,” in “Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism
Threats” White Papers, L Fenstermacher, L. Kuznar, T. Rieger, and A. Speck-
hard, eds., US Department of Defense and the Air Force Research Laboratory, avail-
able at http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/U_
Counter_Terrorism_White_Paper_Final_January_2010.pdf, 2010.
[199] C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, “Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What
Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical Action,” Terrorism and Political
Violence, Vol. 26, p. 69-85, 2014.
[200] C. McCauley and S. Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-
Pyramids Model,” American Psychologist, Vol. 72(3), p. 205-216, 2017.
[201] A. McGough, et al, “Insider Threats: Identifying Anomalous Human Behavior in Het-
erogeneous Systems Using Beneficial Intelligence Software (Ben-ware), Proceedings of the
280
7th ACM Computer and Communications Society International Workshop on Managing
Insider Security Threats, p. 1-12, 2015.
[202] J.F. McGowan, “How to Build a Recommendation Engine,” September 24,
2012, available at https://mathblog.com/how-to-build-a-recommendation-engine/
#comments, accessed January 11, 2017.
[203] J. Meloy, J. Hoffmann, A. Guldimann, D. James, “The Role of Warning Behaviors in
Threat Assessment: An Exploration and Suggested Typology,” Behavioral Sciences and
the Law, volume 30, pp. 256-279, 2012.
[204] J. Meloy, “Identifying Warning Behaviors of the Individual Terrorist,” FBI
Law Enforcement Bulletin, April 2016, accessed March 8, 2017, available
at https://leb.fbi.gov/2016/april/perspective-identifying-warning-
behaviors-of-the-individual-terrorist.
[205] R. Mendick, G. Rayner, M. Evans, and H. Dixon, “Security services
missed five opportunities to stop the Manchester bomber,” The Telegraph,
May 25, 2017, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/24/
securityservicesmissedfiveopportunitiesstopmanchester/, accessed May 27,
2017.
[206] R. Metz, “Big Questions Around Facebook’s Suicide Prevention Tools,” MIT
Technology Review, March 1, 2017, available at https://www.technologyreview.
com/s/603772/big-questions-around-facebooks-suicide-prevention-tools/, ac-
cessed on April 10, 2017.
281
[207] Y. Miao, W. Han, K. Li, M. Wu, F. Yang, L. Zhou, V. Prabhakaran, E. Chen, and
W. Chen, “ImmortalGraph: A System for Storage and Analysis of Temporal Graphs,”
ACM Transactions on Storage, Vol. 11(3), July 2015.
[208] L.E. Miller, “Multihop connectivity of arbitrary networks,” http://w3.antd.nist.
gov/wctg/netanal/ConCalc.pdf, 2001.
[209] C. Mindock, “ Who Is Mohammod Youssef Abdulazeez? Chattanooga Shooter Identi-
fied; Dead; High School Peers React In Tennessee,” International Business Times, July
16, 2015, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/who-mohammod-youssef-abdulazeez-
chattanooga-shooter-identified-dead-high-school-peers-2012830.
[210] MITRE, “FFRDCs- A Primer: Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
in the 21st Century,” available at https://www.mitre.org/publications/all/ffrdcs-
a-primer, 2015.
[211] MITRE, “Person-Centric Identity Management- Rapidly Assimilating Data
About a Person of Interest,” technical paper, January 2017, available at
https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/person-centric-
identity-management-rapidly-assimilating-data-about-a, accessed March 1,
2017.
[212] M. Molteni, “Artificial Intelligence is Learning to Predict and Prevent Suicide,”
Wired, March 17, 2017, available at https://www.wired.com/2017/03/artificial-
intelligence-learning-predict-prevent-suicide/, accessed on April 10, 2017.
[213] C. Moody, “Developer Policies to Protect Peoples Voices on Twitter,” Novem-
ber 22, 2016, available at https://blog.twitter.com/2016/developer-policies-to-
protect-people-s-voices-on-twitter, accessed April 3, 2017.
282
[214] J. Monahan, “The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism,” Psychology, Public Pol-
icy, and Law, Vol. 18(2), May 2012, p. 167-205.
[215] M. Mongiovi, R. Di Natale, R. Guigno, A. Pulvirenti, and A. Ferro, “SIGMA: A
Set-Cover-Based Inexact Graph Matching Algorithm,” Journal of Bioinformatics and
Computational Biology, Vol 8, No. 2, p. 199—218, 2010.
[216] J. Murphy, V. Berk, and I. Gregorio-de Souza, “Decision Support Procedure in the
Insider Threat Domain,” Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Science Security and Privacy
Workshops, 2012.
[217] E. Nakashima, M. Zapotosky, and M. Berman, “The FBI looked into suspected bomber
Ahmad Rahami in 2014 and found no ‘ties to terrorism’,” The Washington Post, Sep-
tember 20, 2016.




[219] National Security Agency, “Section 215” fact sheet of Section 215 of PATRIOT Act,
available from https://www.scribd.com/document/149791922/National-Security-
Agency-Section-702-of-FISA-and-Section-215-of-PATRIOT-Act-Fact-Sheets,
accessed April 7, 2017.
[220] National Counterterrorism Center, “Behavioral Indicators Offer Insights for




[221] NPR, “German Program Helps Families De-Radicalize Members Prone To
Extremism,” an interview with Daniel Koehler, March 13, 2015, available
at http://www.npr.org/2015/03/13/392845800/german-program-helps-families-
de-radicalize-members-prone-to-extremism, accessed May 29, 2017.
[222] Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), “NSI Resources,” available at https://nsi.ncirc.
gov/resources.aspx, accessed April 8, 2017.
[223] L.S. Neo, M. Khader, J. Ang, G. Ong, and E. Tan, “Developing an early screening
guide for jihadi terrorism: A behavioural analysis of 30 terror attacks,” Security Journal,
November 2014.
[224] L.S. Neo, “An Internet-Mediated Pathway for Online Radicalization: RECRO,” in
Combating Violent Extremism and Radicalization in the Digital Era, Hersey, PA: IGI
Global, 2016.
[225] National Institutes of Justice, Funding Solicitation: “Research and Evaluation on Do-
mestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism,” 2017.
[226] Office of the Executive of the United States, “National Strategy for Countert-
errorism,” June 2011, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf, accessed April 17, 2017.
[227] Office of the Executive of the United States, “Strategic Implementation Plan for Em-
powering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,” October
2016, available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2016_
strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev%20(2).pdf,
accessed April 17, 2017.
284
[228] Offices of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Home-
land Security, and Department of Justice, “Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterter-
rorism Information,” Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2017.
[229] Office of the Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, “Infor-
mation Interoperability Framework (I2F),” version 0.5, March 2014, available
at https://www.ise.gov/resources/document-library/ise-information-
interoperability-framework, accessed May 21, 2017.
[230] Office of the State’s Attorney Judicial District of Danbury, “Report of the State’s At-
torney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary
School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012,” No-
vember 25, 2013, available at http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_
Report.pdf.
[231] M. Olama, G. Allgood, K. Davenport, and J. Schryver, “A Bayesian Belief Network of
Threat Anticipation and Terrorist Motivations,” Sensors, and Command, Control, Com-
munications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland
Defense IX, edited by E.M. Carapezza, and Proceedings of of SPIE, Vol. 7666, 2010.
[232] R. Olson, “Suicide Threats on Social Network Sites” Centre for Suicide Pre-
vention, 2011, available at http://www.sprc.org/resources-programs/suicide-
threats-social-networking-sites, accessed December 28, 2013.
[233] M. Orcutt, “Why Congress Can’t Seem to Fix This 30-Year-Old Law Governing





[234] P. Paatero and U. Tapper, “Positive matrix factorization: a non-negative factor model
with optimal utilization of error estimates of data values,” Environmetrics, volume 5, pp
111–126, 1994.
[235] R. Paffenroth, P. du Toit, R. Nong, L. Scharf, A. Jayasumana, “Space-time signal pro-
cessing for distributed pattern detection in sensor networks,” Journal of Selected Topics
in Signal Processing, vol. 6, 2013.
[236] S. Page, “Path Dependence,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, p. 87-115,
2006.
[237] M. Palin, “The other ‘imminent’ terror attacks Australia narrowly es-
caped,” December 23, 2016, http://www.news.com.au/national/crime/the-
11-imminent-terror-attacks-australia-narrowly-escaped/news-story/
86fc734df0963e21fe038c0eecce7d80, accessed 3 April 2017.
[238] H. Park, “Nonnegative Matrix Factorization: Algorithms and Applications,” SIAM
International Conference on Data Mining, 2011.
[239] G. Parnell, P. Driscoll, and D. Henderson, eds., Decision Making in Systems Engineer-
ing and Management, 2nd edition, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[240] P. Parveen, J. Evans, B. Thuraisingham, K. Hamlen, and L. Khan, “Insider Threat
Detection using Stream Mining and Graph Mining,” Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust
(PASSAT) and Proceedings of the IEEE Third International Conference on Social Com-
puting (SocialCom), 2011.
286
[241] F. Patel, “Rethinking Radicalization,” Brennan Center for Justice, New York Univer-
sity School of Law, 2011.
[242] N. Patki, R. Wedge, and K. Veeramachaneni, “The Synthetic Data Vault,” Proceedings
of the IEEE International Conference on Data Science and Advanced Analytics, 2016.
[243] J. Pearson, “Facebook Banned This Canadian Surveillance Company From Accessing
Its Data,” Motherboard, available at https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/
instagram-banned-this-canadian-surveillance-company-from-accessing-its-
data-media-sonar, accessed April 3, 2017.
[244] E. Perez and S. Prokupecz,“FBI struggling with surge in homegrown terror cases,”
CNN, May 30, 2015, accessed August 10, 2015 at http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/28/
politics/fbi-isis-local-law-enforcement.
[245] E. Perez and S. Prokupecz,“Paris attackers likely used encrypted apps, officials say,”
CNN, December 17, 2015, accessed May 30, 2017 at http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/
politics/parisattacksterroristsencryption/.
[246] Pew Research Center, “Views of Islam and extremism in the U.S. and abroad,” Feb-
ruary 16, 2017, available at http://www.people-press.org/2017/02/16/3-views-of-
islam-and-extremism-in-the-u-s-and-abroad/, accessed April 16, 2017.
[247] R. Pienta, A. Tamersoy, H. Tong, and D. Chau, “MAGE: Matching Approximate
Patterns in Richly-Attributed Graphs,” Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Big Data,
October 2014.
[248] C. Poulin, B. Shiner, P. Thompson, L. Vepstas, Y. Young-Xu, B. Goertzel, B. Watts,
L. Flashman, and T. McAllister, “Predicting the Risk of Suicide by Analyzing the Text
287
of Clinicial Notes,” PLoS ONE, Vol. 9(1), 2014, available at http://journals.plos.
org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0085733, accessed June 1, 2017.
[249] D. Pressman and J. Flockton, “Calibrating risk for violent political extremists and
terrorists: the VERA 2 structured assessment,” The British Journal of Forensic Practice,
Vol. 14(4), 2012, p. 237-251.
[250] J. Preston and M. Roston, “A Closer Look at the Bombing Suspect’s Twit-
ter Account,” New York Times, April 20, 2013, accessed March 27, 2014 at
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/dzhokhar-tsarnaevs-jahar-
twitter-account-prompts-scrutiny/.
[251] B.K. Pursel, L. Zhang, K.W. Jablokow, G.W. Choi, and D. Velegol, “Understanding
MOOC students: motivations and behaviors indicative of MOOC completion,” Journal
of Computer Assisted Learning, Vol. 32, p. 202-217, 2016.
[252] M. Reddy, R. Borum, J. Berglund, B. Vossekuil, R. Fein, and W. Modzeleski, “Eval-
uating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat As-
sessment, and Other Approaches, Psychology in Schools, vol. 38, 2001.
[253] J. Reich, “MOOC Completion and Retention in the Context of Student Intent,”
Educause Review, December 8, 2014, available at http://er.educause.edu/articles/
2014/12/mooc-completion-and-retention-in-the-context-of-student-intent,
accessed December 31, 2016.
[254] M. Reilly, “How Facebook Learns About Your Offline Life,” MIT Technology Review,
December 28, 2016, available at https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603283/how-
facebook-learns-about-your-offline-life/?utm_campaign=internal&utm_
medium=homepage&utm_source=top-stories_2&set=603276, accessed April 3, 2017.
288
[255] P. Robertson, “How ‘glaring’ intelligence failures allowed a second bout of terror
in Paris,” CNN, November 18, 2015, available at http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/18/
europe/paris-terror-attacks-intelligence-failures-robertson/, accessed July
27, 2016.
[256] J. Robinson, J. Webber, and E. Eifrem, Graph Databases, Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly
Media, Inc., 2015.
[257] P. Rosenzweig, C. Stimson, and D. Shedd, “Maintaining America’s Ability to
Collect Foreign Intelligence: The Section 702 Program,” The Heritage Foundation,
May 13, 2016, available at http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/maintaining-
americas-ability-collect-foreign-intelligence-the-section-702-program, ac-
cessed April 7, 2017.
[258] B. Ross and R. Schwartz, “Major Hasans E-mail: ‘I Cant Wait to Join You in Afterlife,
ABC News, November 19, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/major-
hasans-mail-wait-join-afterlife/story?id=9130339.
[259] R. Rossi, J. Neville, B. Gallagher, and K. Henderson, “Modeling Dynamic Behavior in
Large Evolving Graphs,” WSDM 2013, Association for Computing Machinery, February
2013.
[260] P. Rucker and R. Costa, “In Elliot Rodger, authorities in Calif. Saw warn-
ing signs but didn’t see a tipping point, The Washington Post, May 25,




[261] W. Ruderman, “Court Prompts Twitter to Give Data to Police in Threat
Case,” New York Times, 7 August 2012, accessed March 29, 2014, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/nyregion/after-court-order-twitter-
sends-data-on-user-issuing-threats.html?_r=1&.
[262] M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 2004.
[263] M. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror networks in the twenty-first century, Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
[264] M. Sageman, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,” Terrorism and Political Vio-
lence, Vol. 26(4), p. 1-16, 2014.
[265] A. Sanzgiri and D. Dasgupta, “Classification of Insider Threat Detection Techniques,”
Proceedings of the 11th Annual Cyber and Information Security Research Conference,
2016.
[266] K. Sarma, “Risk Assessment and the Prevention of Radicalization from Nonviolence
Into Terrorism,” American Psychologist, Vol. 72(3), p. 278-288, 2017.
[267] D. Schanzer, C. Kurzman, J. Toliver, and E. Miller, “The Challenge and Promise of
Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Com-
munity Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety, Final Report,”
U.S. Department of Justice report, January 2016, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017.
[268] B. Schneier, “Why Data Mining Won’t Stop Terror,” Wired, March 9, 2005, available
at https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2005/03/why_data_mining_wont.
html, accessed April 9, 2017.
290
[269] B. Schneier, “Terrorists, Data Mining, and the Base Rate Fallacy,” July 10, 2006,
available at https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/07/terrorists_data.
html, accessed April 9, 2017.
[270] J. Schram, Y. Steinbuch, and D. Fears, “Killer wife pledged allegiance to ISIS on Face-
book during attack, New York Post, December 4, 2015, available at http://nypost.com/
2015/12/04/killer-wife-in-california-massacre-swore-allegiance-to-isis/.
[271] B. Schuurman, and Q. Eijkman, “Indicators of Terrorist Intent and Capability,” Dy-
namics of Asymmetric Conflict, June 2015.
[272] R. Scrivens, G. Davies, R. Frank, and J. Mei, “Sentiment-based Identification of Rad-
ical Authors (SIRA),” Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE International Conference on Data
Mining Workshops, 2015.
[273] A. Sememov, J. Veijalainen, and J. Kyppo, “Analysing the presence of school-shooting
related communities at social media sites,” International Journal of Multimedia Intelli-
gence and Security, Vol 1, Issue 3, 2010.
[274] A. Semenov, J. Veijalainen, and A. Boukhanovsky, “A Generic Architecture for a Social
Network Monitoring and Analysis System,” IEEE International Conference on Network-
Based Information Systems, 2011.
[275] A. Semenov, A. Nikolaev, and J. Veijalainen, “Online Activity Traces Around a
“Boston Bomber,” ” IEEE and ACM Conference on Advances in Social Network Analysis
and Mining, ASONAM 2013.
[276] A. Semenov, “Principles of Social Media Monitoring and Analysis Software,” PhD
Dissertation, University of Jyväskylä, Finland, May 31, 2013.
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APPENDIX A
Reference Table for Recent Violent Extremist Attacks
A.1. Background
The pervasiveness of social media posts in the form of microblogs such as Twitter has
led researchers to the potential of detecting latent signals of human behavior. Some, in
particular, have begun to study the social media signals of ‘lone wolf’ terrorism48 and radical
violence and proposed analytical methods to detect such signals [35] [52]. In recent history,
some domestic terrorists left social media footprints, including Jared Loughner in Arizona
in 2011 and Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011 [127]. Brynielsson recently proposed the use
of a subset threat behaviors from [203] as indicators of a lone wolf’s intent to commit an
act of terror: 1) activity on a radical webpage, 2) radical expressions in postings, 3) leakage
of intent to do harm, 4) identification of oneself with a previous attacker or as an agent
of a particular cause, and 5) fixation on issue, idea, or person [35]. He also went on to
identify potential online detection methods for each of these indicators, including Bayesian
and non-Bayesian classifiers, supervised and unsupervised machine learning, and semantic
text analysis, but stopped short of providing any results [35].
To develop a basis for understanding the Tsarnaev threat signals and many others, we
compiled an open-source case study database of the digital signals of targeted violence. It
consists of 12 prominent and recent cases of targeted violence (a majority of which are
incidents of homegrown violent extremism) where online communications in some form may
had contained some latent signal of the threat. See Tables A.1-A.3. This compilation is
unique in the literature with its focus on bringing to light those available digital indicators,
48A ‘lone wolf terrorist’ is defined as “a person who acts on his or her own without orders from– or even
connections to– an organization” [37].
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with an emphasis on recent cases of homegrown violent extremism (both those carried out
as well as foiled). There are three other collections worth mentioning. First, the website
“New America” has a periodically updated dataset of U.S. terrorist plots (to include those
inspired by the jihadist ideology) [17]. A recent compilation of jihadist lone actor terrorists
can also be found in [111], which summarizes the warning signs or indicators but does not
include specifics. Additionally, [273] detailed the digital signals in 12 cases of only school
shootings from 2005 to 2009 mostly in North America and Europe. In forthcoming research,
we intend to provide a further analysis of the signals in each of the cases we covered and
their implication for future study in social media targeted violence detection.
A.2. Related Work
Many have been applying the fields of both machine learning and text analysis (or text
mining) to social media data. Twitter, a popular micro-blog, is a widely utilized data source
because of its accessibility and availability49. In the last few years, researchers have found
macro-level, crowd-sourcing correlations of Twitter data to some real world phenomenon,
including movie box office results [4], stock market performance [29], the incidence of in-
fluenza [180], and even the prevalence of depression [71]. To date, however, we have been
unable to find any research that tries to make micro-level (individual) correlations to real
world activity, which is of prime importance in lone-wolf indicator detection.
49Twitter has also made content and user information available to the police [66] [261].
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Table A.1. Recent Incidents of Targeted Violence with Social Media Signals (1 of 3)












Yes Target: US Army Soldiers
at an inprocessing center
on post. Description:
Fatally shot and killed 13
people and injured more
than 30 others
1) Exchanged 18 emails with
Awlaki [306] [258]. 2)
Developed powerpoint
presentation entitled (“The
Koranic World View as it
Relates to Muslims in the US
Military”) [307]; unknown if
it was distributed.
Yes, 2 FBI task forces
intercepted the messages,
but they and the Army
deemed them “innocent”
[306] [258].







8-Jan-11 Tucson, AZ Yes Target: US
Representative Gabrielle
Giffords. Description:
Shot and severely injured
Congresswoman Giffords,
and killed 6 people.
1) MySpace account with
216 followers. Posted
numerous disturbing
messages [22] [3]. 2) Online
private gaming forum
postings since 2010 at the
Earth Empires Massive
Multiplayer Online game site
[298] [115]. 3) YouTube
videos [22] [3].
No. Yes, some. MySpace
account was terminated,
but FBI released
documents which show the
most troubling posts and
messages as well as
described some of his
YouTube videos [3]. Online
forum posts were private
but released a few under
















Oslo killing 8 people;
Mass shooting on the
island of Utoya killing 69
people.









No Target: NYC Police and
Postal Offices.
Description: One-man
terror plot in retaliation
for the US killing of
Anwar al-Awlaki in SEP
11.
1) Noticed by police by
website postings associated
with al-Awlaki in 2009 [131]








Yes, police knew about









Yes Target: Sandy Hook
Elementary School.
Description: Lone
gunman killed 27 others
at school and home.
1) Lanza destroyed his hard
drive before the shooting
and he reportedly did not
have a Facebook or Twitter
account [288]. 2) However,
investigators recovered other
digital evidence of a
fascination with mass
shootings and entries in a













Yes Target: Boston Marathon
finishline. Pressure cooker
bombs placed at the finish
line. Description: Killed 3
and wounded 264 others.






[108]. 2) Dzokhar’s Twitter
account
https://twitter.com/J tsar
[279] [1] [84] [250].
No. 1) Tamerlan’s YouTube
videos [287] [129] [108]. 2)
Dzokhar’s tweets from
Twitter account in text
(scraped on 19 April
2013)– Note: there have
been many subsequent
tweets deleted since then
[279].
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Table A.2. Recent Incidents of Targeted Violence with Social Media Signals (2 of 3)










Yes Target: Various unit areas
on Fort Hood.
Description: Mass
shooting that killed 4, and
injured 16.
1) Facebook status under the
name Ivan Slipknot [190].
No. Yes, only the posts
highlighted in the media;
actual Facebook account
was pulled [190]. Posted
on 1 MAR 14: “I have just
lost my inner peace, full of
hatred, I think this time
the devil will take me...I
was robbed last night and
I am sure it was 2 “flacos”
(guys). Green light and









Yes Mass stabbing and
shooting in the college




suicide posted as early as
April 2014. 2) YouTube
video, “Elliot Rodger’s
Retribution” posted day of
the shooting [260] 3)
Manifesto “My Twisted
World” was emailed to
mother and therapist
minutes before shooting on
23 May, and possibly a day
before to others [196].
Yes, parents alerted
police in April 2014 due
to his videos. Police
questioned him on 30
APR, but did not search
his house [260] [196].
Also on 22 MAY,
someone posted one of
his disturbing YouTube
videos on reddit.com.
Some were alarmed but
did not warn anyone
[156].
1) Manifesto (137 pages) in




transcript in text [260]
[132]. 3) Remants of
converations on
Bodybuilding.com [132]. 4)










No Target: US Capitol
Building. Description:
Planned to plant pipe
bombs in US Capitol and
shoot people inside.
1) Twitter account(s) using
the online persona “Raheel
Mahrus Ubaydah”
@ISBlackFlags [158] [300]
[286]. 2) Links to prominent
pro-radical jihadists
including “Israfil Yilmaz,” a
prominent Dutch jihadist
fighting in Syria, and
“Muslim-Al-Britani,” the
pro-IS British fighter who
had made headlines after
flooding Twitter with
weapons-making manuals in
late 2014 [158]. 3)
Communication with
confidential informant
eventually went to a
messaging service (BBC) and
typed “I believe we should
meet up and make our own
group in alliance with the




investigated by the FBI
on a different charge
offered to reveal
information about
Cornell in exchange for
clemency. Cornwell was
arrested on 14 Jan 15
outside a gun shop after
purchasing two
semi-automatic rifles and
about 600 rounds of
ammunition. He had long
been tracked by an
undercover agent [300].
1) Yes. Some tweets
















body armor and carried
assault rifles to attack
those in the building.
1) Simpson Tweet: “May




allegiance the leader of the
faithful) (likely ISIS leader
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi) [282]
[50]. 2) Nadir Soofi
reportedly had Facebook
page (unknown) that showed
his pro-Palestine views and
devotion to Islam [321] and
his critique of US Middle
East policy [163].
Elton Simpson was
investigated by the FBI
as early as 2010 before
resurfacing on social
media with a “renewed





Garland Texas in 2013,
which prompted the FBI
send a notice to the Joint
Terrorism Task Force
that was monitoring the
event [282] [321].
1) Yes. Some tweets posted




Table A.3. Recent Incidents of Targeted Violence with Social Media Signals (3 of 3)
















Yes Target: Marines and




was armed with an AK-47
style weapon at the time
of the attack. Shot at
military recruiting center
in strip mall and drove 7
miles to Naval reserve




1) He maintained blog and
wrote 2 entries about Islam
on 13 July [322] [159]. 2) It
is suspected that Abdulazeez
tried to sanitize much of his
social media accounts before
the attack.
No. 1) Yes, some portions of
the blog were posted.



















Yes Target: Department of




bombing that killed 14
people and injured 22.
1) Malik is suspected of
sending at least 2 private
Facebook messages to friends
in Pakistan in 2012 and 2014
that were described to be
”pledging her support for
Islamic jihad and saying she
hoped to join the fight one
day” [278]. 2) On 2 Dec
2015, the day of the attack,
an account suspected to be
associated with Malik posted
on Facebook, ”We pledge
allegiance to Khalifa bu bkr
al bhaghdadi al quraishi”
[likely referring to Abu
Bakhr Al Baghdadi, leader
of ISIL) [299] [270] [94]. 3)




Facebook on 5 Nov 2015:
”No one really knows me. I
lead multiple lives and I’m
wondering when its all going
to collapse on M[e]...Involved
in terrorist plots, drugs,
antisocial behavior,
marriage, might go to prison
for fraud, etc” [299]
No. 1) Yes, small portions of
posts in a FBI affadavit
[299] No other knowledge




Case Studies of Homegrown Violent Extremism
B.1. Introduction
In this section, we present three short case studies of recent homegrown violent extremism
to provide real-world context to the modeling of on- and off-line behaviors as heterogeneous
data graphs, as well as to our investigative search approach. While these graph-based connec-
tions were established after the plot or attack in a subsequent law enforcement investigation,
we also aspire to demonstrate the analysis possible if there were a better fusion of law en-
forcement and public security databases with open-source social media. In the last case
study, we also present a preliminary analysis of the social media account of a violent extrem-
ist as a basis for illuminating the complexities of social media analysis and the importance
of examining indicators and connections beyond the text.
B.2. Case Study #1: Christopher Cornell
Christopher Lee Cornell, an example of a recent homegrown violent extremist in the
United States, was arrested by the FBI in January 2015 for allegedly planning to employ
pipe bombs at the U.S. Capitol and then open fire on nearby people. From the criminal
complaint [300] and other open sources [158], we employed a methodology called process-
tracing to identify increasing indicators of radicalization that ultimately led up Lee’s purchase
of weapons to use in a planned attack. The indicators include Lee’s activity on Twitter with
references to jihadist recruiter Al Awlaki and other homegrown terrorists, posting of Islamic
State propaganda videos, and his attack planning with an FBI confidential human source.
When the signals and indicators are combined into a heterogeneous data graph, there are a
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total of 43 nodes and 16 discernible classes in the class graph as shown in Fig. B.1 (produced
in NodeXL [289]). These classes are devised from the political science literature on potential
indicators of homegrown terrorists [116] [165] [203] [271] [285].
Figure B.1. US Capitol Attack Plot, 2015. Example class graph of Christo-
pher Lee Cornell showing the indicators and signals of his radicalization and
progress towards an attack.
B.3. Case Study #2: Sayed Farook and Tashfeen Malik
The next case study is the San Bernardino, California terrorist attack on December 2,
2015. The perpetrators Syed Farook and wife Tashfeen Malik conducted a mass shooting
and attempted bombing that killed 14 people and injured 22 at the Inland Regional Center.
Enrique Marquez has also been charged with conspiring to provide material support to ter-
rorists [299]. Just as in the Lee case, critical signals here were embedded in the perpetrators’
social media posts. For example, nearly a month before the attack, Marquez posted this
exchange on Facebook with another user: “No one really knows me. I lead multiple lives
and I’m wondering when its all going to collapse on M[e]...Involved in terrorist plots, drugs,
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antisocial behavior, marriage, might go to prison for fraud, etc.” [299]. In future work, we
propose to include n-grams or key words as nodes in the data graph. Connections to those
nodes from the social media posts serve to link the most suspicious phrases and words that
may warrant further investigation from law enforcement officials.
Figure B.2. San Bernardino Terrorist Attack, 2015. Example class graph
of Syed Farook, Tashfeen Malik, and Enrique Marquez showing the indicators
and signals of their collective radicalization and preparations for the attack.
It is also interesting to note that the indicators of radicalization and attack preparations
were not present in just a single individual, but in all three. This case study points outs
that conspiratorial graph patterns (match complementarity over more than one query focus
node) are not addressable by current matching notions. As part of our on-going work in
investigative graph simulation, we propose to identify these types of conspiracy cells through
query-focus node clusters matching.
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B.4. Case Study#3: Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were the prime suspects in the explosions at the Boston
Marathon on April 15, 2013 that killed three people and wounded around 250 others. The
former was killed by Boston Police four days later, and the latter was taken into custody. It
was later revealed that Russian intelligence had made vague warnings to both the FBI and
the CIA in 2011 about Tamerlan becoming increasingly radical with connections to jihadists
in Dagestan [104] [150]. The FBI subsequently interviewed Tamerlan and conducted an
assessment by “check[ing] US government databases and other information to look for such
things as derogatory telephone communications, possible use of online sites associated with
the promotion of radical activity, associations with other persons of interest, travel history
and plans, and education history,” but found no evidence of terrorism [104].
In the investigation that followed the bombing, authorities discovered that both suspects
had a presence in social media: Tamerlan had his own YouTube page, and Dzhokhar was
active on his Twitter account [287] and less so on the Russian personal profile site called
vk.com [275]. Since then, many people have tried to manually analyze these data sources50,
specifically Dzhokhar’s Tweets, in order to determine whether they contained any hints of
their motivations or intentions [1] [84] [250]. However, despite the recent detailed exami-
nation of the Tsarnaev brothers’ social media footprint that exposed suspicious tweets and
linkages to jihadist media, there does not seem to be a consensus that one would have been
able to single them out in advance as an imminent danger. Of interest, then, is whether
NMF has the potential to reveal the hidden topics which could indicate the seriousness of
the threat.
50Additionally, the psychologist James Pennebaker attempted to apply automated linguistic tools and the
detection of pronouns to determine when Dzhokhar may have started plotting the attack [305].
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B.4.1. Preliminary social media analysis.
B.4.1.1. Related Work. This work is a preliminary effort to introduce NMF on Twitter
data as an anomaly detection method of key indicators of lone wolf terrorism. It is part of a
larger research effort to develop a semi-automated anomaly detection system of these threat
indicators using multiple social media sources.
Many have been applying the fields of both machine learning and text analysis (or text
mining) to social media data. Twitter, a popular micro-blog, is a widely utilized data source
because of its accessibility and availability51. In the last few years, researchers have found
macro-level, crowd-sourcing correlations of Twitter data to some real world phenomenon,
including movie box office results [4], stock market performance [29], the incidence of in-
fluenza [180], and even the prevalence of depression [71]. To date, however, we have been
unable to find any research that tries to make micro-level (individual) correlations to real
world activity, which is of prime importance in lone-wolf indicator detection.
NMF was first introduced by Paatero in 1994 [234] as an alternative decomposition
technique for producing low-rank approximations, and was made more prominent by Lee
and Seung in 1999 [186]. One of the appeals of this method is the natural interpretability of
the purely additive results [181], which researchers have found many applications for: image
processing, hyperspectral imaging, signal processing, and even bioinformatics [119] [238].
Others have since made considerable progress in using NMF for text mining, to include
topic detection and document clustering [238] on large volumes of text including medical
abstracts[181], newswire posts [181], corporate emails [21].
51Twitter has also made content and user information available to the police [66] [261].
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More recently, researchers have been examining modified NMF methods specifically to
improve topic detection or document cluster for microblogs (short texts), which tend to have
very sparse term-document matrices [317] [316] [303].
B.4.1.2. Approach. Term-Document Matrix. The term-document matrix is a method
to turn text data into a representation suitable for learning algorithms and classification
tasks; it is often referred to as the vector space model [189]. Each document (or tweet) is
represented by a vector of terms (or words). The collection of documents forms a matrix
A ∈ Rm×n, where m is the number of distinct terms and n is the number of documents.
Each entry of the matrix aij is the weight of word i in document j. We simply use aij = fij,
where fij is the frequency of word i in document j. However, there are other schemes such
as Boolean weighting (where aij=1 if the word occurs in the document, 0 otherwise), or
tf-idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency).
Nonnegative Matrix Factorization. NMF is the method of creating low-rank approxima-
tions of a matrix A by finding nonnegative factors W ∈ Rm×k and H ∈ Rk×n. The desired
rank of the approximation, k  min(m,n), is determined by the user and also serves as
the number of (hidden) topics in the corpus [181]. The factorization is done by solving the
following nonlinear optimization problem [181].
min ‖A−WH||2F
s.t. W ≥ 0
H ≥ 0
(17)
Unfortunately, because this formulation is convex in W and H but not both, it is difficult to
find the global minimum. The matrix W ∈ Rm×k is particularly informative. Each column
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of W contains the set of words found simultaneously in several documents [119] and acts as
a basis vector of words for the dataset.
We also wanted to examine the effectiveness of a modified NMF procedure for short texts
such as Twitter entries in order to overcome the sparsity of the original A matrix.
This involves first constructing the term-correlation matrix S ∈ Rm×m and then factoring
this matrix into U and UT [317]. In this case, the optimization problem is the following
[317]
min ‖S−UUT ||2F
s.t. U ≥ 0
(18)
Algorithms. There are a variety of algorithms to solve (17), including multiplicative update
algorithms, gradient descent algorithms, and the alternating least squares algorithms (ALS)
[20] [6]. Initially, we chose the latter due to its speed and simplicity.
It is important to point out that the NMF is not unique, meaning that both resulting
factors W and H can vary depending upon the particular local minima the algorithm arrives
at [181]. Furthermore, the method of initialization of W and H in NMF algorithms also has
impacts on its speed and accuracy. We initially chose the simple random initialization of W
from [186] (all that is required for ALS), but intend to test others in future work.
Algorithm 7: ALS NMF Algorithm
Input: Term-Document Matrix A and max iter
Output: Term-Topic Matrix W and Topic-Document Matrix H
1 Initialize W as a random dense matrix;
2 for i← 1 to max iter do
3 Solve matrix equation WTWH = WTA for H;
4 Set all negative elements of (H) to 0;
5 Solve matrix equation HHTWT = HAT for W;
6 Set all negative elements of (W) to 0;
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B.4.1.3. Experiments. Experimental Set-up. We accessed the publicly available Twitter
dataset of “J star,” which has been confirmed to be the account of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one
of the two alleged Boston Marathon bombers [279]. This dataset contains 1055 entries made
from 10/25/2011 to 4/17/2013. Most tweets were in English, but 6 entries were written in
Russian. We proceeded to convert the data into a text-document matrix using the Text to
Matrix Generator (TMG), a MATLAB toolbox [296] [323]. TMG allows the removal of stop
words (common, short function words), but cannot process the 6 non-English entries. The
resulting matrix A ∈ R2689×1049 is a collection of 2689 terms in 1049 tweets as shown in
Figure B.3. The matrix has a density of 0.00197.
Figure B.3. Term document matrix of “J star” Twitter account.
Furthermore, we also constructed the term correlation matrix S ∈ R2689×2689. However,
because there were more terms than documents in the original matrix (m > n), the term-
correlation matrix S resulted in a matrix that had only a slightly higher density of 0.00464
as shown in Figure B.4. While m < n was the unspecified assumption in [317] (which may
not be valid in many social media datasets for a single individual), we nevertheless decided
to proceed with this modified NMF approach in order to examine the result.
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Figure B.4. Term correlation matrix of “J star” Twitter account.
We performed nonnegative matrix factorizations of A into W and H, and S into U and
UT using the alternating least squares algorithm [20] [6]. We initially chose rank k = 15,
which also serves as the number of (hidden) topics in the corpus [181]. In the future, we
intend to vary this parameter and analyze the effect of masking or revealing more topics.
Results. First, Table B.1 contains many of the Twitter usernames of those whom
Dzohkhar directed his message (with an “@” symbol), or those whose messages he re-tweeted
(“RT”). For example, “montana,” “copdawholethang,” “alanhungover,” “drjohnyblaze,”
“therealabdul,” “sotirop evi,” “xxjungaxx,” “troycrossley,” “wonkatweets,” “crispylips212”
are all such usernames. We had intentionally left these usernames in the term-document
matrix in order to gain insight on the predominant words associated with these individuals,
but after seeing the results it might have been better to remove these ‘mentions’ because it
limits the topics to substantive words. For example, usernames alone take up 2-3 of the top
6 highest weighter terms in some topics.
Second, we focus our analysis on topic W6 in Table B.1 not only because it is a good
example to explain what the NMF does to produce each of the k topics, but because it
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also addresses the police. The expletive “fu**” appeared many times in the corpus, but
it co-occurred several times with “wit” (sic for “with”), “tho” (sic for “though”), as well
as “police.” This demonstrates that stopword removal in the pre-processing step must be
improved because it did not work on misspelled words. It also reveals that Dzhokhar used the
expletive with regard to the police several times in the corpus, which we verified semantically
in examining the actual messages.
Third, we are still examining the results in Table B.2 (using the modified NMF procedure
for short texts on the term-correlation matrix). We notice that there are less usernames
listed, but also that the terms no longer seem related to the frequency of occurrence in the
data. For example, the terms in W14 in Table B.2 all came from just a single tweet. We will
continue to evaluate the usefulness of the short text procedures or how they can be improved
to give a more intuitive result.
Overall, the rest of the topics in both Tables seem to be typical of young millennials and
do not show linkages to any of the warning behaviors for lone wolf terrorism as identified in
[35].
The first set of results is from the NMF of the term-document matrix. Table B.1 shows
the 6 highest weighted terms in each topic (basis) vector. The second set of results is from
the NMF of the term-correlation matrix. Table B.2 shows the 6 highest weighted terms in
each topic (basis) vector.
On the surface, it appears that there is nothing about the topics detected that would lead
one to suspect that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev would participate in radical violence as a lone wolf
terrorist. However, there are a few points of interest worth mentioning specifically related
to how the NMF worked on the dataset and the insights they give to us for future work.
313
Table B.1. NMF results of term-document matrix
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
baby say don doesn shit
montana hate amp matter real
nigga things care tell hate
copda-wholethang turn sleep hell drjohnny-blaze
today guess alanhung-over met fake
food idiot think feel niggas
W6 W7 W8 W9 W10
fu** kid money therealabdul xxjungaxx
wit wavyy dont evi lol
tho tho need sotirop troycrossley
police tsar sex fast bro
wonkatweets basiklee ahaha yea bad
ahaha yea honey aha show
W11 W12 W13 W14 W15
wait dudes beautiful love http
twitter dam girl heart earthpix
text hit guy dont amp
complain think crispylips-212 meant find
texting guy2 thing twins amazing
guy2 heart woman cats close
B.5. Conclusions and Insights on Real-World Investigative Search
. These two case studies provide a real-world context to the challenges of applying graph
pattern matching to aid in the search for homegrown violent extremists. In particular,
constructing the query is problematic because almost all existing graph pattern matching
approaches rely on certainty in the query and do not have a categorical node labeling struc-
ture for indicators. Between the two case studies, one can discern the variability in the
presence of indicators as well as the significant number of nodes which might be classified
as ‘individually innocuous but related activities.’ Investigative simulation seeks to address
these issues by allowing for partial matches of a comprehensive indicator query, suggesting
node categories for investigative searches, and pruning or augmenting the match relation to
produce sensible matches and less false positives.
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Table B.2. NMF results of term-correlation matrix
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
stop baby chicken don fake
street montana egg money eyes
cleaning today letting need isn
noparking-spacesleft guy decided head mouth
rest future hatch themike-derby amp
streets black surface thing distinguish
W6 W7 W8 W9 W10
kids haven game coming phones
tell room ohjeyy jjr stopped
entertain-ment shits cheater undeniable guys
faces seen french school hit
finish wear request crucial attention
permit didn retard goingham paying
W11 W12 W13 W14 W15
video person zombie den kid
games 1year apocalypse aggy wavyy
jordans aging dream andthatsfast tsar
meekmili appears 1st clicked smh
sports brooke base spanish basiklee
wanting greenberg triggered stds dat
There are several areas we intend to pursue in the future. First, we propose the functional
decomposition of a semi-supervised threat topic detection system in texts as shown in Fig.
B.5. The threat lexicon filter (provided through supervised machine learning) is designed to
separate out the possibly relevant documents from the irrelevant by examining the presence
of suspicious keywords. An analyst can visually inspect for any temporal trends in keyword
frequency, and then select the subset of documents for topic detection. The resultant topics
are again inspected by an analyst for suspiciousness and identified for further investigation.
Within this system, we will continue to experiment with more short text NMF techniques
to this dataset to determine if there is an improvement in the results. This includes testing
a previously-proposed Ncut weighting scheme for the term-document matrix [317] and the
Hadamard Product of Similarities [303]. We will also apply different algorithms as well as
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explore the affect of the deliberate imposition of sparsity on the clarity of the detected topics
[137].
Figure B.5. Functional decomposition of the topic detection system.
Second, we intend to examine the possibility of systematically incorporating special texts
and context into the anomaly detection. While we observe that the topics derived from
just the tweeted words may not contain a detectable signal for the lone wolf terrorism, we
suspect that the signals could be hidden in special text and non-text context of the Twitter
corpus. This is evidenced by a few examples of suspicious tweets that our topic detection
methods did not identify. 1) In March 2013, Tsarnaev wrote “September 10th baby, you
know what tomorrow is. Party at my house!,” which seems to imply a celebration about the
September 11th terrorist attacks [84]. 2) In April 2012 Tsarnaev wrote in Russian “I will die
young” [1]. 3) Finally, Tsarnaev had been following a Twitter user named “Al firdausiA”
(translated: “the highest level of Paradise, Allah willing”), who had encouraged followers to
listen to Anwar Awlaki, an American-born al Qaeda terrorist [287]. If an anomaly detection
system could pick-up on these special contexts in addition to the words in the Twitter corpus,
perhaps it could better signal the potential threat of violence.
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Beyond this, our broader research effort seeks to apply anomaly detection analysis through
social media of all forms targeted violence, of which ’lone wolf’ terrorism is only one type.
Targeted violence is a “violent incident where both the perpetrator and target(s) are identi-
fied or identifiable prior to the incident” [252]. As in [203], we hope to also consider detection
of potential work place violence, campus and university violence, school shootings, adolescent
and adult mass murder. We also seek to develop a larger, semi-automated anomaly detec-
tion system of these threat indicators using multiple social media sources (such as Facebook,
MySpace, YouTube) and mediums (such as text, videos, and network connections).
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APPENDIX C
Codebook Excerpt from Klausen’s Radicalization Trajectories
Dataset
The following is a direct excerpt from [168] of the definitions of the 27 features we utilized
in our data analysis.
Year of Birth This field is a numeric variable that tracks the year in which an individual
was born. If the exact year is known and available, enter the full year. If a source document
only provides an individuals age, subtract the age from the year in which the source was
published. If age and year of birth are both unknown, leave the field blank.
Convert Date This field tracks the approximate date at which an individual marked
converted to Islam. If information is not available, enter the year in which an individual
claimed their conversion to Islam. If there is no available information pertaining to conver-
sion, but the individual did convert to Islam enter Unknown. This should be left blank if the
individual is not a convert to Islam. Dates of conversion to other religions are not included
here. Year of conversion and year of radicalization should not be assumed to be identical.
Pre-Radicalization : The initial stage in the radicalization trajectories is Pre-Radicalization.
This is hallmarked by searching behavior indicative of cognitive opening.
Disillusionment This field tracks the first verifiable date at which an individual began
to overtly express disillusionment with world affairs, religion, or Western society. Expres-
sion of disillusionment could be made evident in various ways, either virtually or in real-life.
Possible cues include disdain towards mainstream societal trends, opposition to Democracy
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or political ideals, expressed anger in regards to the oppression and behaviors of other Mus-
lims, etc. Cues used to code this field are not clearly ideological. Record the first instance
if an individual takes part in a political protest on a certain date, but it is evident that the
individual has taken part in prior protest activity, investigate further to ascertain when the
behavior began taking place.
Trauma This field tracks a discrete occurrence of adverse personal circumstances yielding
feelings of self-dissatisfaction or introspection. To be coded in this field, the event must take
place at a set point in time (ex., death of a loved one, personal injury or illness, separation
from spouse or of parents, etc.) The event must have an impact on the individual.
Personal Crisis This field tracks the date range during which an individual experienced
adverse personal circumstances yielding self-dissatisfaction or introspection. Personal crisis
must be catalyzed by continuous, prolonged phenomenon (ex., incarceration, drug addiction,
unemployment, homelessness, etc.). Personal crisis might also entail a more covert pattern
of “searching behavior,” such as seeking out new a new ideology (though not necessarily
focused on Islam).
Information Seeking This field tracks the earliest known date on which an individual
began actively seeking out sources of Jihadist information (ex., downloading or procuring
Jihadist literature, opening dialogue with extremist figures, seeking out new friendship on a
doctrinal basis, seeking out a more radical place of worship, etc.). Information seeking might
take place virtually through an online platform, in a real-life community setting, or both.
New Religious Authority This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual
began actively seeking out and adhering to new figures of religious authority. This might be
indicated by overt signs (ex., direct support via personal communication), or by more passive
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measures (ex., attending, reading, or listening to material produced by spiritual authority
figures). Unlike “information seeking” as described in the previous column, seeking out
new authority focuses on a specific figure and entails ideological motivation on part of the
individual. Nevertheless, the two are not mutually exclusive.
Stage 1 : The first stage of radicalization is denoted by detachment from previous life
and combined with changes to daily life, combined with experiencing revelations regarding
the ideology.
Ideological Rebellion This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual
began acting out against and detaching from formerly central life figures. To be coded in
this field, the action must be idealized, ex. picking fights with Imams, mosque members, or
parents in regard to increased piety.
Lifestyle Changes This field tracks the first outward indication of an individuals move-
ment towards radical ideology, such as through change in clothing (ex., beginning to wear
kaftan or niqab; grows a beard or starts wearing trousers cut above the ankle (males only)),
abstention from food/substances deemed haram, or sudden overt changes to expressions of
religious piety. Please note that these examples are examples and overt behavioral life styles
changes vary widely based on an individual’s prior activities and interests.
Note: the following three (3) fields are not mutually exclusive of one another, but track
different versions of disengagement from mainstream employment or study. As such, each
field applies to different subsets of individuals. “Dropout” is only applicable for individuals
who are enrolled in an educational institution, while “underemployment” only applies to
people who are employed.
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Occupational/Educational Disengagement This field tracks the most exact date on
which an individual began to disengage from responsibilities at school or work. This field
requires discretion and inference in coding, and will often not be immediately apparent.
Possible cues include, but are not limited to failure to adhere to occupational or educational
obligations, suddenly falling grades, being placed on academic or occupational probation,
and excessive hostility towards colleagues or superiors in professional environment.
School Dropout This field tracks the most exact date at which an individual officially
disassociated from their educational responsibilities. Possible indicators include, but are not
limited to withdrawal from classes or educational program and dismissal from occupation or
education program.
Underemployment This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual com-
menced employment at a job lacking skill or trade knowledge requirements, and sought such
employment on an ideological basis. Not all service or manual workers are coded in this
field. Only enter a value if the individual sought underemployment under the premise that
such work would not interfere with religious beliefs or obligations, or did so in order to travel
abroad or to provide support to an extremist organization.
Da’wah Virtual This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual began
disseminating extremist material in an online setting (ex., publishing or recirculating mate-
rial on social media). To be considered in this field, the dissemination must be active. For
example, an individual who reads material published by extremist hubs but does not repub-
lish that information would be coded under “information seeking,” whereas an individual
who republishes that information would be considered in this field.
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Da’wah Real Life This field tracks the approximate date at which an individual began
actively taking part in the dissemination of extremist material. This might include encour-
aging friends and family to adopt more orthodox beliefs, handing out literature in public
places, espousing radical beliefs to a group of people, etc.
Stage 2 : The second stage of radicalization is the time during which an individual leaves
home to become closer to a peer group of like-minded individuals. They seek out ways to
demonstrate their commitment to the new ideological community and its mission.
Epiphany This field tracks the most accurate date at which an individual starts broad-
casting a personal revelation or proclaims a revelation that participation in violent Jihad is
a necessary and imperative individual obligation.
Peer-Immersion This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual began
seeking out and associating with a group of like-minded individuals, such as through cohab-
itation or by spending increased amounts of time with the group. Peer-immersion can take
place either in a virtual setting or in real-life. Peer-immersion is often preceded by a dis-
association from former social settings, sometimes made evident through “lifestyle changes”
or “rebellion.” The group with which a radicalizing individual associates is often perceived
by the individual as more ideologically knowledgeable than the subject.
Domestic Physical Training This field tracks the date at which an individual first took
part in domestic training for militant action, either by participating in training exercises
with a group of like-minded individuals (ex. shooting practice, weight training, etc.), or
by otherwise cultivating useful battlefield skills (ex., enrollment in nursing/EMT classes).
Training in this category is typically general in nature, rather than being tied to a specific
organization, location, or group.
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Marriage Seeking This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual began
actively seeking, or expressed interest in seeking, a like-minded spouse following the precepts
of the Jihadist ideology.
Societal Disengagement This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual
began actively dissociating from political or societal obligations. Unlike “disillusionment,”
this field denotes active abstention from societal processes, generally subsequent to expressed
disdain. Societal disengagement occurs due to either belief that such engagement goes against
religious ideals (ex., not voting under the premise that democracy is forbidden to Muslims),
or associated rules of the extremist belief system such as that such engagement supports
action against like-minded persons or groups (ex., paying taxes is “forbidden”).
Desire for Action This field tracks the most exact date on which and individual first
expresses desire to take part in extremist action (ex., foreign fighting, financial support,
domestic plot, etc.), but occurs prior to the development of concrete plans.
Stage 3 : The final stage of radicalization is when the individual attempts or enacts
violent action, or joins a terrorist group abroad or attempts to join a group. They actively
support another person carrying out violent action on behalf of the ideology.
Non-Violent Support This field tracks the date at which an individual first lent tangi-
ble non-violent support to a terrorist group or organization (ex., by fundraising or smuggling
materiel).
Joins Foreign Insurgency This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual
travels abroad, or is known to have traveled abroad with the intention of taking part in an
overseas extremist insurgency.
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Issues Threats This field tracks the most exact date on which an individual issues
violent threats, either broad or specific, against another individual or group of individuals.
Threats considered in this category must occur subsequent to radicalization and must be
made in connection with an extremist organization or ideology.
Steps Towards Violence This field tracks the most exact date on which an individ-
ual began actively preparing to carry out action on behalf of an extremist organization or
ideology.
Date of Criminal Action This field tracks the specific date in which an individual
partook in terrorism-related activity. Terrorism related activity includes, but is not limited
to, religiously motivated violent acts, violent intent, fraud, smuggling, robbery, proselytiza-
tion, incitement, or travel occurring after the individual has been radicalized. Enter the last
chronologically occurring date from the following:
• Year of plot. In the case that an individual has partaken in multiple terrorist
activities, use the final date.
• Permanent relocation abroad, but only when that relocation is related to foreign
fighting or joining an overseas insurgency.
• Death. Do not include date of death when not related to terrorist activity (ex.,
natural causes).
Arrest Date This field tracks the specific date in which an individual was arrested and
taken into custody by law enforcement officials for involvement in terrorism-related activity.
Terrorism related activity includes, but is not limited to, religiously motivated violent acts,
violent intent, fraud, smuggling, robbery, incitement, or travel occurring after the individual
324
has been radicalized. This may also include being charged in absentia in the case of foreign
fighters.
Sentencing Date This field tracks the year in which an individual received a penal
sentence relating to involvement in terrorist activity. This is only applicable when the in-
dividuals arrest and trial related to terrorist activity resulted in sentencing. Sentences to
deportation or being sentenced in absentia are reflected in this field as well. This variable
should be left blank if the sentencing has not yet occurred, but it is scheduled for a future
date.
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